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Abstract
The Law of the Sea negotiation, which was instigated as a response to increased
human activities at sea, was an international law making process. The negotiation
has been described as the longest, most techncally complex, continuous negotiation
attempted in modem times. It was attended by almost all states in the world and
contained a series of complex and overlapping issues. It was a remarkably
successful process in that it concluded with an agreement, which protagonists with
different interests and objectives succeeded in producing after 27 years.
This thesis analyses international relations and negotiation theories that relate to
the Law of the Sea negotiation, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each
body of theory. The work goes on to examine the most importnt aspets of the Law
of the Sea negotiation, including why the negotiation started, the core issues and
principal actors of the negotiation, the process up until 1980 when the draft Treaty
was devised, the American rejection of the Treaty and the process which led to the
final agreement of 1994. The work then looks at these individual aspects of the
negotiation in the context of the examination of international relations theory and
negotiation theory that relates to the Law of the Sea.
The thesis concludes by proposing a model that explains the Law of the Sea
negotiation. The model questions existing theory on the meaning of the state and
states' status in international society.
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Background to the Theoretical
Review
1. Introduction
Historically, human activities at sea were limited and consequently so was the
need for rules governng sea use. As human activities at sea dramatically increased
however, the effects of these activities became both far reaching and global and
could therefore no longer be ignored.
The Law of the Sea negotiation, which was convened as a response to increased
human activities at sea, was an interntional law making process. The negotiation
has been described as 'the longest, most techncally complex, continuous
negotiation attempted in modem times.'l It was attended by almost all the states in
the world and contained a series of complex and overlapping issues. It was a
remarkably successful process in that it concluded with an agreement, which
protagonists with different interests and objectives succeeded in producing after 27
years.
In addition to sea use other human activities now have global implications; for
example the effect of buring fossil fuels on climate change. As a result,
contemporary international society will deal more frequently with the type of
international negotiation which produced the Law of the Sea Convention (Treaty) in
1982 along with its amendment in 1994 which allowed the Convention to gain
lRobert L. Friedheim, Negotiating the New Ocean Regime (Columbia, South Carolina; University of
South Carolina Press, 1993), p. 5. The provisions of the Convention embrace almost all human
concerns with the sea use. See also Ellot L. Richardson, 'Preface', in Markus G. Schmidt, Common
universal acceptance. International society therefore needs to fully understand the
process by which the Law of the Sea negotiation was successfully concluded.
The aim of this thesis is to make a detailed theoretical analysis of the' Law of the
Sea negotiation process in an attempt to understad the process in the context of
international relations and negotiation theory. In order to make this analysis the
following steps were taken:
1. International relations theory and negotiation theory that relates to the
Law of the Sea negotiation was reviewed,
2. The most importnt aspects of the Law of the Sea negotiation were
reviewed.
3. Each of the aspets of the negotiation were examined in relation to the
theory reviewed in stage one.
4. Based on stages one, two, and three a framework for explaining the
Law of the Sea negotiation was developed.
Chapters one to three contain the review of the relevant international relations
and negotiation theories. Based on this review the Law of the Sea negotiation is
examined in detail in chapters four to eight. In chapter nine a frmework for
explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation is presented. Chapter ten concludes the
thesis. More specifically chapter one includes a background to the theoretical
review~ chapter two examines current attempts and frameworks to explain the Law
of the Sea negotiation in international relations theory~ chapter thee details curent
attempts and frameworks to explain the Law of the Sea negotiation by negotiation
theory; chapter four examines why the negotiation started~ chapter five examines
major issues, particularly the core issues and principal 'actors' of the negotiation~
chapter six outlines the negotiation process up until 1980, when the Draft
,
Convention was devised~ chapter seven examines the United States' rejection of the
Heritage or Common Burden?: The United States Position on the Development of a Regime for Deep
SeabedMining in the La of the Sea Convention (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); p. v,
2
Convention in 1982; and chapter eight examines the process that led to the final
agreement of 1994. Chapter nine discusses the issues which emerged from the
detailed examination of the Law of the Sea negotiation and presents a framework
for explanation of the process. Chapter ten concludes the thesis.
Prior to commencing the theoretical review the next section of this chapter
contains a brief background to the Law of the Sea negotiation. The purpose of this
section is merely to provide the background necessary for understanding the
theoretical review that follows and a much more detailed analysis of the Law of the
Sea negotiation takes place in chapters four to eight.
2. Background to the theoretical review
The Law of the Sea negotiation was initiated at the United Nations in order to
solve problems relating to increased use of the world's seas whose resources,
although once considered abundant, were now realised as limited. This changing
perception of the sea and the subsequent disputes among states over sea use had
intensified aftr the Second World War. The negotiation, which began in 1967 at
the United Nations, lasted for 27 years and within this period there were many
political, economic and technological changes in the world which inevitably
influenced the negotiation.
Man's use of the sea had developed rapidly after the Second World War. Before
that time use of the sea was limited, with activity concentrated on its sudace for
navigation and fishing. Navigation interests were mainly held by maritime states,
such as the United Kingdom and the United States. These maritime states had either
strong navies or numerous commercial vessels for foreign transporttion, or both,
and in order to secure their free movements on the sea had a strong interest in
maintaining the existing principles which governed sea use, namely the three-mile
3
territorial seas2 and freedom of the high seas. These principles, which had lasted for
three centuries, meant that within three miles of their coastlines states had
jurisdiction, whereas beyond three miles every vessel was given free navigation.
After the Second World War the status quo of sea use was challenged by the
Truman Proclamation. The Proclamation declared that the continental shelf of the
United States was an extension of its land-mass. This meant extending United States
jursdiction over the continental shelf, which in fact stretched out far beyond three
miles. The United States however maintained the three miles terrtorial seas,
meaning that although it claimed jurisdiction to the extent of its continental shelf, it
did not claim jurisdiction of the water colum above it, except within the three mile
limit. The purpse of the Truan Proclamation was to promote investments in
exploiting natual resources, mainly oil, on the continenta shelf These resources
were intended to replace those which had been used in large quantities for the war
effort. After the Truan Proclamation many states followed suit and extended
national jurisdiction over their continental shelves. These extensions of national
jurisdiction were also a reflection of the fact that technology was undergoing a
period of rapid development and exploitation of resources on the continental shelf
was becoming feasible.
Just aftr the Truman Proclamation there was another development in Latin
America which also challenged the status quo of sea use. Chile, Peru and Ecuador,
because of fishing interests, claimed a two-hundred miles maritime zone over their
adjacent seas, including the water column of the area. What was meant by a
maritime zone was never actually defined but it appeared that what they claimed
2The terntorial sea is a marine space over which coastal states exercise sovereignty. This sovereignty
extends to an adjacent belt of sea: described as the terntorial sea, to the airspace over the terntorial
4
was in fact equivalent to a two-hundred miles territorial sea.3 This was a concerted
action by the three states and similar claims spread quite quickly throughout the rest
of the South American continent.
It was under these circumstances of challenge to the existing principles and in
order to establish new rules of sea use, that in 1958 the First Law of the Sea
Conference was held. This 1958 Conference, despite reaching a compromise on
national jurisdiction over the continental shelf, failed to reach agreement on the
issues of breadth of terrtorial sea and states' jursdiction over fisheries. This failure
to reach agreement was largely a reflection of the high tension of the Cold War and
the difference in capabilty between the navies of East and West. At the time the
Soviet Union was not a maritime state and therefore insisted on twelve miles
territorial sea in an attempt to keep other states' navies away from its shorelines. On
the other hand, the United States and other western states wanted narrower
territorial seas in order to maintain as much navigational freedom as possible for
their navies. These unsolved items led to the Second Law of the Sea Conference in
1960, however, once again this failed to reach agreement. Regardless of the absence
of a formal agreement, however, an increasing number of states began, in various
forms of national jursdiction seawards, to claim more than three miles terrtorial
seas.
By the early sixties the Soviet Union had itself become a maritime state and as a
result its concerns, despite the Cold War, became more aligned with those of the
United States, and both states became increasingly concerned with the expanding
claims of national jurisdiction seawards, often called 'creeping jurisdiction'. As a
. sea as well as to its bed and subsoiL.
3Schmidt,op. cif., p. 21.
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result, in 1967, the United States and the Soviet Union informally discussed the
threat posed to maritime states, namely that 'creeping jurisdiction' would impede
their naval and commercial vessels' mobilty, especially in international straits. Both
states had realised that if the breadth of the territorial sea became wider than three
miles many important interntional straits such as the Strait of Gibraltar, which is
only eight miles wide, might be overlapped on both sides by territories of coastal
states. Such a sitution would not only impede their ships but would also mean tht
their submarines could not pass though those straits while submerged,4 or their
aircraft fly through without the consent of coastal states. Even if the extension of
national jursdiction was only of the fishing zone, and not an extension of terrtorial
seas, there were stil possibilities that coastal states might intervene with the passage
of foreign navies in the name of protecting their fisheries. The United States and the
Soviet Union therefore tried to stop the extension of coastal states' national
jurisdiction, but without success. The problem was that although these two states
were anous about producing agreement on the limits of national jursdiction, many
non-maritime states wanted to keep their national jurisdiction as wide as possible in
order to secure resources in their adjacent seas.
There was another issue in the 1960s which impacted on the existing principles
of sea use and that was the exploitation of resources on the deep seabed which lay
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. It was the Maltese Ambassador to the
United Nations, Arid Pardo's initiative at the United Nations General Assembly in
1967, that first directed states' attention to this issue. Pardo advocated that the deep
seabed, which is the area beyond national jurisdiction, be regarded as the 'Common
Heritage of Mankind'. He suggested that the untold mineral resources in the form of
4ohe Territorial Sea Convention of 1958, Aricle 14 paragraph 6.
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manganese nodules5 lying on the seabed should be exploited for the benefit of
human beings, and particularly developing states. The possibilty of deep seabed
development was not new and had in fact been first highlighted not by Pardo, but by
John Mero who, in 1965, published his infuential book The Míneral Resources of
the Sea. Mero estimated that there were 1.66 trillon tons of nodules in the Pacific
alone,6 that deep seabed mining could start at any time and that it would be a
profitable investment since 'there should be no major problems in adapting existing
industrial equipment and processing to the mining and processing of manganese
nodules,.7 The existence of manganese nodules on the ocea floor had been known
since the 19th centur, however, the viability of deep seabed mining had not
previously been seriously considered because the technology to exploit them had
not been available. Even at the time of the book's publication Mero's idea was still
premature because technology for deep seabed mining needed much more
development. Nonetheless his idea inspired interest in deep seabed mining and
under these circumstances Pardo's speech was 'both timely and well conceived. ,8
Pardo's proposal received mixed reactions.9 The developing countries, which had
formed the Group of 77 as a vehicle to pit their interests against those of the
developed states, generally welcomed it, however in the industrialised states the
reaction was less than enthusiastic. In the United States, Pardo's Common Heritage
idea was considered to 'handicap US industr and dampen its enthusiasm,.10 In
addition, Latin Americans feared that detailed discussion of Pardo's initiative at the
5More presicely they are called poly metallc nodules. Their commercial exploitation has yet to begin.6John L. Mero, The Mineral Resources of the Sea (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1965), pp. 174-175.
7Ibid., p. 277.
8Schmidt,op. cit., pp. 23-24.
9See, Said Mahmoudi, The Law of 
Deep Sea-Bed Mining: A Study of the Progressive Development
of International Law Concerning the Management of the polymetallc Nodules of the Sea-Bed
(Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987), pp. 121-122. .
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United Nations might raise the question of the breadth of national jurisdiction and
this might adversely affect them. The reason for ths was that the breadth of national
jurisdiction, as well as the status of the high seas, were closely related to deep
seabed mining. In order to define the area of the seabed, which was defined as that
lying beyond national jursdiction, the breadth of national jurisdiction needed to be
determined. This logic frightened some Latin American states with two-hundred
miles claims, because they feared that they might be forced to compromise to a
narower limit. They were therefore against proposals made at the United Nations
for a moratorium on national claims and also against establishing a boundary for the
international seabed area. This sitution caused a rift among the developing
countres of South America and other developing states who hoped for an
international seabed area as wide as possible in order to maximise the benefit
accrued from the exploitation of it. Consequently the developing countries as a
whole were unable to tae a unified position on the breadth of national jursdiction.
As a result, the developing countries ignored this problem and insisted on deciding
the deep seabed regime, that is the system which would govern deep seabed mining,
without having defined the limits of national jurisdiction. The developed countries
on the other hand insisted on the need to first define the boundaries of national
jurisdiction, since this would provide their vessels with orderly navigation. In
addition, the developed states argued that it would be meaningless to discuss the
deep seabed regime without first defining the boundaries.
Pardo's speech led to the establishment, in 1968, of the Seabed Committee within
the United Nations. In terms of the deep seabed regime, especially of the machinery
to control deep seabed mining, the developed states favoured a very weak
lOSchmidt, op. cif., pp. 24-25.
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machinery, of registry or licensing. Some developing states on the other hand, such
as India and Kuwait, insisted on a strong machinery which could directly exploit
deep seabed resources. This discussion was a reflection of the difference in
capability of deep seabed exploitation, in that the developing states did not have the
means of exploitation whereas the developed states did. Around this time it became
apparent that the basic structure of the negotiation was one of developing states, in
the form of the Group of 77, versus developed states, and when the discussion
finally stalled it was along these lines.
In 1970, as an outcome of the discussion in the Seabed Committee, the
Conference Resolution1l was adopted at the United Nations General Assembly and
this called for the convening of a conference on the Law of the Sea in 1973. The
United States originally favoured a limited item conference such as one discussing
only the breadth of territorial sea and navigation rights and objected to convening a
comprehensive conference that included discussion on the seabed issues. The
United States eventully changed its position, however, and joined the list of
sponsors of this Conference Resolution because it judged that this 'package deal'
approach would quickly solve its then primary objective of navigational freedom in
return for concessions in other areas, particularly that of the deep seabed mining
regime. 
12
The Conference began in December 1973 and was immediately influenced by the
oil embargo by the Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). The embargo
was triggered by the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 and caused a rise in the price
.
of commodities such as minerals and food. In addition, it chaged the perceptions
liThe United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2750C.
12There are some opinions that the core trade-off of this package deal was not navigational guarantee
and deep seabed mining regime. See, chapter 5 of this study.
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that developing countries had about their own solidarity. Since OAPEC's group
action resulted in a dramatic rise in oil price, which had previously been controlled
by developed states, it enabled members of OAPEC to increase their income from
exporting oil. As a result of this developing states came to believe that group action
would enable them to change the international system in their favour. The Group of
77 therefore declared national jurisdictions over their resources, without defining
the limits of national jursdiction, and called for a more equitable economic
relationship between developing and developed states. This was made clear by the
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NO)13
in May 1974 which was followed by the more detailed Chartr of Economic Rights
and Duties of States 
14 in December 1974. The latter referred to the seabed15 and as a
result the Law of the Sea negotiation was explicitly linked with the NIO.
As a result when the Law of the Sea Conference began the morale of the
developing countries was very high. In terms of the deep seabed regime, the
developing countries wanted to control the machinery to govern the deep seabed
area and have a strong autonomous machinery in order to prevent developed states
from interfering in the exploitation of the deep seabed. The developed countries
however objected to this and argued that a strong machinery would be hopelessly
ineffcient and absorb almost all the profit from the mining operations. In addition.
they argued that a strong machinery would discourage mining companies from
exploiting the seabed and would hamper technological development.
At the beginning of the Conference it was thought that the Conference would be
able to produce a Convention by around 1975, however progress was very slow. By
13The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3201.
14The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3281.
is Aricle 29 of 
Chapter II of the Charer.
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1975 it was thought almost impossible to conclude the Conference as expected
because states' opinions were so diverse and, largely because they were attempting
to produce a Convention by consensus, they were unable to produce draft articles.
In order to break this impasse, a new method of single negotiation text was
adopted.16 This method aimed to produce, for further discussion, a single text,
without alternative drafts of each article. This text was produced by the Committee
chairmen who gave an opinion on where the general consensus lay. This approach
had the advantage of persuading the participants to move forward from their
deadlocked positions.17 The first draft produced by this method was the Informal
Single Negotiating Text (ISNT) in 1975. This draft contained provisions for twelve
miles terrtorial seas and two-hundred miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
within which coastal states have jurisdiction for economic purposes, such as fishing
and the development of the continental shelf 18 It also included the provisions,
favoured by the United States, that coastal states would be obliged to accord free
transit through interntional straits.19 Although it had not yet become international
law, states began to practice these provisions almost immediately and accorded free
transit through interntional straits to passing vessels. In January 1976, the United
16Unlike the First Law of the Sea Conference, there did not exist any agreed-upon text. See
Mahmoudi, op. cif., p. 45.
17There was some room for manoeuvrng by chairmen and the negotiation in Committee I was
disrupted several times by this. See Schmidt, op. cit., pp. 113-114. Schmidt stated that ls)tates which
at any given point found their positions reflected in the text were in a distinctly favourable
negotiating position. This was mainly because time did not permt any but the most contentious pars
of the suggested compromises to be challenged in fact.' Ibid, p. 112.
18The 1982 Law of 
the Sea Convention inscribed the EEZ in it, however, it has not clearly spelt out
the relationship between the legal position of the continental shelf and that of the EEZ. The
difference between the legal positions of the continental shelf and the EEZ is that EEZ rights need to
be declared, however, rights over the continental shelf are not required to be declared. See United
Nations Offce for Ocean Afairs and the Law of the Sea, The La of the Sea: National Legislation
on the Continental Shelf~ew York: United Nations, 1989), p. 5. The Convention stipulated that
where national continental shelf margin extends beyond 200 miles, states can extend their national
lurisdiction up to 350 miles. Aricle 75 para. 5.9See, for example, Evan Luard, The Control of the Sea-Bed: Who Owns the Resources of the
Oceans?, revised. (London: Heineman, 1977), pp. 196-197.
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States established its own two-hundred miles fisheries zone by the Fisheries
Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) and many states followed suit.
At this time the negotiation of the seabed regime resulted in a compromise based
on a strong International Seabed Authority (ISA) having its discretionary powers
circumscribed by detailed Treaty provisions.2o This came about because in order to
bring the negotiation to a successful conclusion the United States changed its stance
from one of pursuing a weak machinery to one of allowing a strong machinery.
In September 1980 a Draft Convention was produced after almost all issues had
been negotiated and the 1980 session ended in 'an atmosphere of reliet,21 since it
was thought that the remaining issues could be solved in the next session scheduled
for 1981. The advent of the Reagan Administration in the United States, however,
altered this scenario. The Reagan Administration started a lengthy review of the
Draft Convention and in 1982, although 130 states were in favour, rejected the
Convention in the voting at the Conference. This was mainly because it judged the
deep seabed regime in the Convention to be unsatisfactory for the United States.
Afer its rejection a Reciprocating States Agreement for deep seabed mining, which
was drafted to enable the United States to engage in deep seabed mining outside of
the Convention, was signed between the United States, the United Kingdom, the
Federal Republic of Germany and France. The developing countres strongly
objected to this and claimed it was an ilegal activity. In 1983 President Reagan
issued an ocean policy statement which said that the United States would exercise
its navigation and overfight rights consistent with the Convention and would not
agree to other states' unilateral action which attempted to restrict them. Whether the
2°Sehmidt,op. cif., p. 105.
21Ibid., p. 145.
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United States could benefit from the non-seabed provisions, especially straits
passage and overfight, was disputed but the United States maintained that this had
now become customar international law since states had been exercising these
rights for some years. The Group of 77 consistently rejected this view, claiming that
the negotiation of the Convention was a package deal and that the navigational
provisions of the Convention created new international law and that there had never
been any intention that this should be available to non-parties and that the
provisions were only binding between signatory states. 
22
Ths situation, in which both sides refuted the other's position, continued for
some time but finally altered due to changes in circumstances. Technology for
exploiting the seabed was by now available, but because the demand for seabed
minerals had fallen the need for exploitation had diminished and deep seabed
mining was not now envisaged for a considerable time. Some developing states,
which had already ratified the Convention, started to worr about the prospect that
they might have to pay burdensome contributions to the ISA, without having any
guarantees of income from exploitation. The ISA, which the Convention established
to govern the seabed once the Convention entered into effect, would require
financial support and the developing states were worried that they might not be able
to afford this without the participation of the developed states. In 1989, the Group of
77 called publicly for re-negotiation of the Law of the Sea Convention 'without any
22This view has some problems because the extension ofterrtonal sea and straits passage have a
very close relationship. Without extending terrtonal sea the issue of straits passage might not have
been an issue. It is logical to consider that when the extension of terrtonal sea was agreed, in return
a new measure for straits passage was agreed. In this sense, a state cannot pick up one nght and
rejec the other. See Mahmoudi, 0p. cit., p. 249. As of December 1994, out of 151 coastal states, 128
states have adopted limits ofterrtonal sea, up to 12 miles, in conformity with the Convention.
United Nations Division for Ocean Afairs and the Law of the Sea Offce of Legal Afairs, The La
of the Sea: National Legislation on the Territorial Sea, the Right of Innocent Passage and the
Contiguous Zone (New York: United Nations, 1995), p. ii.
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preconditionsi23 and the UN Secretary-General staed to hold informal
consultations among interested parties the following year. Issues in the Convention
relating to the deep seabed regime, which the developed states where unable to
accept, were highlighted and these provisions in the Convention were subsequently
changed to accommodate most of the United States' demands. At this time the
United States, in order to prevent conflct with other states and because it was
downsizing its navy, did in fact want to have a universal agreement of sea use,
particularly one that secured its navigational rights.
In November 1993, the 1982 Convention was ratified (or acceded to) by a 60th
state and because the Convention would therefore enter into effect in November
1994, exactly a year. after the 60th ratification (or accession), the negotiation
speeded up. Before the entr into force of the Convention, an agreement,
'Implementation on the part of deep seabed regime to the 1982 Convention', was
adopted in the United Nations General Assembly and the United States and other
developed states signed it.24 The negotiation therefore ended successfully.
3. Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the thesis and given a background to the theoretical
review. It has outlined that the world's . sea use intensifed because of growing
interests in the sea by states and that this instigated the Law of the Sea Conferences
in an attempt to determine new rules of use. Developing states and developed states
23Renate Platzöder. Third United Nations Conference on the La of the Sea, Vol. X(Dobbs Ferr,
New York: Oceaa Publishers 1992), p. 472.
24 As of September 1998, 127 states including the EU had ratified the Convention, acceded to it or
succeeded. The Implementation entered into force on 28 July 1996, and as of 31 December 1996, 71
states had expressed their consent to be bound by the Implementation. Although the United Kingdom
ratified the convention in July 1997 and Russia in March 1997, the United States have not yet ratified
it. See also United Nations, The La of the Sea: Declarations an Statements with respect to the
United Nations Convention on the La of the Sea and to the Agreement relating to the
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had different interests in sea use and they attempted to accommodate their interests
in a 'package deal' aimed at trading navigational freedom for concessions in the
deep sea bed regime. The advent of the Reagan Administration changed this and the
United States rejected the Law of the Sea Convention because it judged that the
terms of the deep seabed regime were unfavourable to it. After the Conference the
United States and the Group of 77 objected to each other's positions. This situation
was eventully altered due to changes in circumstances and both sides finally
succeeded in producing an agreement on the deep seabed regime.
Having given a brief overvew of the Law of the Sea negotiation the next two
chapters contain the theoretical review, with chapter two examining the Law of the
Sea in the context of international relations theory and chapter three examining it in
the context of negotiation theory.
Implementation of Part Xl of the United Nations Convention on the La of the Sea of 10 December
1982 (New York: United Nations, 1997).
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Chapter 2 The Law of the Sea Negotiation25 in International
Relations Theory
Despite the fact that there have been many descriptive accounts of the Law of the
Sea negotiation,26 there have only been a few attempts to explain the negotiation
within the theoretical framework of international relations theory.27 This is because
the Law of the Sea negotiation lasted for 27 years and was influenced by various
domestic and international factors.28 For example, interests groups in the United
States, such as fishermen and the deep seabed mining industry, influenced the
United States' Law of the Sea policy during the negotiation, and an administration
change signficantly altered policy. The fact that these factors influenced states'
policy on the law of the sea made the Law of the Sea negotiation diffcult to explain
in a consistent manner within a theoretical framework, mainly because assumptions
of each theory do not cover the many factors which influenced the Law of the Sea
negotiation. In this chapter, curent attempts to explain the Law of the Sea
negotiation in the context of international relations theory are critically reviewed
and the lack of a framework which can explain both states' interactions at the
negotiation and domestic factors is highlighted. Reflecting this, the relationship
between states' actions in the interntional arena and domestic factors is then
25In this study the Law of the Sea negotiation is the negotiation over sea use, which staed in 1967
and ended in 1994, including the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea which was
held between 1973 and 1982.
26See, K. J. Holsti, Interntional Politics: A Frameworkfor Analysis, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983), p. 8.
271n interntional relations theory, the object of analysis is not limited to a negotiation. In terms of
the Law of the Sea states had a long history of interactions between them on sea use. On this point,
international relations theory in general treats the Law of the Sea negotiation as par of a process to
determine sea use.
28Domestic factors include domestic politics, bureaucratic politics and other moves in a state which
influence states' actions, including other states' actions. International factors are factors influencing
perceptions of individuals or policy-makers, apart from domestic factors.
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examined. Finally the level-of-analysis problem in international relations, which
investigates which level or unit of analysis can best explain interntional relations,
is examined. It will be argued that although many agree that all the levels are
interrelated, a theoretical framework of how to 'put together' the levels or units of
analysis is yet to be established.
1. How the Law of the Sea negotiation was explained
There have been some attempts to explain the Law of the Sea negotiation within
the context of international relations theory. In this section, the complex
interdependence model of Keohane and Nye, the strctural (modified) realism of
Krasner, along with some other attempts ar examined. It is concluded that all the
attempts at explanation share the same problem, namely, too great an emphasis on a
particular feature of the negotiation. As a result, attempts at explanation have failed
to adequately examine or explain other importnt factors of the negotiation and
although each attempt is capable of explaining a certin aspect of the negotiation
none can explain the Law of the Sea negotiation in its entirety.
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye took the Law of the Sea negotiation to be
a featue of a world changing from one described by the conventional realist model
to one characterised by complex interdependence. Keohane and Nye's complex
interdependence modeP.9 was devised against the conventional realist modeL. The
conventional realist view is that international politics is a struggle for power,
dominated by organised violence in the form of war. This view assumes: first, that
states are coherent units, namely unitary actors, and that they are the dominant
29Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependnce (Boston: Little-Brown, 1977)
and Power an Interdependence, 2nd ed. (Harer Collns, 1989). The 2nd edition contains the
onginal edition.
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actors in world politics; second, force is a usable and effective instrument of policy
and using or threatening force is the most effective means of wielding power; third,
the 'high politics' of military security dominates the 'low politics' of economic and
social affairs.30 This conventional realist model assumes a static world, where states
are unitary and rational actors and national interests are constant. Keohane and Nye
regarded the conventional realist model as an 'ideal type' since it assumes an
extreme set of conditions. They produced another 'ideal ty', complex
interdependence, reflecting the conditions of a changing world. The three
characteristics of complex interdependence are multiple channels of contact, the
absence of hierarchy among issues, and the minor role of miltary force.3! Multiple
channels of contact (communication) means that there are varous channels of
communication that connect societies, including interstate, transgovernental and
transnational relations. Interstate relations are the relationships between states and
are a feature of the conventional realist modeL. Transgovernental relations mean
various communications between people in states other than the formal
communications by governents. Including transgovemmental relations as a
channel of communcation requires relaxation of the realist assumption that states
act coherently as units. Also, inclusion of transnational relations, which mean
communication by trannational organisations, including multinational corprations,
requires relaxation of the assumption that states are the only unts. Multiple
channels of contat as a characteristic of complex interdependence particularly
highlights the close economic relationship between societies which make
30/bid., pp. 23-24.
3!/bid., pp. 24-29. In another place in their work they described the three characteristics as negligible
role offorce, lack of hierarchy among issues and multiple channels of contact. Ibid., p. 113. Table
5.3. When considered that the complex interdependence is an analytical concept of 
' ideal type', the
latter characteristics seem to be more appropriate.
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governments' policies more sensitive to each other, since a state's domestic
economic policy may influence other states' economies.
The absence of hierarchy among issues means that all foreign policy agendas can
no longer be subordinated to miltary security, since foreign policy agendas have
become larger and more diverse. Issues, such as energy and resources for example,
have assumed particular importnce for many states. In addition, since the
overlapping of domestic and foreign policy has become common among developed
pluralist states, it has become difficult to say that a hierarchy among issues exists.
The minor role of miltary force means that partcularly among developed
pluralist states, fear of attck in general has declined, and fears of attack by one
another are virtually non-existent. In addition, it is now recognised that force is
often an inappropriate way of achieving other goals, such as economic and
ecological objectives.
Keohane and Nye explained the contemporar world as being situated between
the two ideal tys, transforming from one similar to the conventional realist model,
to one similar to the complex interdependence modeL. The Law of the Sea
negotiation was considered by Keohane and Nye to represent this ty of
transformation of the world and they pointed out that the two main characteristics of
complex interdependence, namely the minor role of force and the absence of
hierarchy among issues, changed the way of carring out issue-linkage, and that ths
was clearly observed durng the Law of the Sea negotiation. Issue-linkage means
linking one state's policies on some issues to another state's policies on other
issues.32 For example, in the conventional realist model, stronger states in terms of
military power are able, through their military power, to coerce weaker states to
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accept other issues which the stronger states want. In the world closer to complex
interdependence, however, weaker states would be able to extract concessions or
side payments from stronger states, since due to the minor role of miltary force and
the lack of hierarchy between issues, stronger states have diffculty in forcing
weaker states to accept the issues at stake. At the Law of the Sea negotiation,
developing states succeeded in making the negotiation, until 1982, a trade-off
between navigational freedom, namely security, and the deep seabed regime.33 This
situation was one that allowed weaker states to extract concessions from stronger
states, particularly the United States which wanted navigational freedom, by trading
that navigational freedom for favourable terms for deep seabed regime. This
situation arose because the developing states wanted to obtan benefits from deep
seabed exploitation, which, at the time, only a few industrialised states were
considered to be capable of conducting. The built-in trade-off between navigational
freedom and the deep seabed regime was considered by Keohane and Nye to be one
of the manifestations of complex interdependence.
Although Keohane and Nye's model explained some aspects of the Law of the
Sea negotiation, it has some weaknesses and is unable to explain the entire Law of
the Sea negotiation. First, the characteristics of complex interdependence were
parly a reflection of the time in which the work was published.34 At that time, many
believed that after the success of the OAPEC's oil embargo which highlighted the
power of group action by developing states against developed states, interntional
politics would change in favour of developing countries. In reality this did not
32Ibid., pp. 30-32.
33See for example, Finn Laursen, 'Security versus Access to Resources: Explaining a Decade ofD. S.
Ocean Policy', World Politics, Vol. 34, (1982), pp. 206-213. This trade-off is called a 'package deal'.
See chapter 5 of this study.
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happen. Keohane and Nye tried to prove that the shift from a conventional realist
model to a complex interdependence model was occuring. They noted that
'(aJIthough these conditions are not irreversible, major changes would be needed to
reverse them. A strong argument could even be made that complex interdependence
will increasingly characterize world politics, because each of the three conditions
corresponds to a long-term historical change with deep causes of its own. '35 Even
though the change in interntional politics could, until 1980, be partly explained by
the shift from the realist model to the complex interdependence model, after 1980
the situation changed and in my view reverted fuher than its original position
towards the realist modeL. This can be ilustrated by the fact that at the beginning of
the Law of the Sea negotiation the United States attempted to solve the issue of
navigational freedom by negotiation, namely co-operative behaviour. In 1983,
however, the United States suggested its intention to use force in the case of coastal
states' intervention against its Navy's navigational freedom.36 The United States'
announcement could be said to be coercive. In this sense the United States'
behaviour, after nearly 15 years of negotiation, changed from co-operative to
coercive. This was the opposite of Keohane and Nye's assumption, since they
argued that the world was moving away from coercive behaviour, towards co-
operative behaviour. Keohane and Nye later admittd, however, that many
observers viewed, within the oceans issue area, the process of complex
interdependence as shrnking rather than expanding. 37
34This work was originally published in 1977. See Keohane and Nye, 1989, op. cit., Preface for
Second Edition.
35Keohane and Nye, 1977, op. cit., p. 227.
360cean statement by President Reagan on 10th March 1983, United Nations Offce for Ocean
Affairs and the Law of the Sea, The La of the Sea: current Developments in State Practice, No. I
(New York: United Nations, 1987), p. 137.
37Keohane and Nye, 1989, op. cit., p. 256.
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A second problem with Keohane and Nye's model is that contrary to the
assumption of the minor role of military force, the United States' primary concern at
the beginnng of the Law of the Sea negotiation was its security. When the United
States judged that its security concern was fulfilled outside of the Convention, it
abandoned the negotiation. After its rejection of the Convention in 1982, the United
States was ready to use force in order to enforce what it judged to be customary
international law38 and when the United States finally agreed to the 1994
Agreement, its primary concern was stil securty. At that time, although coastal
states' unilateral claims over their adjacent seas, which would potentially intedere
with the mobilty of the United States Navy, were increasing, the United States was
engaging in down-sizing its Navy. The United States judged that making a universal
agreement would be less costly in terms of its securty than not making an
agreement. In this sense, the United States' primar concern was, all along, its
security. Markus G. Schmidt has also pointed out the weakness of Keohane and
Nye's complex interdependence in explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation in
terms of the role of force and hierarchy between issues.39 The fact that the United
States' primary concern was always security and that the United States changed its
position according to its judgement of the circumstances surrounding its securty,
weakens the framework of complex interdependence in explaining the Law of the
Sea negotiation.
A furher problem with Keohane and Nye's complex interdependence model is
that it lacks a 'domestic politics' dimension.4o Keohane and Nye have not rejected
38The meaning of customary international law wil be looked at in chapter 4 of 
this study.
39Markus G. Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common Burden?: The United States position on the
development ofa regime for deep sea~bed mining in the law of the sea convention (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1989), p. 6.
4oKeohane and Nye ,1989, op. cif., pp. 260-264.
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the realist model,41 and although they relaxed some assumptions of the conventional
realist model by including transgovemmental and transnational relations, they stil
focused their analysis on states' behaviour, not on factors within a state. This
reliance on states' behaviour is problematic in explaining the Law of the Sea
negotiation because states' actions were often drven by domestic factors and states'
actions therefore cannot be understood uness these domestic factors are also
understood. For example, the advent of the Reagan Administration changed the
United States' policy on the Law of the Sea, from one of attempting to achieve a
universal agreement of sea use by producing a Convention, to one of rejecting the
Convention. As such a domestic factor in the form of a change in Administration
affected the state's action in relation to the Convention. The complex
interdependence model is unable to explain this feature of the Law of the Sea
negotiation in that the model does not tae domestic factors into consideration. As a
result, Keohane and Nye's model does not explain the relationship between states'
actions and domestic factors and this is critical to an explanation of the Law of the
Sea negotiation.
At the same time, Keohane and Nye emphasised transgovernental relations,
naely communications between societies by people other than governental
offcials, and they pointed out that such multiple channels of contact blur the lines
between domestic and foreign policy.42 They suggested that multiple channels of
communication are a featue of complex interdependence, however, ths in itself
does not explain how domestic factors influence an international situation or an
international negotiation such as the Law of the Sea. Keohane and Nye clearly
41Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Engene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Tranformation, 5th 00.
(New York: St. Marin's Press, 1995), p. 32; Keohane and Nye, 1989,op. cit., p. 250. .
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recognised the possibilty of transgovernental communication influencing both
domestic and international politics but they did not develop their arguments beyond
this and explain how the mechanism works by changing states' behaviour. In
addition, the idea of trasgovernental communication appears to be too simplistic.
For example, if transgovernental communication between people in different
states exists, it would be natural to consider that there would be similar
relationships, intentionally or non-intentionally, between governental officials and
non-governental people in different states. This tye of communication influenced
the Law of the Sea negotiation. For example, a Chilean whaling company lobbied
the governents of other states. When Keohane and Nye mentioned multiple
channels of communcations they should have considered these cases as well,
however, they did not.
The basic problem is that Keohane and Nye's analysis was focused on states'
behaviour, since their model assumes that states are the principal actors in world
politics.43 This means that regardless of complex interdependence, which through its
assumption of multiple channels of contact relaxed assumptions made by the
conventional realist model that states act coherently as units and that states are the
only units, Keohane and Nye stil regard states as principal actors in world politics.
As a result, they examined states' behaviour and it was this, in my view, which
prevented them from developing their assumption of multiple channels of contat
into an adequate explanation of the inter-relationship between states' actions at the
negotiation and domestic factors which is required to adequately explain the Law of
42Keohane and Nye, 1977, op. cit., p. 26.
43This is the same as in Keohane's later work After Hegemony, in which he described states 'crucial
actors' in world politics so that his analysis 'focuses principally on states'. Robert O. Keohane, After
Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 25.
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the Sea negotiation. Multiple chanels of communication recognise the influence of
domestic factors but because of the assumption that states' actions matter, that is that
states are treated as 'unitary actors', domestic politics are not examined. For this
reason, the complex interdependence model assumes that states' actions influence
other states' actions in the international arena, and that domestic factors do not. In
addition, the model assumes that domestic politics is not infuenced by other states'
behaviour.44 As Keohane and Nye later admitted, their work of 1977 ignored
'domestic politics and the impact of international relations on domestic politics.'45
As a result, their work of 1977 is incomplete and inadequate46 in explaining the Law
of the Sea negotiation, since that negotiation was influenced by various international
and domestic factors. In later work, although Keohane and Nye came to recognse
the importance of domestic sources of policy in explaining states' behaviour,47 they
did not develop a framework which could explain the influence and inter-
relationship between international and domestic factors.48 Without this framework
an explanation of the Law of the Sea negotiation, such as the policy change by the
Reagan Administration, is very diffcult.
Stephen D. Krasner attempted to explain the Law of the Sea process using a
structural realism model.49 This model assumes that in keeping with the realist
44They said that their explanation was 'at the level of the international system'. Keohane and Nye,
1977,op. cit., Preface to Pirst edition, p. vi.
45Ibid., p. 256. Later, Milner and Keohane also pointed out the impact of , Interntionalization' on
domestic politics. Helen V. Milner and Rober O. Keohane, 'Internationalization and Domestic
Politics: An Introduction', in Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner (eds) ¡iinternationalization
an Domestic Politics (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 3.
46See, Keohane and Nye, 1989, op. eft.., p. 263.
47Por example, Keohane and Nye, 1989, p. 256. Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions an
State Power: Essas in interntional Relations Theory (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. vii.
48Keohane and Nye admitted that 'it is terrbly diffcult to link domestic politics and the international
system together theoretically without reducing the analysis to little more than a descriptive
hodgepodge.' Keohane and Nye, 1989, op. cft., p. 303, note 24.
49Stephen D. Krasner, Strctural Conflict: 
"The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley,
California: University of California Press, 1985).
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assumption states pursue power, but they do this within a set of constraints. In the
case of the Law of the Sea negotiation the constraints were provided by the United
Nations. Krasner looked at the negotiation as a manifestation of the Third World
pursuing power by utilising the United Nations' system in their favour. The realist
model assumes that states pursue national interests and power and that states act in
their own interests. 
50 Further, the model assumes that power is a necessary means to
pursue national interests. The conventional realist view assumed that miltary power
dominated other forms, and tht states with the greatest military strength controlled
world affairs. This view on power was later adapted in order to explain various
international events and came to be viewed as the abilty of an actor to get others to
do something they otherwse would not do. Power is also conceived in terms of
control over outcomes. 
51
Krasner's view of the Law of the Sea negotiation is based on the realist model,
however, he qualified it by emphasising structural constraints, namely the
international regime. 52 The international regime is defined by Krasner as 'sets of
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around
which actors' expectations converge in a given area of interntional relations. '53 In
Krasner's view, under the rights of sovereignty, the United Nations system in
particular represents an interntional regime, it being the plac which gurantees all
501t is diffcult to give operational meaning to the concept of national interest. lames E. Doughert
and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contending Theories of Interntional Relations: A Comprehensive
Survey, 3rd. 00. (New York; Harper & Row, 1990.), p. 124. See also Keohane and Nye, op. cif., p.
35.
51 See Ibid., p. 11. Power is a very elusive concept, and diffcult to measure. Doughert and
Pfaltzgratf op. cit., pp. 125-126.
52Krasner,op. cif. p. 28. See also Robert L. Rothstein, 'Epitaph for a monument to a failed protest? A
North-South retrospecive', International Organization, Vo!. 42, No. 4 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 732-733.
53Stephen D. Krasner, 'Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables',
in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.) International Regimes (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1983) p. 2. See
also Krasner, 1985, p. 4 and p. 60.
26
states sovereign equality. 
54 Krasner regards states as the basic actors in the
international system, however, he relaxes the assumptions of the realist model that
states are the only units and that states are coherent units. He relaxes the former by
including other actors such as multinational corprations and interntional
organisations, although these, he argues, are conditioned and delimited by state
decisions and state power, and he relaxes the latter by saying that states' strategy
will be affected by domestic attributes within strctural constraints. 55
The central point of Krasner's model is, however, its inclusion of the structural
constraints. Krasner states that under these constraints the 'behaviour of states is
determned by their relative power capabilities'56 and that the Third World sought to
maxmise stability and control in order to reduce their vulnerability. The realist
model assumes international politics as a strggle for power and does not consider
such strctural constraints. For this reason strctural constraints, in terms of the Law
of the Sea, were included in Krasner's model since, by itself, the realist model does
not explain how states behaved during the Law of the Sea negotiation. The United
States for example would never have agreed to join the negotiation or to
concessions to the Group of 77 if the realist assumption of power is applied.
Krasner considered that as the negotiation was conducted in the framework of the
United Nations, the Third World's numerical strength played a signficant role in
determining the direction of the negotiation. If, therefore, the negotiation had been
held outside of the United Nations the Third World would not have had the
capabilty to determine the direction of the negotiation. Krasner stated that '( aJn
analysis based on national power capabilties may explain the preferences of the
54/bid., p. 8.
. 55/bid., p. 28.
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Third World, but not how they were achieved in the oceans issue area.'57 For this
reason Krasner added the structural constraints of the United Nations to the realist
model as the 'how' of achieving Third World preferences. The preferences of the
Third World were defined in terms of power and control as much as wealth58 and
Krasner emphasised that the principle of the sovereign equality of states in the
United Nations enabled Third World states to pursue their objectives.59
Krasner argued that the Third World states were 'behaving the way states have
always behaved; they are trying to maximise their power-their ability to control
their own destinies,'6Q and that the Third World supported 'international regimes
based on authoritative, rather than market, principles and norms'61. Krasner's
strctual realist model therefore assumes that states pursue power but within
structual constraints. Krasner's model explained that in the case of the Law of the
Sea negotiation the structural constraints became the means for the Group of 77 to
obtain power.
Krasner's model explains some aspects of the Law of the Sea negotiation. First,
the Law of the Sea negotiation was prolonged because the issues of deep seabed
mining regime were diffcult to solve. The Group of 77 as the representative of the
Third World, which placed strong ideological value on a deep seabed regime, did
not give in easily to the United States because they were pursuing power to control
the deep seabed regime. This complies with Krasner's view that the Third World
pursued power. Secondly, the venue of the negotiation was basically within the
United Nations and the procedures and precedents of that institution greatly affected
561bid, p. 12.
57 Ibid., p. 241.
58lbid, p. 3.
59Ibid., pp. 7-8.
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the negotiation. For example, the negotiation was first conducted in the Seabed
Committee which was set up by the General Assembly. The Seabed Committee's
decisions were taken by consensus among participants, however, Third World states
were stil able to utilise the General Assembly to make resolutions against the
developed states in order to infuence the negotiation, since the General Assembly
adopts majority rue. In addition, the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference
was organised within the framework of the United Nations because it was
considered a natural venue, since past Conferences in regard to sea use were
organised by the League of Nations and the United Nations. These organisational
settings therefore infuenced the outcome of the negotiation and these are examples
of how structual constraints influenced states' actions. This feature complies with
Krasner's view of structural constraints.
On the other hand, Krasner's view does not explain some importnt points. First,
the ideology of the Group of 77 evolved durng the negotiation and was not a
precondition of it. Krasner's view generally neglects this development within the
negotiation and also neglects changes in states' perceptions.62 The Third World was
not consolidated at the beginnng of the negotiation, nor was the Group of 77
dominant as a group of Third World states early in the negotiation. Krasner's view
that the Group of 77's refual of Nix on's 1970 Trusteeship proposal was an example
of the Third World being willing to trade wealth for control63 ilustrates a lack of
understanding of this point. Trading wealth for control means that the Third World
pursued power to control the deep seabed regime regardless of how much wealth
60Ibid., p. 12. See also pp. 305-306.
61Ibid., p. 30.
62This point is closely related to the realist assumption. The conventional realist model assumes
static national interests so that this change of interests during the negotiation should not have
happened. This point will be considered in chapter 3.
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would be accrued from Nixon's proposal, which was in fact very generous. In reality
it was not as simple as that. In 1970, the real nature of deep seabed mining was stil
not clear, however, deep seabed mining was widely being thought of as a 'bonanza'.
On this point, the Third World believed that deep seabed mining would bring them
enormous wealth. In addition, the Group of 77's refusal of Nixon's Trusteeship
proposal was not based on a thorough evaluation of that proposal64 but.was based on
ideology as well as their negative feelings for the former suzerain. The Third World
did not like the term 'trusteeship' because it smacked of colonialism. This means
that the Third World did not refuse Nixon's Trusteeship proposal with a clear
intention of trading wealth for control, rather it was the result of mixed feelings
relating to a very vague idea of a deep seabed bonanz coupled with hostility
towards colonialism. In addition, in 1994 the Group of 77 gave up their ideological
objectives on the strcture of the Interntional Seabed Authority, which controls
deep seabed development, in retur for reducing the financial burden the ISA put on
them. Without the financial contrbutions of the developed states each developing
state which had ratified the 1982 Convention would have had to pay heavy
contributions to support the ISA. In order to avoid this the Group of 77 gave up its
long-standing objectives, such as a decision mechanism based on one-nation-one-
vote, which would have given control of the ISA to them, in favour of a system
which gave a few developed states control of the ISA. Krasner's model does not
explain this since it contradicts his assumption of the Third World's trading wealth
for control. With regard to the ISA the Third World did in fact trade control for a
lesser financial burden.
63Ibid., p. 310.
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Furhermore, Krasner's model does not explain the Reagan Administration's
rejection of the 1982 Convention. Although Krasner says that it is possible to argue
that the rejection 'was grounded in domestic American politics, not in international
structures,l6S he further argues that it is too simple to blame it 'on the vagaries of
American politics. '66 Based on a statement made by James Malone, the head of the
United States' delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference at the time of the United
States' rejection of the Convention, Krasner explained that economic interests and
power and not domestic politics, led to the rejection.67 Malone's statement explained
the reasons for the United States' rejection in terms of deep seabed mining regime,
stating that the Law of the Sea Convention's provisions ultimately sought the
redistribution of the world's wealth. Malone pointed out that the inabilty of the
United States to control the ISA's activities was the problem that led to the United
States rejection. Malone's statement, which mentioned the United States' economic
interests and power, could be said to be the manifestation of the realist world,
however, the real cause of the United States' rejection was the change in
governent policy. The rejection of the Convention was commonly attributed to the
advent of the Reagan Administration since it was widely believed that the Carter
Administration would have signed. The admnistration change in the United States,
namely domestic politics of a state, changed the United States' actions at the
negotiation. Even if the United States' domestic politics cannot fuly explain why
the Conference failed to reach an agreement between the United States and the
Group of 77, it can certinly explain some of it. For this reason the domestic politics
640ne of 
those who led the opposition against the Trusteeship proposal was Fran Njenga of Kenya,
who later acknowledged that it would have been wiser to accept it. Schmidt, op. cit., p. 28.
6slbid., p. 246.
66lbid. p. 248.
67/bid., p. 247.
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angle cannot be ignored. In addition, moves in Congress to legislate domestic
seabed mining and the technological development in deep seabed mining greatly
infuenced the negotiation. These facts made the position of the Third World more
diffcult, since the United States was considered to be staing deep seabed mining
without waiting for a universal agreement. Regardless of the fact that there was no
direct action on the part of the United States, the Third World was infuenced by
moves within the United States to start mining. Krasner's model is also unable to
explain these events. Furhermore, it is unable to explain the situation whereby
states' actions at the negotiation directly influenced moves within the United States.
Actions within the General Assembly, such as the Moratorium Resolution, which
called for a moratorium on seabed exploitation until agreement was reached, or the
Principles Resolution, which declared that the area of the seabed and ocean floor
and the subsoil thereof as well as their resources are the common heritage, caused
industry with interests in deep seabed mining within America to act to protect those
interests. The industry lobbied the governent (the administration and relevant
agencies) and Congress to change the direction of the negotiation. These
interactions between states' actions at the negotiation and domestic factors canot be
explained by Krasner's model, since it attmpts to explain international events by
states' interactions almost exclusively.
Krasner's structural realism is unable to explain the Law of the Sea negotiation
not only because of the model's assumption that the Third World traded wealth for
control, but also because of his realist assumption that states are 'unita' actors.
Krasner tried to explain the Law of the Sea negotiation from the view that states
pursue national interests and power. In his view states are basic actors in world
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politics68 and how states behave is the primary source of explanation of
international events. From this view, what is discussed within a state, or what
happens in a state to influence international events is not important. What appears as
a state's policy, however, is importnt, since Krasner suggested only 'examining the
final policy decisions of states'.69 This, in my view, is incorrect since a final policy
cannot be divorced from the process by which it was made. Particularly when a
policy is changed the process needs to be understood in order to understand that
change. Krasner's model does not explain the difference in the decisions of the
Reagan and Cartr Administrations, which led to the policy change of the United
States. In addition, the influences of states' actions at the negotiation on domestic
factors and the influence of domestic factors on states actions are not explained,
since Krasner assumes they are not importnt. Krasner's view therefore has the same
problem as Keohane and Nye's complex independence model in that he ignores
domestic factors and the relationship beteen domestic factors and states' actions at
the negotiation. Keohane and Nye, and Krasner, all focused on states' actions when
examining the Law of the Sea negotiation. Since states negotiated to make new
rules for sea use, the negotiation appeared to be one by states. Keohane and Nye,
and Krasner's' models interpreted the Law of the Sea negotiation from the
perspective of state power.
Robert L. Friedheim, however, attempted to explain the Law of the Sea
negotiation based on how states negotiated in the United Nations, without the
perspective of states' power. Freidheim attempted to explain the Law of the Sea
negotiation by focusing on states' behaviour at the negotiation, using a framework
68Ibid., p. 28.
69Ibid., p. 306.
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called parliamentary diplomacy.70 The concept of parliamentary diplomacy came
from the resemblance between the coalition formation of states in international
negotiation and the political structure of parliamentary democracies, partcularly
Sweden, the Netherlands and Italy.71 Friedheim noted some points of the Law of the
Sea negotiation which were similar to a legislatue's in parliamentary democracy.
First, the number of negotiators was large and their values and interests were
heterogeneous. Second, the list of issues to be negotiated was voluminous. Third,
interactions were based upon a formal structure. Fourh, formal rules of procedure
outlined the decision process to be followed. Fifth, a rich set of informal procedures
developed to manage the interactions of states as they sought positive-sum
outcomes. Positive-sum means everyone gains something and that the sum of
everyone's gain is positive. This is the opposite of zero-sum which means that if
someone wins, someone else loses, so that the sum of their gains is zero. Sixth, the
nature of the issues themselves played an importnt role in shaping the negotiations.
Finally, players did not change. From the beginning of the negotiation until the end
of the Conference many delegates to the negotiation did not change and this is
similar to legislatues since legislators are usually the same while they are seated at
the parliament.72 These seven characteristics can be observed in the Law of the Sea
negotiation up until the end of the Conference in 1982.
Although there are some similarities between parliamentary diplomacy and the
Law of the Sea negotiation, there. are also fundamental differences. Whereas
7uRobert L. Friedheim, Negotiating the New Ocean Regime (Columbia, South Carolina: University
of South Carolina Press, 1993)
71Daniel Dnickman, Human Factors in International Negotiations: Social~Psychological Aspects of
International Conflct (Beverly Hils, California: Sage Publications, 1973), pp. 47~48.
72Friedheim,op. cit., pp. 47-48.
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decision-making in a Parliament is by majority and is legitimatised,73 in the Law of
the Sea negotiation decision-making throughout the Seabed Committee and
Conference was by consensus. Even when the majority approved the outcome at the
end of the Conference, some states rejected it and the outcome was not
automatically legitimatised. As Friedheim admitted, the choice mechanisms used by
legislatures do not normally provide positive-sum outcomes to all participants
because legislatures tend to pit majority against minority, to create winners and
losers and a minority will accept the decisions. On the other hand, in the United
Nations or in the world communty 'defection, or refusal to accept a decision' is stil
common.74 For ths reason, there is a fundamental difference between parliamentary
democracy and the Law of the Sea negotiation. In addition, parliamentary
democracy is unable to explain the negotiation between the Group of 77 and the
United States between 1982, when the conference ended, and 1994, when
agreement was reached because there was no 'parliamentary' or formal conference
discussions after the Law of the Sea Conference ended in 1982. During this period
there were no direct negotiations between the United States and the Group of 77
until 1993 when the United States joined the negotiation at the United Nations
Secretary-General's informal consultations. For this reason, Friedheim's perspective
cannot adequately explain the Law of the Sea negotiation. Furhermore, Friedheim's
work almost exclusively concentrated on analysis of states' behaviour at the
negotiation, so that Friedheim's work shares the same limitations as Keohane and
Nye's complex interdependence model and Krasner's structural realist model, both
73See, Knut Midgaad, and ArId UnderdaI, 'Multiparty Conferences', in Daniel Druckman (ed.),
Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspctives (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications,
1977), pp 340-342.
74Friedheim, op. cif., p. 45.
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of which are unable to explain the relationship between states' actions at the
negotiation and domestic factors in explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation. 75
As outlined above, most attempts at explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation
treat states as unitar actors. Some theorists, however, have attempted to look at the
Law of the Sea negotiation from different perspectives, such as the bureaucratic
politics model and the domestic politics modeL. The bureaucratic politics model
looked at the negotiation from the viewpoint of United States foreign policy
making. An L. Hollck, for example, looked at the policy dispute between coastal
and maritime interests within the United States governent which determined
foreign policy.76 Within the United States governent, coastal interests were
represented by economic agencies such as the Treasur Deparment or Interior
Department. They basically wanted wider jurisdiction over adjacent seas in order to
acquire larger economic interests from those areas. In terms of deep seabed mining
they wanted a system having as few restrictions on its deep seabed miners as
possible. Maritime interests were represented by the Department of Defense which
originally wanted to have narrow coastal states' jurisdiction so as not to intedere
with its Navy's mobility. Their primary concern was to acquire navigational
freedom. These interests within the United States governent conficted. Hollck
stated that '(oJne cannot understand the U.S. position on the ocean issues without
understanding the pressures and concessions produced by diverse national and
commercial interests as they interact with these same kinds of interests in other
countries', and she argued that the most frutful approach to understanding how
75This is the same as Kaufmann's Conference diplomacy. The literature of diplomacy tend to treat
states as unitar actors. Johan Kaufmann, Conference Diplomacy: An Introdctory Analysis, 2nd
revised ed. (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Marinus Nijhoff 1988).
76 Ann L. Hollck, 'The Clash ofU. S. Interests: How U. S. Policy Evolved', Marine Technology
SocietyJotirnal, Vol. 8, No. 6, (July 1974), pp. 15-28.
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ocean policy was formulated was that of bureaucratic politics.77 In this approach
bureaucrats and governental agencies were engaged in a continuous process of
bargaining which was influenced throughout by domestic interests as well as
foreign interests. For this reason, Rollck argued that 'the ocean policies that result
are a product of contention--within the governent and with domestic and foreign
interests--and not of a rational centralized decision-making process. '78
This view essentially questions the conventional realist assumptions that states'
national interests are constant and that states are untary actors. In terms of national
interests, bargaining within the governent can result in change. With regard to
untary actors, there are many actors within the governent influencing the United
States' policies and as a result the state cannot be considered the unitary actor. In
addition, this process of bargaining means that the policy outcome is a compromise
between agencies within the governent and might not be the ideal outcome for any
of the agencies. This means that states are unable to be rational actors since the
assumption of rational actor means that each state behaves as a cohesive unit tring
to maximise its own national interests. Accordingly, the bureaucratic politics model
assumes that interactions of bureaucrats and governental agencies explain state's
actions.
Hollck's view explains bureaucratic wrangling in the United States, however,
this model does not necessarily explain United States' interactions with other states
at the negotiation. Negotiators' choices are diffcult to explain because what choices
are available at the negotiation and what is to be chosen would depend on the
situations at the negotiation, and also on other states' choices. For example, during
77Ibid., p. 16.
78Ibid
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the Conference the United States allowed the Group of 77 to build up a strong
autonomous ISA, with the intention of binding the power of the ISA by devising
detailed rules. At earlier stages of the Conference there were two options for the
United States: first to deny a strong autonomous ISA outright; second to allow a
strong autonomous ISA but to tie the ISA with detailed rules. The United States
chose the second option largely due to the circumstances of the negotiation at the
time.
At the end of the Conference many in the United States opposed the Convention
and claimed there were many defects. This opposition, which originated from the
choice taken by the United States, led to the United States' rejection of the
Convention. What influences states' actions at the negotiation is diffcult to explain
by the bureaucratic model since the states' positions or tactics are usually decided
after examination of many factors, including their counterparts' positions or tactics
during the negotiation. States' actions, therefore, are influenced by states'
interactions at the negotiation and this is not explained by the bureaucratic modeL.
Moreover, states' actions sometimes bring unexpected outcomes. When Henr
Kissinger, the United States Secretary of State, proposed a parallel system, which
was the system to exploit the deep seabed by both the ISA's mining arm, the
Enterprise, and private miners, Kissinger intended to end the Law of the Sea
Conference as soon as possible by offering this concession to the Group of 77. The
Group of 77 however did not tae this as a concession, rather it fixed its position
based on Kissinger's proposal and demanded furher concessions. This situation
cannot be explained by Rollck's modeL.
In addition, there are cases where bureaucratic involvement in policy-making is
limited. For example, if interest groups in the United States directly lobby Congress
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or the President, the role of bureaucracy would be limited. President Ford's 1976
decision to sign the Fishery Conservation and Management Act which extended the
United States' jurisdiction on fisheries to two-hundred miles was an example of this.
When coastal fishermen did not receive strong support to prevent foreign distant-
water fishermen from catching fish in the United States adjacent seas from the
Commerce Department they directly lobbied representatives in Congress and the
President's decision was influenced by fishermen and their representatives in the
Congress.79 In this case the President's decision was not influenced by bureaucracy,
namely the Commerce Deparment, and the bureaucratic politics model is unable to
explain this. If the bureaucratic politics model is defined as career offcials being the
central element of policy-making, Finn Laursen judged that the bureaucratic politics
model's abilty to explain the Law of the Sea negotiation is epiphenomenal,8o since
motivations of bureaucrats are different from the motivations of legislators and
presidents. Put another way, it would be insuffcient to explain the Law of the Sea
negotiation based on the motivations of bureaucrats. In addition, presidents might
decide policy without considering policy co-ordination. Laursen also argued that it
is necessary to go beyond the bureaucratic agencies and study wider societal forces
in order to make predictions of the outcomes of negotiations.si
Schmidt also pointed out that the bureaucratic politics model is unable to explain
the Departent of Defense's change of policy during the above period, from
supporting the Law of the Sea negotiation to withdrawing that support. Schmidt
however regards the bureaucratic politics model as offering more explanation of the
Law of the Sea negotiation than Laursen does. Schmidt has noted that 'if domestic
79Laursen, op. cit., pp. 217-218.
8o/bid.,p.227.
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political considerations ... account for the sweeping natue of the changes in (Law of
the Sea) policy (of the United States) in 1981-2, bureaucratic politics affected the
conduct, if not the outcome, of the (Reagan Administration's) policy review. '82 At
the final stage of the negotiation, bureaucratic infighting in Washington brought the
reversal of the United States' policy on the Law of the Sea and this in tur affected
the negotiation.
Considering the above, the bureaucratic politics influenced the Law of the Sea
negotiation to some extent, however, the ability of the model to explain the Law of
the Sea negotiation is limited. The bureaucratic politics model is unable to explain
fully states' actions at the negotiation or the process that led to states' actions. In
other words the bureaucratic politics model needs another theoretical framework to
explain states' actions both domestically and internationally.
In terms of the domestic politics model, Laursen, while also looking at other
models, examined the extent to which various domestic groups actively lobbied
their interests, and the extent to which the interests of constituents influenced
members of Congress to become involved in the process of formulating United
States' ocean policy. Laursen termed this perspective the domestic politics model,83
This model focuses on the role of Congress, interest groups, and public opinion, in
determining state's foreign policy. This view can explain President Ford's 1976
decision to sign the FCMA mentioned above. The enactment of the FCMA was
considered to undermine the United States' position, paicularly at the Law of the
Sea Conference and Ford's foreign and securty advisers were against the enactment.
Ford signed it, however, in order to secure his re-election. The number of coastal
8I/bid., pp. 213-218.
82Schmidt., op. cif., p. 260.
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fishermen in the United States is considerably small, about 100,000 people,84
however, because they received sympathetic press as well as support from the
general public and conservation and environmental groups, and because the
President faced a tight political race, the coastal fishermen's lobbying influenced the
President's decision.8s This case ilustrates how domestic politics influenced the
United States' foreign policy without direct intederence from either bureaucracy or
the international negotiation. In addition, the domestic politics model explains the
final stage of the decision making of the Reagan Administration when it decided to
reject the Convention. Representatives of industry which had interests in deep
seabed mining had a meeting with the President's policy adviser Edwin Meese, who
was the 'moving force' on the Law of the Sea in the White House context. The aim
was to reverse the instructions given to the United States' delegations to the
Conference. This meeting strengthened Meese's belief that he could not recommend
acceptance of the Law of the Sea Convention to the President and the choices that
became available for the United States were abstention or rejection in the vote for
the Convention. 86
The domestic politics model, despite explaining some aspects, is by no means a
comprehensive perspective that explains the entire Law of the Sea negotiation. For
example, the domestic politics model is unable to explain actions taken by the
United States' Deparment of State. The State Department wanted the negotiation at
the Conference to end successfully, so it tried to accommodate the Group of 77 in
its instructions to delegates of the Conference. Its attempts however were
83Laursen, op. cif., p. 218.
84/bid., p. 222.
8s/bid. pp. 220-222.
86Schmidt, op. cif., pp. 248-249.
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overturned by other moves in the United States, such as actions taken by the
industry towards Meese. In addition, the State Department, without success, tried to
make the United States abstain from voting for the Convention, as opposed to
rejecting the Convention. The domestic politics model is unable to explain the
action taken by the State Department since, according to Laursen's definition, a
governent departent or bureaucracy is outside the scope of the domestic politics
modeL. Moreover, this model has the same problem as the bureaucratic politics
model in that it is unable to explain influences of states' interactions on state's
actions at the negotiation. It is therefore unable to explain the Law of the Sea
negotiation since states' interactions influenced states' actions. In order to explain
the Law of the Sea negotiation, another framework is required.
Based on examination of the five perspectives of the Law of the Sea negotiation,
the assumptions of each model are summarsed below in Table 2-1.
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Table 2-1: Evaluation of the theories
. Models . Assumptions . Evaluation
. Complex . World is changing from . We canot defintely say
interdependence the conventional realist that the World is moving
model to complex toward complex
interdependence modeL. interdependence modeL.
. Its thee conditions are: . Multiple chanels can
Multiple chanels of explai some aspects but the
contact; Minor role of concepts of mior role of
militar force; Absence of militar force and absence
hierarchy among issues. of hierarchy among issues
. States are principle are weak.
actors and states' actions are . The influence of
importt. interactions of states on
domestic factors, and the
inuence of domestic factors
on the interactions of states
are not explained.
. Strctual realism . States' behaviour . Can explai the UN
matters. system.
. Strctural constraits . Canot explain the US
restrain states' actions. action durg and afer 1982.
. The Thd World traded . Canot explain Third
wealth for power. World concessions on the
seabed regie.
. Parliamentar . States' behaviour is . Unti1982 the Law of 
diplomacy importt. the Sea Conference and
. The Law of the Sea parliamentar diplomacy are
negotiation is simlar to simlar but the decision
parliamentar democracy. makg mechansm is
fudaentally different.
. Does not explai the
negotiation after 1982.
. The influences of
interactions of states on
domestic factors, and
domestic factors on the
interactions of states are not
explaied.
. Bureaucratic politics . Bureaucratic politics . Does not explai states'
defies policy and can actons at the negotiation nor
explai US actons. process which led to states'
actions.
. Domestic politics . Domestic politics can . Does not explai states'
explai US actions. actions at the negotiation nor
. Congress, interest all the domestic factors.
groups' behaviour matters.
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As shown above, of the five different views,87 complex interdependence,
structural realist, parliamentary diplomacy, bureaucratic politics and domestic
politics models, there is no one model which can explain the Law of the Sea
negotiation in a single theoretical framework. There have, however, been some
attempts to put together different models in order to explain the Law of the Sea
negotiation. Afer examining four models: realist (statism), complex
interdependence (international interdependence), bureaucratic politics and domestic
politics model based on rationality,88 Laursen concluded that each model has some
defects in explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation, but that the realist model and
domestic politics model can explain most. 89 Laursen pointed out that the realist
model was useful for understanding the primacy of securty interests through the
i 970s, and the importnce of access to resources, which were then considered of
strategic importnce, but that this model was unable to explain changes in policy in
the United States.90 The realist model did not foresee conflct between the President
and his foreign policy and security advisers, which occurred with the FCMA. From
87There are many classifications of models. Kegley and Wittkopf classify the theories of
international politics into four perspectives: Idealism; Realism; Behaviouralism; and Neoliberal
Institutionalism. Kegley and Wittkopf, op. cif. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr.
introduced different perspectives, such as environmental perspectives and systemic perspectives.
James E. Doughert and Robert L. PfaItzgraff Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations: A
Comprehensive Survey, 3rd. ed. (New York; Harer & Row, 1990). In this study, the above five
models were chosen after considering four models: the realist (statism), complex interdependence
(international interdependence), bureaucratic politics and domestic politics model, which were
assessed by Laursen and Schiidt in explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation. These five models
were all attempts to explain the Law of the Sea negotiation by adopting each modeL. Schmidt
included the structural realism model in the realist modeL. As the conventional realist model has
diffculties in explaining international events, such as the Law of the Sea negotiation, structural
realism and complex interdependence models were devised and adopted to explain them. Therefore
in this study the conventional realist model was treated as a basis of these two models. Parliamentary
diplomacy model treats' states as unitary actors, however, it does not emphasise power which is the
basic assumption of the realist model so that it was treated separately.
88Laursen defines the rationality as follows: The statist perspective assumes that central decision
makers wil pursue national interests in a rational manner-Le., they will try to maximise the values
and interests they perceive to be important from the national point of view. The three other models
suggest that central decision makers are constrained in their value maximisation by both international
and domestic factors. Laursen, op.cif., 225.
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Laursen's view, realist and domestic politics models largely compliment each other
because realist goals set importnt parameters for United States' ocean policy and
the changes in policy 'may largely be explained by domestic politics'. 
91
Schmidt also examined the four models, and concluded that no single model is
able to explain the Law of the Sea negotiation.92 Schmidt emphasised the role of
United States' domestic politics in the Law of the Sea negotiation and stated that it
was vital to examine Congressional input into the formation of United States' ocean
policy, since domestic forces are channelled into the political system via Congress,
and that 'presidents may follow the views of domestic groups and lobbies instead of
the imperatives of realism or interntional interdependence. '93 This means that
presidents may choose their policy according to some domestic opinions, not
considering national interests or relationships with other states as primacy. Congress
in fact led the moves towards United States' domestic legislation of deep seabed
mining. This was considered a threat by the Group of 77 and to be in defiance of the
Law of the Sea negotiation, and this greatly influenced the negotiation. Domestic
groups in the United States influenced the . Presidents' decision, in the case of
FCMA, and this, coupled with Congress's moves toward legislation, might not be
considered to be in the best interests of the United States in that it damaged its
relationships with other states. A similar decision situation was observed in the final
stages of the Law of the Sea Conference when domestic interest groups infuenced
the decision of the President to reject the Law of the Sea Convention. These
89Ibid., p. 198.
90Ibid., p. 226.
91Ibid., p. 198.
92Sehmidt,op. cif., pp. 4-9.
93Ibid., p. 9.
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examples show the reasons why domestic politics needs to be considered as much
as any other perspective in explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation.
It might be considered possible to explain the Law of the Sea negotiation using a
combination of any of the above models, however, this is difficult since the models
are based on different assumptions. For example, the complex interdependence
model does not deny the basic realist assumption that states are principal actors in
world politics and it emphasises that states' actions are importnt in explaining
international events. This is the same in the case of the strctural realist model and
parliamentary diplomacy. Complex interdependence, structural realist and
parliamentary diplomacy therefore have a common assumption that states'
interactions basically determine states' actions. States are therefore considered as
'unitary actors', although the level of cohesiveness of states differs depending on the
models. On the other hand, the domestic politics model focuses attention on
domestic politics which determines states' policy. The bureaucratic politics model
focuses on bureaucrats and governental agencies. The common assumption of
these two models is that domestic factors basically determine states' actions. In
other words the former three models focus on states' interactions as the source of
states' actions, whereas, the latter two models focus on domestic factors as the
source of states' actions. These assumptions are basically opposite. Therefore even
if, as Laursen stated. the realist model and domestic politics model could be
combined to explain the Law of the Sea negotiation another model to bridge the
difference in assumptions between the two models would be required. As a result,
another model is needed to set different assumptions which can satisfy the
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conditions of the Law of the Sea negotiation. Developing such a model would need
a formula to inter-relate states' actions at the negotiation and domestic factors.94
Examination of the five models suggests that none of them are able to explain the
Law of the Sea negotiation. Each model examined in this section can explain a part
of the negotiation but none of them can explain all of it. The first three models,
complex interdependence, structural realist and parliamenta diplomacy are limited
in their ability to explain how domestic factors infuenced the negotiation. The lattr
two models, bureaucratic politics model and domestic politics model are also
limited in their ability to explain what influenced states' actions which ultimately
influenced the outcome of the negotiation. The reason why the above models fail to
explain the process is ultimately the lack of a framework which explains states'
interactions at the negotiation and domestic factors together in a single framework.
2. The relationship between states' actions in the international arena and
domestic factors
In terms of the relationship between states' actions in the interntional arena and
domestic factors, there is an international relations theory which attempted to
explain this relationship. Peter M. Haas attempted to explain part of the relationship
by using the epistemic communities perspective.95 Epistemic communities are
networks of 'professionals with recognzed expertise and competence in a particular
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain
or issue-area that transcend national boundaries.'96 Furter, 'what bonds members of
94In relation to this problem, two-level game perspective is assessed in chapter 3.
95Peter M. Haas, Do regimes matter?: Epistemic communities and Mediterranean pollution control',
Interntional Organization, Vol. 43, No. 3, (Summer, 1989); Peter M. Haas, 'Introduction: Epistemic
Communities and International Policy Coordination', Interntional Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1,
(Winter, 1992).
96Ibid, p. 3.
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an epistemic communty is their shared belief or faith in the verity and the
applicability of particular forms of knowledge or specific truths'.97 This means that
members of epistemic communities may stick to their common beliefs and prefer
those beliefs to their own states' national interests. This perspective pointed out the
ties between bureaucrats in different states with regard to environmental policy.98
Haas ilustrated that bureaucrats in different states co-operated to persuade their
respective politicians to co-ordinate environmental policy. This suggests that state
boundaries, even at the level of bureaucracy which is supposed to be most sensitive
to them, are not always relevant and that states are not always unita actors. This
perspective is not able to explain the whole Law of the Sea negotiation since this
perspective aims to explain the relationship between policy co-ordination among
bureaucrats in different states and states' behaviour as a result of that co-ordination.
The perspective does not explain the various relationships between states' actions in
the international arena and domestic factors, other than the relationship between
members of epistemic communties and states' actions. Durng the Law of the Sea
negotiation, for example, there is no evidence that such an epistemic community
existed between the Group of 77 and the United States, rather, experts in the
delegations of both sides made opposite claims in terms of feasibility of deep
seabed mining. In addition, even when the 1994 Agreement was adopted and when
most states' representatives understood that deep seabed mining would not start in
the foreseeable future, the United States and the Group of 77 did not share beliefs or
faith in the verity and the applicability of deep seabed mining. Representatives of
the Group of 77 felt finacial burdens on the ratified member states were too heavy
97lbid, p. 3. note 4.
98Haas, 1989,op. cif., pp. 388-389.
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and so conceded to the United States in order to share the cost of the ISA with the
developed states. The epistemic community perspective is not therefore capable of
explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation.
This perspective, however, falls 'somewhere between the international and
domestic level99 and it is significant here because the five models examined are
unable to explain this case of policy co-ordination among bureaucrats who belong to
an epistemic communty in different staes. This perspective is able to explain how
actions of some bureaucrats in some states influence other states' policies. The
problem is that it is unable to explain actions of bureaucrats who do not belong to
epistemic communities, nor is it able to explain influences of domestic and
international factors on bureaucrats, since the epistemic communities perspective is
based on beliefs of a limited group of people who belong to epistemic communities
and share an identical belief. In addition. if domestic interest groups which do not
belong to epistemic communities influence the political leadership in a state, this is
not within the scope of epistemic communities perspective. Likewise if states'
interactions influence the outcome of the negotiation this also is not within the
scope of the perspective. 
ioo
The inabilty of existing theories to explain states' actions in the international
arena and domestic factors together in one theoretical framework was also pointed
out by Helen Milner. She examined theories of international co-operation and
pointed out that the weakness of these theories was the lack of a domestic
viewpint. As the Law of the Sea negotiation was concluded with a unversal
agreement it can be considered as an exaple of interntional co-operation. Milner
99Helen Milner, 'International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses',
World Politics, Vol. 44 (April, 1992), p. 488.
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defined interntional co-operation as occurng 'when actors adjust their behaviour
to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy co-
ordination.'101 This definition is applicable to the Law ofthe Sea negotiation.
Milner stted that one of the great weakesses of the literature on interntional
co-operation is 'its neglect of domestic politics,'102 and at the same time, that 'no
single theory of domestic politics exists today to explain international co-
operation. '103 This neglect of domestic politics was brought about because of 'the
centrality of anarchy as the condition for differentiating between domestic and
international politics' and because of 'the use of game theory'. 104 In terms of the
former, international politics has been considered separately from domestic politics
because whereas a state has a central force to enforce order, there is no central force
to make states comply with the rules of international society. This has been
considered the key characteristic in distinguishing international politics f~om
domestic politics. With regards to game theory, the premise is that states are unitary
and rational actors.105 When states are considered as such, there is no room for
domestic politics to explain interntional events, since each state is supposed to
behave as a unit tring to maximise its own national interests. The assumption of
the state as a unita actor fails to recognise that domestic pressure may force a state
into a position where it does not act either rationally or in its own best interests.
Taking the above two reasons together, study of international politics has often been
lOOOn this point, Milner stated that Haas 'has nQ theory about domestic politics that explains why and
when an epistemic community can have an impact on the domestic system'. Ibid., pp. 488-489.
IOIIbid., p. 467
102Ibid, p. 481. Domestic politics here seems to include bureaucratic politics as well. The term,
domestic factors, in this study, include domestic politics, bureaucratic politics and other moves in a
state which influence states' actions, including other states' actions.
lO/bid, p. 494.
104Ibid, p. 489.
I05As for game theory, see chapter 3.
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considered as the study of how states behave in order to maximise their national
interests under the conditions of anarchy. These factors make simultaneous
consideration of states' actions in the international arena and domestic factors
impossible.
In order to overcome the problem that states' actions are infuenced by domestic
factors, the differentiation between international politics and domestic politics has
been relaxed by the complex interdependence model, which emphasised
communication between societies. In addition, the assumption of states as unitary
and rational actors has also been relaxed by the complex interdependence model and
structural realist modeL. The complex interdependence model relaxed this
assumption by including transgovernental relations and transnational relations, in
addition to interstate relations. The structural realist model also includes structual
constIaints, that is an interntional regime, which influenc~s states' choices. This
relaxation of assumptions, however, has not overcome the problem that
international relations theories face in explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation.
The inability of models of international relations theory to explain the Law of the
Sea negotiation is highlighted by the problems of differentiating the international
arena and domestic factors.
3. The levei-or-analysis problem
The examination of interntional relations theory in sections one and two of this
chapter highlighted that the problem in explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation
. stems from the assumption tht the international areaa is separate from the domestic
domain and because of this assumption what influences states' actions at the
negotiation and what influences domestic factors canot be explained
simultaneously in one framework.
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This problem directly relates to the level-of-analysis problem which essentially
asks whether it is the international system or other factors which causes
international events and produces the outcomes. Although previously recognised by
Waltz and Kaplan, this problem began to be investigated when J. David Singer, who
coined the term 'level-of-analysis problem', asked 'which level (of analysis) offers
the most fruitful approach to answering the question: (for example) what are the
sources and causes of war?'106 The levels of analysis are usually considered as
individuals, states, the international system, and sometimes the bureaucracy. There
are various opinions about these levels,lo7 for example, Kenneth N. Waltz
considered two levels of analysis: the international system (structue) level and the
units (states) leveL. 108 Waltz argued that, the 'structure (of international system) may
determine outcomes aside from changes at the level of the units and aside from the
disappearance of some of them ((units)) and the emergence of others'109 and
'(s)tates are the unts whose interactions form the strcture of international-political
systems. ' 1 10 This means that the international system determines international
events and the international system is constrcted by states' interactions.
Accordingly, Waltz's analysis is based on two levels, that is, the international
106J. David Singer, 'International Confict: Thee Levels of Analysis', World Politics, Vot. 12, No. 3
(1960), p. 453. See also J. David Singer, 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations',
in K. Knorr and S. Verba (eds) The Internonal System: Theoretical Esays (princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bar Buzan, 'The Level of Analysis Problem in
International Relations Reconsidered', in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds), International Relations
Theory Tod (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 200-201. Kenneth N. Waltz and Morton A.
Kaplan's works investigated the problem before Singer, however, Singer's work called academics'
attention to this problem.
107For example, Jervis referred to two to five perspectives. Robert Jervis, Perception an
Misperception in International Politics (Pnceton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.
15. Russett and Star referred to six levels of analysis. Bruce Russett and Harey Star, World
Politcs: The menufor choice, 5th ed. (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1996), pp. 13-16.
108Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
Although Waltz stated that 'in reality, everyhing is related to everyhing else, and one domain cannot
be separated from others' (Ibid., p. 8.) he indicated these two levels as essential elements.
109Ibid, p. 78.
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system and states' interactions. In Waltz's analysis the domestic level within each
state is irrelevant. As a result, Waltz's framework does not explain the domestic
factors which influenced states' actions at the Law of the Sea negotiation.
There have been many attempts to solve the level-of-analysis problem, however,
none of these attempts have been conclusive. For example, Martn Holls and Steve
Smith have set out three layers of the level-of-analysis: the relationship between the
international system and nation state; the nation state and bureaucracy; and the
bureaucracy and individuaL. 'At each stage the 'unit' of the higher layer becomes the
'system' of the lower layer'.ii This framework is potentially able to put every layer
together if the mechanism of the link between each layer can be identified. This
requires an explanation of how changes in the individual level relate to changes in
the international system level, however, such an explanation has not been devised.
In addition, Holls and Smith's analysis also has the problem of presenting an levels
in sequence from bottom to top. When there are some actions which bypass one of
the layers, for example an individual infuences a state's action directly, it is outwith
the scope of this framework. As a result, this framework is unable to explain the
situation when United States President Ford was influenced by coastal fishermen
directly, as opposed to via the bureaucracy. 1 12
A. Nur Yurdusev distinguished the 'level of analysis' from the 'units of
analysis. 
' 11 According to him, the levels (of analysis) are the philosophical, the
llOlhid, p. 95.
11 1Martin Holls and Steve Smith, Exlaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 8.
112See section 1 of this chapter.
l13This position that distinguished the 'level of analysis' from the 'units of analysis was first
presented by W. B. Maul, 'The level of analysis problem revisited', Canian Journl of Politcal
Science, Vol. 61, No. 1. (1973).
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theoretical and practical levels.114 The units (of analysis) are the individual as an
actor, the society or groups of individuals (agglomeration of actors) and the
universe or humanity (the all-inclusive actor).llS Yurdusev argues that 'level of
analysis is inclusive of unit of analysis, in the sense that those operating at any level
may choose any of the units, while remaining stil at the same leveL. Therefore, level
of analysis and unit of analysis are not identical, but interwoven. '116 He concludes
that 'for analytical precision and because of the interwoven nature of the different
units, it might be better to analyse the subject in question from all three points of
view.'1l Yurdusev pointed out the interwoven nature of the different units, but it is
doubtful that his proposal, that is analysis of the subject in question from all three
points of view, would be able to explain the events any better than others since his
analysis may make the process more complicated. If the analysis needs to be
conducted at three levels, namely, the philosophical, the theoretical and practical
levels, the analysis should sta, as Yurdusev pointed out, from identifying these
three levels and then analysing an event from each of the level's needs. Such
analysis divides the phenomena of events methodologically and makes the whole
matter more complicated since there could be three explanations of an event. In
addition, there stil remains the question, how are the three levels assimilated into
one analysis? Yurdusev, however, argues as his conclusion that 'one needs to be
clear about both the level and the unit of analysis before undertakng a particular
study in order for the context of the subject and the premises under which one is
114A. Nuri Yurdusev, "Level of Analysis' and 'Unit of Analysis': A Case for Distinction',
Milennium: Journal of Interntional Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, (1993), p. 78.
l1S/bid, p. 80.
116Ibid.
1l/bid., p. 82.
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operating to be known.'IlS This conclusion showed that Yurdusev did not attempt to
assimilate the three levels of analysis.
Barr Buzan proposed separating the 'units of analysis' from 'sources of
explanation'. The five units of analysis, according to him, are system (structue),
subsystem, unit (state), bureaucracy and individuals. The sources of explanation are
interaction capacity, structure and process.119 Buzan, like Yurdusev, does not seem
to explain interntional events fully. For example, if a particular event in the
international arena is analysed, we can ask, who caused it? The answer might be a
certin individual, or a group of people. The next question is then, why did he (they)
do it? He (they) might answer that he (they) considered it the best option (or chose it
instinctively) under a specific set of conditions. The next question becomes what
were those conditions and what caused them? This chain of questions shows that
each question is not independent and eventually all the units, that is, Buzan's
System, Subsystem, Unit, Bureaucracy and Individuals, can be interrelated. Buzan
himself has claimed that '(iJn international relations generally, all the levels are
powerfully in play' ,120 however, Buzn's concluding question, 'if two or more units
and sources of explanation are operating together, how are their different analyses to
be assembled into a whole understanding?'121 shows that this method of segmenting
unts is limited.
The above arguents suggest that each level or unit, irrespective of the authors'
definition of them, are interrelated. Nowadays many agree with this perspective. For
example, Kegley and Wittkopf stated that 'common sense suggests that there are
I IS/bid., p. 88.
119Buzan,op. cit., pp. 210-212.
120/bid., p. 213.
121Ibid.
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interrelationships across all levels and that trends and transformation in world
politics are linked simultaneously to forces operating at each level.'122 Further,
Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr stated that '(a)ny level of analysis ignores
something importnt' because 'everyhing afects everyhing else'. 123
If it is concluded that all units or levels are interrelated, the problem remains how
various levels or unts can be put together in order to explain an international event
such as the Law of the Sea negotiation?
4. Conclusion
Despite many descriptive accounts of the Law of the Sea negotiation, there have
been few attempts to explain the Law of the Sea negotiation within the theoretical
framework of international relations theory. This is due to the fact that the Law of
the Sea negotiation was a long process, lasting for twenty-seven years.
Consequently it was influenced by various interntional and domestic factors and it
has been very diffcult to explain this within a theoretical framework. By examining
attempts to explain the Law of the Sea negotiation, it is concluded that none of the
five models examined, nor a combination of them, is able to explain the entire Law
of the Sea negotiation.
The reason for this lack of explanation. is that most of the theoretical models
focus on states' behaviour and therefore ignore domestic factors. When a model
does focus on domestic factors, it is unable to explain the interactions between
states at an international negotiation such as the Law of the Sea negotiation. The
problem with both tys of theoretical model is that they clearly differentiate the
international arena from domestic factors. In addition, many theories assume the
122Kegley and Wittkopf, op. cit., p. 40.
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state is a unitary and rational actor. Models which were examined in this chapter
relaxed these assumptions or focused on domestic factors in an attempt to make an
adequate explanation of the Law of the Sea negotiation. Nonetheless, they were stil
unable to explain international relations and domestic factors together in one
framework, so that ultimately these models failed to explain the Law of the Sea
negotiation in its entirety.
The examination of the level-of-analysis problem, which relates directly to the
simultaneous examination of international relations and domestic factors, suggests
that all units or levels are interrelated, however, a theoretical framework of how to
'put together' the levels or units of analysis has not yet been successfuly achieved.
This issue is the central reason why international relations theory cannot explain the
Law of the Sea negotiation and this issue will therefore form part of the basis of the
detailed examination of the Law of the Sea negotiation carried out in chapters four
to eight.
This study aims to examne the process of the Law of the Sea negotiation. Since
the Law of the Sea negotiation was a negotiation as well as an international event, it
is necessary to understand the theoretical basis of international negotiations as well
as international relations. As such, prior to the detailed examination of the Law of
the Sea negotiation in chapters four to eight, the next chapter examines the Law of
the Sea negotiation in the context of negotiation theories.
123Russett and Staff, op. cif., p. 18.
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Chapter 3 The Law of the Sea Negotiation in Negotiation
Theory
As the Law of the Sea Convention, including the 1994 Agreement, was produced
through negotiation,124 the process needs to be looked at in the context of
negotiation theory. There has not, however, been much analyses in this context
because most negotiation theory assumes that a negotiation lasts for a short period
of time and that negotiators', or actors,'125 preferences126 do not change during a
negotiation.127 The Law of the Sea negotiation lasted for twenty-seven years and it
was greatly influenced by various international and domestic factors128 that arose
during that period. As a result, actors' preferences changed significantly during the
course of the negotiation. This fact makes analysis diffcult. There have been some
attempts to overcome this problem, however, most of these attempts do not explain
how actors' preferences were defined or how they altered. When a negotiation is of
a short duration, the manner in which preferences are defined does not matter since
124The word negotiation is used as the same manner as bargaining. See David A. Lax and James K.
Sebenius, The Manger as Negotiator: Bargainingfor Cooperation an Competitive Gain (New
York: The Free Press, 1986), p. 6. footnote 1; Jacques Rojot, Negotiation: From Theory to Practice
(Hampshire: Macmilan 1991), pp19-2L. There are some cases which look like negotiation but are
not. See Fred Charles Iké, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harer & Row, 1964), p. 27.
125 Actors are usually considered as individuals or entities engaging in negotiation.
126Preferences are perceived interests of individuals or entities and they are considered to detennne
actors' behaviour at the negotiation.
1270n this point, Specor's view is different and he attempts to explain the circular relationship
between negotiators' preferences and the environment of the negotiation, namely the preferences of
the negotiators could be changed by the negotiators' perception of the environment of the
negotiation. See Bertrar i. Spector, 'A Social Psychological Model of Position Modification:
Aswan', in i. W. Zarman (ed.) The 50% Solution (Gaden City, New York: Anchor Press, 1976), pp.
344-347.; Bertar I. Spector, 'Decision Theory: Diagnosing Strategic Alternatives and Outcome
Trade-Offs', in i. Wiliam Zarman, ed., International Multilateral Negotiation: Approaches to the
Mangement of Complexity (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994), p. 75. This point wil be looked at
later in this chapter.
128Domestic factors here mean anything within a state, which influence an international negotiation.
Domestic politics influences the state policy at the negotiation and is par of domestic factors. While
domestic politics is considered to influence the state policy within the state, domestic factors could
influence other states' actions at the negotiation.
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those preferences do not change. Where preferences change, however,
understanding how and what defines preferences and preference change becomes
critical to understanding the negotiation as a whole.
The aim of this chapter is to examine attempts to explain the Law of the Sea
negotiation in the context of negotiation theory. Following on from chapter 2, which
examined attempts to explain the Law of the Sea negotiation in the context of
international relations theory, problems in explaining the negotiation within the
context of negotiation theory are critically examined. In international relations
theory, analysis usually focuses on the international system in which an
interntional negotiation is conducted. Negotiation theory, however, focuses on the
negotiation itself, so that the scope of negotiation theory is much narower than that
of international relations theory. Reflecting this difference between interntional
relations theory and negotiation theory, the analysis of the Law of the Sea
negotiation in negotiation theory is generally fragmented and the number of
analyses is few.
1. The Law of the Sea negotiation and negotiation theory
James K. Sebenius has pointed out that many people, particularly diplomats,
view the process. adopted in negotiating the Law of the Sea as inappropriate for
estalishing a convention129 mainly because it absorbed so much time and energy.
This ty of argument does not attempt to clarify or explain the mechanism of the
Law of the Sea negotiation since it only comments on whether the process itself was
a suitable one. As a result these arguments, centring on appraisal of the negotiation,
have been ignored in this thesis.
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There is in fact very little analyses of the Law of the Sea negotiation in the
context of negotiation theory. This lack of analyses originates from a discrepancy
between the assumptions of negotiation theories and the characteristics of the Law
of the Sea negotiation which are not within the assumptions of the negotiation
theories. Analysing the Law of the Sea negotiation using these theories is difficult
because their scope is limited to negotiations with much narrower and much more
limited conditions than those which occured in the Law of the Sea negotiation.
There are in general two lines of theory of negotiation, game theoretic models
and behavioural models.l3O Game theory deals with the way in which super-rational
people behave in competitive, interactive situations. These people know the 'rules of
the game' very well and 'each can think about what the others are thinking about
what he is thinkng, ad infinitum.'l31 This model is useful in clarifying the nature of
the choice situation, namely when and how the players (actors or negotiators) best
choose from alternate possible moves, and in demonstrating whether a co-operative
solution, namely the players co-operating to solve the issues at stake, is likely or
not. The problems with game theoretic models are that before these models can
operate a number of parameters, such as the probabilities a player will use given
'moves' or a player's preference orderings, must be determned by using non-game
theoretic models, such as examining the player's behaviour.13 In addition, there is
no guarantee that a player wil, in practice, choose the best possible 'moves'. Choice
129James K. Sebenius, 'Designing Negotiations towards a New Regime: The Case of Global
Warming', Internonal Security, Vot. 15, NoA (Sprng, 1991), p. 116.
l3°Game theoretic model here includes mathematical analysis. Cr. Haward Raiffa, The Art an
Science of Negotiation (Cambndge, Massachusetts: Harard University Press, 1982), pp. 20-21. See
also Dean G. Pruitt and Peter 1. Carevale, Negotiation in Social Confict (Buckingham: Open
University Press, 1993), pp. 7-8.; 1. Wiliam Zarman, 'The Analysis of Negotiation', in 1. Willam
Zarman (ed.), The 50 % Solution (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press, 1976).
l3Raiffa,op. cif., p. 2.
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therefore cannot be determined from the game theoretic modeL. 133 Also in
negotiation in practice, the rues of interaction, for example who can communicate
with whom, when and about what, are defined ambiguously, if at all. In practice, the
paries do not know each other's preferences and sometimes they are not too sure of
their own. Even if these preferences are completely known, there are typically many
reasonable solutions available which are individually rational and effcient. The
question, in the case of many reasonable solutions being available, is which of the
available solutions is the most reasonable?134 Furthermore, by itself, game theory
does not consider how parties interpret and explain the moves of the other side,
since it assumes that the other par's motivation can be inferred from its payoffs or
what it obtains from the game. If this is the case then, according to Deborah Welch
Larson, reciprocity in international negotiations, which means why states co-operate
.
despite the lack of a coercive central authority, cannot be explained.135 Therefore,
game theoretic models in general, despite giving some insight into players' choice at
the negotiation, cannot explain the negotiation as a whole.
Behavioural models mainly focus on negotiators' behaviour within a set of
conditions. The main stream of behavioural models are based on three assumptions:
first, the negotiation is by two unitary parties; second, negotiators are always trying
to maximise self-interest; and, third, the negotiation is a one-off and the parties have
13See Morton A. Kaplan, System an Process in Interntional Politics (New York: John WHey &
Sons, 1957), pp. 247-250.
133Ibid, p. 247. Even the type of task may change the outcomes of negotiation. For example,
behaviours of negotiator differ on easy task and diffcult task. Jerome D. Frank, 'Recent Studies of
the Level of Aspiration', Psychological Builetin, Vol. 38, (1941), p. 220.
134H. Peyton Young, 'Negotiation Analysis', in H. Peyton Young, ed. Negotiation Analysis (Ann
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1991), pp. 2-4.
135Deborah Welch Lason, 'The Psychology of Reciprocity in International Relations', Negotiation
Journl, (July, 1988), pp. 297-298.
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no past dealings with each other.136 This typ of model assumes that the negotiation
happens 'suddenly' and negotiators concentrate their attentions only on the issue of
the negotiation and attempt to maximise self-interest without being influenced by
other factors, including their past and future dealings. These behavioural theories
particularly ignore the social context of negotiation, such as social norms, the
relationships between the parties, and the type of parties. With this latter item,
behavioural theory does not, for example, consider that parties might be made up of
groups of people with common interests. In reality the social context of negotiation
infuences negotiations and for this reason behavioural models appear to be
inadequate in explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation.
Behavioural models also lack a time dimension137 and do not consider the past or
on-going situations and relationships between the parties. Therefore if the
negotiation is influenced by changes that occur with time, this ty of model is
unable to cope.
Both game theoretic models and behavioural models have a narow context
within which they view negotiation. There have, however, been substantial
developments in negotiation theories and various factors from real life negotiations
have been incorprated in order to adapt the orthodox theories. 138 Such
developments have not completely escaped from the assumptions of the orthodox
theories139 but nonetheless these developments are examined below.
The Law of the Sea negotiation was quite different from the ty of negotiation
which the above theories envisage. The characteristics of the Law of the Sea
136Pruitt and Carevale, 0p. cit., pp. 7-8. See also Dean G. Pruitt, Negotiation Behaior (New York:
Academic Press, 1981).
13See Pruitt and Carnevale, op. cif., p. 8.
138For behavioural theory, see Ibid., chapters 7-13.
139For game theory, see Larson, op. cit.
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negotiation are follows: 1) participants of the negotiation numbered more than 150
states; 2) the participants had a past history with each other; 3) there were numerous
issues; 4) the negotiation lasted for 27 years and participants' preferences changed
during that time; in addition, 5) individuals, groups and Congress within the United
States' domestic domain14o not only influenced the United States' Law of the Sea
policy but interacted directly with other states at the negotiation.
These charateristics are quite different from the assumptions on which
negotiation theories are based and this discrepancy has made the analysis of the Law
of the Sea negotiation diffcult. Attempts to explain the Law of the Sea negotiation,
namely the works of Haward Raiffa and Sebenius are examined below. Following
on from this, Sebenius's theoretical development in attempting to overcome the
above diffculties is examined.
Raiffa did not analyse the Law of the Sea negotiation itself, but highlighted it as
an example of a negotiation involving many parties and many issues. 141 He pointed
out two features of the negotiation, the single negotiation text method to converge
diverse interests of states and coalition formation which states undertook to pursue
their own interests. Raiffa based his analysis on game theory, but attempted to
expand his analysis in order to accommodate real life situations. The negotiation of
many parties and many issues is often called multi-lateral, multi-issue negotiation.
The Law of the Sea negotiation embraced more than 150 states as paricipants142
and with regard to the issues there were 'virtually hundreds that (had to J be
140¡omestic domain means within a state.
141Raiffa,op. cif.
142There were also many international organisations which participated in the Conference as
observers. See United Nations, The La of the Sea: Offcial Text of the United Nations Convention
on the La of the Sea with Annexes and Indx (New York: United Nations, 1983), pp. 187-189.
Among them, the European Economic Community (EEC) signed the Convention.
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resolved.!14 Raiffa concentrated, among other things, on the usefulness of the single
negotiation text method144 which was used for converging and balancing
participants! interests.145 This method aims to produce a single text, without
alternative drafts of each article, for further discussion. In multi-lateral and multi-
issue negotiation, such as that of the Law of the Sea, it is very diffcult to balance
each participant's interests on every issue because each participant has individual
interests which are different from others. The single negotiation text method
basically highlights where consensus lies on the issue. Although each participant
can pursue their arguent furher on each issue, as well as judge the merits and
demerits of the entire text, they tend not to argue too strongly in order to protect
interests which are in their favour in the text. This approach also has the partcular
advantage of persuading the participants to move from their deadlocked positions
by indicating a point where consensus could be merged. As a result, this method can
converge general consensus on all the issues much more quickly than the traditional
method, which requires discussions on each issue and incorprates the outcomes of
the discussions into a text. This is because the traditional method has no guarantee
that first, participants can reach an agreement on each issue, and second, that the
total agreement can achieve each participant's acceptace as a whole.
The method of single negotiation text was used from 1975 in the Law of the Sea
Conference in order to break the impasse until 1980. It was a useful method for
converging the diverse interests of states and advancing the negotiation. This was
despite the fact that the final product of this method, the 1982 Convention, did not
143Raiffa, 0p. cit., p. 14.
144Por the reason why the single negotiation text method was introduced, see Barr Buzan, Seabed
Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), pp.245-247.
145See chapter 1.
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obtain universality because the United States and some other industrialised states
refused to sign it. The single negotiation text method is a useful method to deal with
multi-lateral and multi-issue interntional negotiation, however, this method was
not used throughout the entire Law of the Sea negotiation. This method was used
between 1975 and 1980, durng the 27 years period of negotiation.146 In addition,
this method is not a framework in itself for analysing the Law of the Sea negotiation
since it is a 'tactic' to converge participants' opinions.
Raiffa also stressed the process of coalition building which occurred among
paricipants of the Law of the Sea negotiation in order to pursue their interests
collectively. Raiffa pointed out that there is a vast difference between conflicts
involving two disputats and those involving more than two, and that in the latter
case disputants may form coalitions and may act 'in concert' against others.147 In
terms of coalitions in the Law of the Sea negotiation, Raiffa stated that there was
one comprised primarily of 'most of the developed world' and 'many Third World
states',148 and that the Group of 77 was 'one reasonably stable coalition of
players'.149 It is true that many interest groups formed during the negotiation
according to the specific interests of states and therefore largely followed the
process described by Raiffa.l50 The majority of these interest groups, however, cut
across developing and developed states lines. The coalition of the land-locked states
group is one example.
146At the final stage ofthe negotiation, between 1993 and 1994, a text, which was called 'boat paper',
was utilsed to help negotiation and to focus negotiating points although it was an unoffcial text.
147Raiffa, op. cif., p. 11.
148Ibid., p. 278.
149Ibid., p. 11.
15ûWith regard to the interests groups formed dunng the Law of the Sea negotiation, see Willam
Wertenbaker, 'A Reporter at Large: The Law ofthe Sea, Part 1', The New Yorkr, (1 August, 1983),
p. 50.; Buzan, op. cit.
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If, as outlined by Raiffa, the negotiation was one between the Third World,
namely the Group of 77, and the developed states, then there is a fundamental
problem with his analysis because the Group of 77 was in fact formed in 1964, thee
years before the Law of the Sea negotiation started. Raiffa defined how the coalition
is built up as disputants may form coalitions in order to act tin concert' against
others in the negotiation. Raiffa's coalition formation process canot therefore
explain the formation of the Group of 77 in a straightforward manner as the
coalition formation which was supposed to occur during the negotiation. In
addition, although Raiffa assumed that partcipants of a negotiation had specific
objectives from the beginnng of the process, the Group of 77 did not begin the
negotiation with firm objectives and it took three to four years to consolidate its
position on major issues. It cannot therefore be said that the Group of 77 was
formed to pursue specific aspects of the Law of the Sea negotiation.
When a multi-lateral negotiation is conducted the negotiation becomes very
complicated since, as Knut Midgaard and Arld Underdal have stated, 'there will be
more values, interests, and perceptions to be integrated or accommodated', and,
'there will probably be more uncertainty as to the interests and motives of some of
the others and as to their perceptions of one's own utilities. '151 In a bilateral
negotiation the sitution is already strctued by definition, whereas in a multilateral
negotiation the initial perception of the participants is often not adversarial because
participants do not know who the adversary is.152 Gilbert. R. Winham noted, in
examining the GATT Tokyo Round negotiation, 'the essence of multilateral
151Italics in originaL. Knut Midgaad and Arld Underdal, 'Multipary Conferences', in Daniel
Druckman (ed.), Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspectives (Beverly Hils, California: Sage
Publications, 1977), pp. 331-332.
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negotiation is that what other parties do between themselves affects ones' own
position with each of them, and hence ultimately affects ones' own interests.'I53
Under these conditions, it is very diffcult to determine state's preferences at the
outset of the negotiation since these are sometimes developed durng the
negotiation. Reflecting the complexity of multilateral negotiation, i. Wiliam
Zartman noted that 'no conceptual work addresses the vast area of multilateral
negotiation'l54 and this is a serious omission in the field of negotiation theory.
Multilateral negotiations therefore have often been considered as being between
two major coalitions. As Raiffa pointed out above, two major coalitions were a
result of coalition building among participants and were therefore par of the
negotiation itself Jeffrey Z. Rubin and Bert R. Brown have stated that the formation
of coalitions is a primary characteristic of multipart bargaining.I55 In addition,
Robert Jervis has stated that analysts must reduce multilateral negotiations to their
bilateral dimension in order to understand them.156 In case of the Law of the Sea
negotiation, many have stated that the negotiation, particularly with regard to the
deep seabed mining regime, was between developing states, in the form of the
Group of 77, and developed states.l5 The Group of 77, in that it complies with
Rubin and Brown's argument that coalitions are generated when 'self-perceptions of
weakess, disadvantage, or insuffciency of resources are needed to obtain an
1521. Wiliam Zarman, 'Two's Company and More's a Crowd: The Complexities of Multilateral
Negotiation', in 1. Wiliam Zarman, (00.), International Multilateral Negotiation: Approaches to the
Mangement of Complexity (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994), p. 1.
153Gilbert. R. Winham, Interntional Trad and the Tokyo Round Negotiations (pnnceton, New
Jersey: Pnnceton University Press, 1986), p. 371.
154Zarman, 1994, op. cit., p. xi.
155Jeffrey Z. Rubin and Bert R. Brown The Social Psyhology of Bargaining an Negotiation (New
York: Academic Press, 1975), pp. 64-65.
156Cited in Robert L. Fnedheim, Negotiating the New Ocean Regime (Columbia, South Carolina:
University of South Carolina Press, 1993), p. 374, note 23.
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outcome,'158 was a typical case of coalition formation. The formation of the Group
of 77, however, was not, as explained above, generated by the Law of the Sea
negotiation. It was formed before the negotiation started and the level of
coalescence, namely the strength of solidarity, of the Group of 77 was enhanced by
various factors. These factors were not only the Law of the Sea negotiation itself,
but also negotiations with developed states at the United Nations Conference of
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as well as many international events, such as
the oil crisis.159 This suggests that in the Law of the Sea negotiation, the formation
of a coalition and the level of coalescence of the Group of 77 is diffcult to explain
within the context of existing negotiation theories.
Raiffa's analysis does not concentrate on the process of negotiation within the
Law of the Sea, but on how multi-lateral and multi-issue negotiations should be
conducted. Using the Law of the Sea negotiation as an example he ilustrated how
multi-lateral negotiation becomes bilateraL. It is, nevertheless, importnt to examine
coalition at the Law of the Sea negotiation. The negotiation can be considered as a
bilateral negotiation, however, Raiffa's explanation about coalition building at the
Law of the Sea negotiation, particularly the Group of 77, is not a reflection of what
actually happened. In order to analyse the actions of the Group of 77, the process of
its coalition building and the level of its coalescence should be considered to
include the events outside of the Law of the Sea negotiation, however Raiffa did not
do this. In addition, since Raiffa's publication was in 1982 his analysis is incomplete
since he did not analyse the United States' rejection of the 1982 Law of the Sea
157For example, i. Wiliam Zartman, 'Introduction: Explaining North-South Negotiations', in i.
Willam Zarman (ed.), Positve Sum: Improving North-South Negotiations (New Brunswick, New
Jersey: Transaction Books, 1987), p. 11.
158Rubin and Brown op. cit., p. 65.
159See chapter 5.
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Convention, nor did he examine the influence of domestic politics on the United
States' Law of the Sea policy.
Sebenius presented two different approaches for explaining international
negotiations. After examining the Law of the Sea negotiation using assumptions of
constant preferences and variable preferences, he developed an analytical
framework called negotiation analysis. These two approaches are examined here.
His first approach was based on two opposite assumptions, that parties'
preferences are constant and that parties' preferences are variable. Sebenius
attempted to analyse the Law of the Sea negotiation 160 using the game theoretic
modeL. His primary focus was not on the entire negotiation, but on the negotiation
of financial arrangements of deep seabed mining, namely the system of financial
payments to the International Seabed Authority. This included fees, royalties and
profit shares required for futue deep seabed miners, as well as the financing of the
first operation of the mining arm of the rSA, which was called the Enterprise. His
assumptions in analysing the financial arangements were that the parties, the
issues, and the evaluation of the issues were constant,161 namely preferences were
constant. He assumed these preferences did not change from the beginning of the
negotiation until the end, although he did point out that parties, issues, and
evaluation of the issues 'may become variable.'162 Whether preferences are constant
or variable is importt for analysts since it determines the method of analysis,
however, Sebenius used both constant and variable assumptions. In his analysis,
Sebenius analysed the negotiation of financial arrangements of deep seabed mining
160James K. Sebenius, Negotiating the La of the Sea (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harard
University Press, 1984).
161Ibid., p. 73.
162Ibid.
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by assuming preferences were 'constant', however, when he explained the rejection
of the 1982 Convention by the United States, he used the 'variable' assumption,
since he considered that the Reagan Administration's preferences changed.
Sebenius gave an account of why, in 1982, the United States rejected the Law of
the Sea Convention. He pointed out that the 'central trade' or trade-off of the Law of
the Sea negotiation between the United States and the developing states (the Group
of 77) was one of navigational rights traded for a deep seabed mining regime.163
The United States originally wanted to acquire navigational rights in return for
concessions in deep seabed mining through a universal agreement of sea use. The
United States' position changed for two reasons. First, the administrtion's
preferences shifted, in that deep seabed mining became more importnt than it had
been before, due to concern about strategic minerals. Second, the Reagan
Administration judged that the 'alternatives to agreement', of the Law of the Sea
Convention, both in terms of navigational rights and deep seabed mining, would be
much more favourable th many previous United States' policy-makers had
thought.l64 'Alterntives to agreement' means other ways of achieving no worse
results than is provided by producing an agreement, and includes the sitution
without an agreement. If pursuing agreement is judged no more meaningful than
without the agreement there is no reason to stick to the negotiation, since the
negotiation is conducted to produce something better than the results that can be
obtained without it.l65 The Reagan Administration came about because of political
change in the United States. It considered deep seabed mining more importt than
l63See/bid., pp. 80-81.
l64/bid., p. 82.
l65See Roger Fisher and WìIiam Dry with BlUce Patton, editor, Getting to Yes: Negotiating
Agreement without Giving in (Lndon: Hutchinson, 1981), p. 104.
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before and that navigational rights were generally available without an agreement
because of states' practices. As a result, Sebenius stated that '(ilf the price of an
agreement appears to rise and the benefits seem largely available without joint
action, the bargain looks poor. '166 Therefore, the United States' policy-makers
decided to reject the Convention.
The concept of a shift in preferences outlined above is substantially different
from the traditional game theoretic approach that a negotiation starts with a given
set of parties, a given set of issues, and fixed preference orderings based on different
possible settlements of the issues.167 According to this traditional approach, parties,
which do not change durng the negotiation, would be able to decide exactly what to
do at the outset of the negotiation and would not change until the end of the
negotiation. In addition, it assumes that parties are unitary and rational actors. The
term unitary actors means that actors are treated as a cohesive unit and there is no
difference in opinion within the actor even if the actor consists of more than one
individuaL. Rationality here means that actors have consistent, ordered preferences,
and that they calculate costs and benefits of alternative courses of action in order to
maximise their utility in view of those preferences, so that each part plans actions
to be taen according to their preferences and has no incentive to change its
plan.168 The shift in the United States' policy was brought about by the change in
administration; 169 that is, a change in domestic politics changed state's preferences.
Sebenius tried to explain this relationship between domestic politics and state's
166Sebenius, 1984, op. cit., p. 82.
167James K. Sebenius, 'Negotiation arithmetic: adding and subtracting issues and paries',
Interntional Organization, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Spring, 1983), p. 281.
168See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy (princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 27. James K. Sebenius,
'Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review', Management Science, Vol. 38, No. 1,
(Januar, 1992), p. 18. .
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behaviour, as a 'negotiation' between 'the different parts of a compartmentalized
bureaucracy' or 'domestic pressure groups'170 in his 1983 article. Ths meant that
some groups in the United States engaged in a 'negotiation' to change the United
States' policy. In this 'negotiation' Sebenius's basic assumption is that each of the
parts or groups was a unitary and rational actor.17 On the other hand, when he
examined the shift of the United States' policy in his 1984 book, Negotiating the
Law of the Sea, Sebenius did not refer to the above pars or groups in the United
States, he only mentioned domestic politics causing the change of state's
preferences,17 without giving an explanation of how this mechanism works.
Sebenius did not mention in his 1984 work whether he considered a state a unitar
and rational actor or not.
If the shift in state's preferences and domestic politics are considered together, it
can be seen that this is a two stage process. 'Negotiations' within the state, which are
synonymous with domestic politics, cause a shift in state's preferences and this in
tu results in a change in state's behaviour at the negotiation. As Sebenius takes
this approach to explain the United States' rejection of the Convention, states'
cannot be unitary actors since it is impossible to have 'two layers' of unitary actors.
If domestic pressure groups are considered as untary and rational actors as outlined
by Sebenius, these groups would be able to take actions rationally under the given
conditions, however, states would not be able to take actions unitaly and rationally
under the given conditions since states' actions would be largely defined by their
domestic politics. A unitary actor cannot have another untary actor inside of it.
169See also chapter 2.
17oSebenius, 1983, op. cif., p. 287.
17/bid., p. 287, note 12.
17Sebenius, 1984, op. cif., p. 77.
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When the United States' rejection, which was caused by 'the shift of preferences', is
linked with its domestic change, namely administration change, it is impossible to
consider a state as a untary and rational actor. Sebenius, however, made the
assumption that within the negotiation on financial arrangements conducted by
states, that the parties, the issues, and the evaluation of the issues, namely
preferences, were constant. This means that states were in fact treated as unitar and
rational actors. If the shift of preferences caused by domestic politics, which
Sebenius used to explain the United States' rejection of the Law of the Sea
Convention is accepted, it is very diffcult to explain the actions taken by the United
States by using the assumption that states are untary and rational actors. As a result,
Sebenius used two approaches, constant preferences for most of his analysis of the
Law of the Sea negotiation and variable preferences for the United States' rejection
of the Convention. The former is a game theoretic model and the latter is a non-
game theoretic modeL. Sebenius was therefore unable to explain the Law of the Sea
negotiation in one analytical framework because of the discrepancy of assumptions.
Sebenius's second approach, in which he attempted to clarify his earlier position,
treated all parties as unitary and bounded rational actors. Sebenius called this
negotiation analysis, saying that, although his basic position in analysing
negotiations depends on game theory, it stands on the concept of bounded
rationality as against rationality.l7 Bounded rationality means that the negotiators'
rationality is limited.174 Game theory assumes that the game's strctue, rules, and
l7Sebenius, 'Negotiation Analysis', op. cif.; James K. Sebenius, 'Challenging Conventional
Explanations ofInternational Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case ofEpistemic
Communities', Interntional Organization, Vot. 46, No. i, (Winter, i 992).
174This bounded rationality is different from Keohane's. On this point, Keohane stated that
,f dJecisionmakers are in practice subject to limitations on their own cognitive abilties, quite apart
from the uncertainties inherent in their environments' (Keohane,op. cif., p. i i 1.) and they
'economize on information by searching only until they find a course of action that falls above a
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possible moves are known by negotiators, however, in reality they are often not
common knowledgeI75 and for this reason negotiation analysis takes a subjective
perspective. In negotiation analysis how negotiators assess the probabilties of
different events is up to the parties and the other side's likely behaviour is
subjectively assessed in the light of available evidence, although subjective
perceptions of the parties' underlying interests are taken as 'sovereign (though not
immutable)'.176 Subjective perceptions of the paies' underlying interests are
therefore basically assumed not to change.177 This view can be very flexible in
explaining negotiations. Negotiators can in fact change their perceptions about the
negotiation as well as their perceptions about other partes' preferences during the
negotiation, since these are judged subjectively at the beginnng. For this reason,
negotiators wil be able to 'expand the pie' or locate the 'zone of possible agreement'.
The 'zone of possible agreement' means the set of possible agreements that are
better for each par than the alternatives to an agreement.17 For example, when
there is only one orange available, and two people want it, they might sta a
negotiation about the orange. If one of them turns out to want only the zest of the
orange and the other the flesh they would be able to obtain exactly what they
wanted. Even if there is only one orange it is actually considered as two. Using one
orange for two objectives is to 'expand the pie' and to find out what each other
wants is to locate the 'zone of possible agreement'. As a result each negotiator can
satisfactory level. . . (which is) adjusted from time to time in response to new information about the
environment'. Ibid., p. 112. This was extracted from Herbert A. Simon, 'Theories of bounded
rationality', in C. B. Radner and R. Radner, Decision an Organization (Amsterdam: North-Holland,
1972), p. 168.
17Sebenius, 'Negotiation Analysis', op. cif., pp. 23-26.
176Ibid., p. 21.
I77Italics by author.
I78See Sebenius, 'Challenging Conventional Explanations ofIntemational Cooperation', 0p. cif., p.
333.
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understand each other's preferences better though negotiation and can reach a better
outcome, since negotiation analysis takes a subjective perspective. Sebenius,
however, states that negotiation analysis does not explain how actors come to define
their interests and preferences.179 Although Sebenius argues that '(t)here should be
no presumption that a part's interests are fixed', 180 it is very diffcult to explain the
shift of preferences without knowing how actors came to define their interests and
preferences in the first place. For example, in terms of the United States' rejection of
the 1982 Convention, uness it is understood how the United States defined its
interests and preferences originally, it is very diffcult to explain why it rejected the
Convention. As a follow on, Sebenius's work does not explain the causes of the shift
of preferences which led to the United States' rejection of the Law of the Sea
Convention and this is a serious omission. In addition, according to Sebenius's view,
in order to analyse a negotiation, all the actors need to be defined at the start of the
negotiation. If so, a group which evolves during the negotiation is not within
Sebenius's scope. For example in his analysis, bureaucratic wrangling in the United
States' governent about the Law of the Sea policy could be explained as a
negotiation within the governent. This wrangling could be seen when some top
ranking, politically appointed governent offcials in the Reagan Administration
started objecting to the Law of the Sea Convention. This new group in the
governent eventully became the dominant power during the decision makng that
led to the United States' rejection of the Convention, however, this cannot be
explained by Sebenius, since the group evolved during the negotiation.
179Ibid., p. 355, p. 333, note 36. Preferences are decided 
after interests are identified.
180Ibid., p. 333.
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When Sebenius referred to theories in international relations, he defined actors as
states, domestic interests, and transnational groupings of either of these. 181 These
possible actors are treated as separate from each other.182 Although Sebenius's
position is that the parties of a negotiation can change during the course of the
negotiation by joining or leaving the negotiation, in order to analyse a negotiation,
all the actors need to be defined at the start of the negotiation and are treated as
unitary actors.183 If this approach is accepted, each individual or group, whether
inside or outside of a state, can be designated as an actor of a negotiation. This
approach is very flexible since, even in international negotiation, state's boundaries
need not necessarily be the only basis for analysing the negotiation. For example,
the role of an epistemic community, which was cross-boundary for the negotiation
of environmental policy co-ordination of Med plan184 could be explained by
Sebenius's approach.185 The problem is, however, that if a state and interests group
in the state are treated as untary actors, the analysis rus into diffculty. This was
mentioned earlier, in that unitary actors cannot have another unitary actor inside of
them. This means that a state and interest groups in other states could negotiate with
each other as unitary actors, however, if interest groups in a state influence their
own governent, the interests groups and the governent cannot both be unitary
actors. As a result, Sebenius's negotiation analysis has diffculty in explaining
actions of actors at two levels: state's actions and domestic factors in a state. This
means, in the Law of the Sea negotiation, that Sebenius's negotiation analysis does
181Ibid., p. 352, note 93.
182See Ibid., p. 333.
183See, for example, Sebenius, 'Negotiation Analysis', op. cif., p. 33.
184See chapter 2.
185Sebenius, 'Challenging Conventional Explanations ofIntemational Cooperation', op. cif.
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not explain the shift of preferences of the United States which was caused by
'domestic politics'.
Sebenius states that paries, their preferences, and issues can all be variable.
When he analyses a negotiation, however, Sebenius assumes that paries, a set of
interests and preferences are given at the outset of the negotiation. 186 In reality, it is
very diffcult to determine state's preferences at the outset of the negotiation. There
is in fact a process of incremental clarification of interests and objectives that takes
place before and durng the negotiation.187 Shaping preferences durng international
negotiation is very importnt for most states since, as Bertram I. Spector pointed
out, interntional negotiators usually confront their counterparts only with their
wits, instructions from their home governent and minimal background
information, without in-depth analyses of issues, strategies, and outcomes that are
required to understand the implications of one negotiation proposal over another.188
During negotiation, parties often clarify or shape their preferences according to their
counterparts' reactions to their demands.
In the Law of the Sea negotiation, the shaping of preferences during the
negotiation was done not only by the developing states. The United States, for
example, at first wanted to have a very weak licensing agency to control deep
seabed development, however, during the course of the negotiation, its position
moved to accepting the establishment of a strong ISA. The process of shaping
preferences is an importt factor in analysing a negotiation and the Law of the Sea
1861bid, p. 355.
187Gunnar Sjöstedt, Bertram i. Speetor, and, i. Wiliam Zartman, 'The Dynamics of Regime-building
Negotiations', in Berram I. Speetor, Gunnar Sjöstedt and I. Willam Zarman (eds), Negotiating
International Regimes: Lessons Leared from the United Natons Conference on Environment an
Development (London: Graham & Trotman, 1994), p.16.
188Bertram I. Specor, 'Decision Analysis for Practical Negotiation Application', Theory and
Decision, Vot 34, No. 3, (May, 1993), p. 184.
77
negotiation is no exception. Sebenius's theoretical framework does not recognise
this. In the case of both Raiffa and Sebenius, they succeeded in explaining only part
of the Law of the Sea negotiation.
The above analysis of the Law of the Sea negotiation was based on the game
theoretic modeL. With regard to the other line of negotiation theory, behavioural
theory, there is no substantial work on the Law of the Sea negotiation in terms of
explanation of the process. Behavioural theory focuses on negotiators' behaviour at
the negotiation as well as the impact of behaviour on negotiation outcomes. There is
a concentration on the tactics which negotiators deploy to influence the outcomes of
the negotiation, and the negotiatots motivation, such as limit, aspiration level and
demand leveL. A limit is the negotiator's ultimate fallback position, which means the
level of benefit beyond which the negotiator is unwiling to concede. Aspiration
level is the level of benefit sought at any particular time, and is the value to the
negotiator of the goal toward which he is strving.189 Demand level is 'the level of
benefit to the self associated with the curent offer or demand'. 190 Negotiators often
decide how much to demand or concede on the basis of the concessions they expect
from the other part. The fuher the other is expected to concede, the more will be
demanded and the less will be conceded.191 Dean G. Pruitt quoted Gary A. Yuk's
work that limit tends to remain constant over time, and aspiration declines toward
limit.192 In addition, Pruitt stated that demand level is ordinarily higher than limit
and aspiration level and that it usually diminishes over time.193 Under these
conditions, the negotiation is usually described as the process of concession making,
189Pruitt, op. cif., p. 25.
190/bid., p. 19.
19/bid., p. 21.
19/bid., p. 29.
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namely reductions in demand, and of deploying tactics between negotiators towards
an agreement. 
194
There are, it can be argued, two fundamental problems in terms of behavioural
theories in explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation. First, when negotiations are
conducted by states in which diverse interests exist, it is diffcult to explain the
entire Law of the Sea negotiation or other international negotiation because most
international negotiation analyses are based on the assumption that states are untary
actors. 
195 Although non-traditional actors, International Governental
Organisations (IGOs) and Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) have started
participating in international negotiations, traditional actors, namely states 'who
embody the interests of governents ... are usually the exclusive agents invited to
the table to conduct bargaining'.196 The outlook of interntional negotiations has
been very influential in regarding states as unitary actors in analysing those
negotiations. Analysis of negotiation between groups whose members have diverse
interests has been cared out, however, this development stil has not included the
influence of domestic factors on other sttes' actions at the negotiation or the
influence of states' actions on domestic factors. This point is examined in greater
detail in Section 2 below.
The second fundamental problem is that the negotiator's limit is assumed to be
constant once it has been established. In some cases, as Spector pointed out,
negotiators do not have definite ideas about their own interests, rather they form
these during the negotiation. The problem is that if a negotiator's limit changes
193Ibid., pp. 30-31. See also Pruitt and Camevale, op. cif., pp. 50-54.
1945ee Pruitt, op. cit., p. 19 and Pruitt and Camevale, op. cit., p. 193. This process is often called a
'negotiation dance'.
195For example, Iklé, op. cit.
1965jostedt et all, op. cit., p. 12.
79
during negotiation, it is difficult to explain the negotiation because of the
assumption that limit remains constant. This is particularly the case with the Law of
the Sea negotiation and is clearly shown in the case of the United States' rejection of
the 1982 Convention. The United States changed its limit, which was originally to
acquire a universal agreement in terms of navigational rights, to protecting its
interests in deep seabed mining. The assumption that limit is constant, cannot cope
with the United States' change in policy. It is clear that a change in the environment
or context of the negotiation, either domestic or international, affected the
negotiation and for this reason, it is examined with reference to United States' policy
in Section 3.
2. Negotiation by groups or states
Dean G. Pruitt and Peter J. Carnevale stated that 'most negotiation theorists draw
no clear distinction between interprsonal and intergroup negotiation'. 197
Accordingly, for these theorists, actors were unitary, and they made no distinction
between the negotiations by individual actors and by groups of individuals, such as
states, when conducting their analysis. This assumption was problematic, since
groups or states usually have diverse interests within, such as bureaucratic politics
or domestic politics. Groups or states have different decision making mechaisms
from individuals who are acting only on their own behalf. When groups or states
engage in negotiation, their representatives are chosen, and they negotiate with each
other on the groups' or states' behalf. As behavioural theory assumes that two parties
negotiate with each other, the negotiation by groups is assumed to be as follows:
Two groups negotiate with each other; and each group chooses a negotiator or
197Pruitt and Carevale, op. cit., p. 152.
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negotiators as their representatives and the negotiators negotiate with each other.
Based on this assumption, in order to explain the difference between the negotiation
between individuals and groups, three models have been developed: the one-way
influence model; the mutual-influence model; and the network model.198 First, the
one-way influence model assumes that constituents, who are the group members,
influence the representatives' behaviour at the negotiation and determne policy
which representatives follow. Second, the mutual-infuence model assumes that
negotiators and constituents infuence each other before and during a negotiation.
Third, the network model assumes that there are several levels or 'arenas' where
intermediaries try to reconcile various interests, and that the levels or arenas are tied
to each other by a network and reconciled interests of constituents are finally
brought to the negotiator. Negotiators of both sides then negotiate with each other,
and bring outcomes back to the constituents. The internal process then proceeds
again through the network and the process of reconcilation of each level or 'arena'
is conducted and the outcome put forward to the negotiator again. In this network,
the negotiation between the representatives is not necessarily the most importnt
one and the reconciliation process between the group members, which can also be
called a 'negotiation' can be the most diffcult. Each of the three models can occur
respectively depending on the ty of negotiation or partes involved. An exception
to the model occurs, when the negotiator is a 'dictator' of a state and in this case the
negotiation can be conducted by him without being influenced by 'constituents'. As
this type of negotiation can be dealt with by the unitary actor assumption model, it
is excluded here.
198Ibid., pp. ISS~160.
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The problem is that the three models outlined above are unable to be applied to
the Law of the Sea negotiation since the models all assume that influences on
negotiations occur horizontally. The communications are assumed to occur only
along the route of constituents of the group to negotiator of the group. From there
communications are from the negotiator to the negotiator of the other group and
onwards to the constituents of the other group. This means that in case of
negotiation by states the negotiation is conducted along the route of constituents of
a state to negotiator of the state and from there to the negotiator of the other state to
constituents of the other state. Constituents are considered to be people involved in
domestic politics, and therefore the process can be described as domestic politics of
a state to negotiator of the state and from there to negotiator of the other state to
domestic politics of the other state. This type of horizontal analysis is problematic
since in reality communication is not along one horizontal route199 and there exist
various communication channels between states, the negotiation itself and domestic
politics.
There have, however, been some attempts to explain the relationship between
domestic politics and states' actions at international negotiations. Robert D. Putnam
attmpted to explain the relationship between international negotiation and domestic
politics by a two-level games model.2oo The two levels are the international leve1201
and the domestic leveL. Putnam focused on the role of 'central decision makers' who
are top governental offcials, including the President in the case of the United
States, in foreign policy decision making. Putnam stated that these central decision
1995ome examples of this case, see James E. Doughert and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contending
Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, 4th. ed. (New York; Longman, 1997),
p.27.
2ooRobert D. Putna 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-level Games',
International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, (Summer, 1988). .
82
makers 'have a special role in mediating domestic and international pressures
precisely because they are directly exposed to both spheres'.202 Within international
negotiations central decision makers are often pressurised by other states and
domestic groups because some states may demand concessions from other states.
Interests groups within the states may then oppose these concessions. The outcome
of a negotiation would therefore be a 'compromise' between the two games because
the 'central decision makers' are unable to ignore either of them 'so long as their
countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign'.203 In this model, the 'central
decision makers' are not necessarily the negotiators at the negotiation table,
however, they are people who decide state's actions at the negotiation. This model
attempted to reconcile the influences of domestic politics on states' behaviour at the
negotiation and the infuence of states' interactions204 at the negotiation on states'
actions at the negotiation. Accordingly, the outcomes of the negotiation would be a
mixture of infuences of domestic politics and states' interactions at the negotiation.
As a result, Putnam's model does not regard states as unta actors, which are only
influenced by external factors, since within his model states' policies are influenced
by internal and external factors.
Putnam's view on the role of central decision makers is similar to that of
negotiators in Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie's intra-organisational
bargaining which refers to 'the system of activities which brings the expectations of
principles into alignent with those of the chief negotiator.'205 Walton and
201Putnam described this as diplomacy.
2021bid, p. 432.
2031bid, p. 434.
204States' interactions mean here the exchange of words or proposals by states' representatives at
negotiation.
205Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behayioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: An
Analysis of a Social Interaction System, 2nd ed. (Ithaca, New York: ILR Press, 1991), p. 5.
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McKersie identified the existence of such a system during labour negotiations. The
chief negotiator is 'the recipient of two sets of demands-one from across the table
and one from his own organization. '206 This alignent of positions often happens in
negotiations between management and trade unions, because each part usually
consists of people who have different interests and different views on their sides'
objectives. The role of chief negotiators in Walton and McKersie model could be
considered the same as that of chief decision makers in Putnam's modeL. Although
Walton and McKersie treated this process of alignent in each side as a 'sub-
process,'207 P. D. Anthony argued that the internal negotiation is 'an essential part of
the negotiation process' and that 'it can probably be explained in precisely the same
terms as the external process which takes place between organizations'.208 Anthony
tried to explain both internal and externl negotiations equally as the 'main process'.
This was the same argument as Putiiam since Putnam treated both domestic and
international factors equally. Anthony's model, however, clearly differentiated the
internal negotiation and the external negotiation and treated them separately, albeit
equally, and focused on each negotiation. Putnam's model tried to explain the
system which leads to a statels actions at the negotiation and focused on the
relationship between states' interactions at the negotiation and domestic politics and
the relationship between these and the system. Putnam's model is basically the same
as Pruitt and Carnevale's mutual-influence model outlined earlier. The most diffcult
element in an international negotiation sometimes lies within domestic politics.
Winham, in analysing the GATT Tokyo Round negotiation, stated that it 'is usually
206Ibid, p. 6.
207Ibid., p. 4.
208p. O. Anthony, The Conduct of 
Industrial Relations (Lndon: Institute of Personnel Management,
1977), pp. 227-228.
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the case that the greatest diffculties in negotiation arise at home.' He concluded that
the particular patterns of constituency pressures on politicians that are related to the
substance of the negotiation may be the most important factor in understanding the
negotiation process.209 This case is shown by Pruitt and Carnevale's network model
which also points out the possibilty that the greatest difficulties in negotiation arse
at home.
In the sense that negotiators face pressure from home, their role, or sometimes
that of central decision makers, is importnt in explaining the negotiation. Likewise
the two-level games model or the network model are able to explain how and why
negotiators define or adjust their preferences at the negotiation. The problem is that
these models are not necessarily a framework for explaining international
negotiations, such as the Law of the Sea negotiation, since they only explain the
'horizontal' relationship between domestic politics and international negotiation.
'Horizontal' analysis is unable to explain all of the communications which
influence the negotiation. As highlighted earlier, the infuence of activities of
individuals or organisations are not limited within the borders of a state. For
example, the development of deep seabed mining technology, such as the
construction of a ship for such purpses in the United States, infuenced the Group
of 77's behaviour at the negotiation. This news alerted the Group of 77, which then
considered that the commencement of deep seabed mining was imminent~ so that it
consolidated its position against the United States. This means that domestic factors
in the United States influenced other states' actions at the negotiation. In addition,
the United States' negotiator used the attempts at domestic legislation for' deep
seabed mining in Congress as a tool for manipulating the negotiation. When the
209Winham, op. cit., p. 375.
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negotiation with the Group of 77 became stalemated in the late 1970s, the United
States' chief negotiator, Ellot L. Richardson, influenced Congress to proceed with
the legislation as a means of breaking up the impasse. These moves toward
domestic legislation in the United States threatened the Group of 77 with the result
that the Group of 77 took an accommodating position. Conversely, when the
negotiation moved forward the United States' chief negotiator influenced Congress
to slow down legislation to help the negotiation proceed smoothly.zlO This example
shows how domestic factors in the United States infuenced the progress of the
negotiation. The above models do not explain suffciently the influences of states'
actions at the negotiation on domestic factors and the influences of domestic factors
on other states' actions.
There is another aspect of interntional negotiations that the two-level games
model and the network model are unable to explain adequately. At the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) negotiation,
national delegations from countries with suffcient resources were composed of
offcials from various relevant ministries and departments. In addition some of the
delegates included, as offcial members, small numbers of NGO representatives,
representing importnt interests within their national populations. As a result, 'the
internal composition of offcial negotiation actors often optimized the multifaceted
interests of a wide range of domestic stakeholders-both in and out of
governent.'Zl1 In this case, if negotiators are defined as delegations to the
negotiation, the domestic and international levels become indistinguishable. This
was also the case in the United States delegation during the Law of the Sea
ZlOMarkus G. Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common Burden?: The United States position on the
development ofa regime for deep sea-bed mining in the law of the sea convention (Oxford:
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negotiation.212 On the other hand, in the case of many developing countries, their
delegates were often only learning about the issues themselves and formulating their
national interests 'for the first time at the negotiation sessions.'213 In this case the
internal process of a state which is envisaged by the two-level games model and the
network model is unlikely to occur, since the issues are not recognised as the
domestic politics of these states.
As shown above, when analysis focuses on the relationship between international
negotiation and domestic politics, such as Putnam's two-level games model, the
analysis only explains part of the negotiation and not the entire process. In Section
2, the relationship between states' actions at the negotiation and domestic factors
was examined. The examination suggests that in order to analyse the Law of the Sea
negotiation, a review of states' actions at the negotiation is not enough, and that it is
necessary to examine factors which influenced the' negotiation, including domestic
factors. In addition, the communication channels which exist other than the
'horizontal relationship' between constituents and negotiators, or centrl decision
makers, also need to be examined.
3. The context of negotiation
Historically, negotiation theory regarded negotiations as tang place between
unitary actors but it was later recognsed that domestic factors could influence the
negotiation along a horizontal channel of constituent to negotiator. On the other
hand, an idea of the context of a negotiation influencing the process was also
recognised. These two ideas were furher e~panded to include both a combination of
Clarendon, 1989), pp. 73-74.
211Sjöstedt et ai, op. cit., p. 13.
212See Schmdt, op. cit" pp. 65-66.
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domestic factors and the context of negotiation itself as an influential factor. These
ideas are outlined below and it is concluded that none of the theories are capable of
explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation.
In his analysis of the Reagan Administration's decision to reject the Convention,
Sebenius argues that the Administration judged that the alternatives to the
agreement became more favourable because the governents preferences shifted
due to the change in circumstances of the negotiation.214 This explanation is not
game theoretic,215 and is merely an observation. As shown in the previous section,
varous factors influenced state's behaviour at the negotiation, but for the purpose of
analysis this observation is insuffcient. The real question is how various factors
influenced states' behaviour at the negotiation, and what the mechanism by which
they influenced it was. In addition, if the negotiation is on-going, as in the case of
the Law of the Sea, how is this tye of change in the circuistances of the
negotiation incorporated in the framework for analysis?
Negotiation theories in general have weaknesses in that they assume the stage
must be set before the negotiation starts. This means that the actors in a negotiation
are supposed to have fixed interests or preferences. As Raiffa pointed out, however,
in many cases the parties are not clear about what is in their own interests.216 In
addition, Raiffa,217 as well as David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius218 mentioned
that, due to new information or a changing situation, the negotiator's preferences
might change. This suggests that negotiation is not straightforward, since it may be
213Sjöstedt et aI, op. cif., p. 13.
214Sebenius, 1984, op. cif., pp. 81-84.
215See section 1 of this chapter.
216Raiffa, op. cif., p. 274.
2l7/bid, p. 127.
218Lax and Sebenius, op. cit., p. 50.
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influenced by many factors, such as the uncertinty of negotiators' preferences or
changes in the circumstances.
Janice Gross Stein has noted that analyses which ignore the context in which a
negotiation takes place are inadequate as explanations of international
negotiation.219 Stein emphasised 'the importnce of context to analyze the goals,
processes, strategic choices, and outcomes of interntional negotiation. '220 The
context of negotiation has a paricular importnce as Anselm Strauss stated that
'the meaning of negotiation process cannot be grasped unless they are seen
within the larger context of ... relations and events. That context is necessarily a
changing one. Furhermore, negotiation takes place in specific relationships with
other modes of action, in accordance with how the actors perceive curent
situations. '221
On this point, in order to understand the negotiation, it is necessary to look at the
process,as well as its surounding circumstaces that together produce the outcome.
Negotiation process includes why paries negotiate, how they identify their interests
and how situational change influences the negotiation. A negotiation like the Law of
the Sea negotiation is not single phased, or one proceeded by a straightforward
'negotiation dance'. It is multi-phased, in that the negotiation itself changes its
characteristics many times due to the changes in circumstances. In order to
understand the Law of the Sea negotiation, changes during that period also need to
be examined. This effectively means that not only the negotiation but also its
context need to be examined.
219Janice Gross Stein, 'Interntional Negotiation: A Multidisciplinary Perspective" Negotiation
Journal, (July 1988), p. 230.
220Ibid.
221Anselm Strauss, Negotiations: Varieties, Contexts, Processes, and Social Order (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1978), p. 23.
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There have been some attempts to explain the context of negotiation, one of
which is Deborah M. Kolb and Guy-Olivier Faure's organisation theory.222 Kolb
and Faure pointed out the need to look at the interface between organisational
structures, cultures, and procedures and negotiation, since many negotiations are
conducted under the auspices of a particular organisation. This means that
organisational settings would be considered as one context of negotiation. This is an
importnt point in understanding the Law of the Sea negotiation because the
negotiation was largely conducted in the organisational setting of the United
Nations. The structure of the United Nations General Assembly and the Conference
influenced the negotiation process a great deal.223 Within the auspices of the United
Nations the negotiation was conducted in several different settings, the Seabed
Committee, the Conference, the Preparatory Commission and the United Nations
Secreta-General's informal c'onsultations. In this respect, Kolb and Faure's
organisation theory can be seen to apply. There are, however, two defects in their
approach. They argue that durng the GATT Uruguay Round, the negotiating parties
went outside the existing strctures to increase their leverage and position because
'£iJntemational multiateral negotiations require considerable creativity and
innovation, and existing structures are generally not appropriate to meet this
challenge. '224 This means that another 'structure', apart from the 'structure' within
which a negotiation is conducted, is needed to explain the parties' activities outside
the existing strcture. In order for Kolb and Faure's work to be conclusive in
222Deborah M. Kolb and Guy-Olivier Faure, 'Organization Theory: The Interface of Structure,
Culture, Procedures, and Negotiation Processes', in I. Wiliam Zartman (ed.), Interntional
Multilateral Negotiation: Approaches to the Management of Complexity (San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass, 1994).
223See chapter 2, and also Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global
Liberalism (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1985).
224Kolb and Faure, op. cif., p. 128.
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explaining the GATT Uruguay Round it needs to explain how the other 'structure'
produced creativity and innovation, because these influenced the negotiation by
increasing parties' leverage and position.
In addition, Kolb and Faure concluded that when negotiations occur under the
auspices of generally weak convening organisations which do not have stable nor
effcient structures, such as the GATT Uruguay Round, the negotiation foru tends
to become an arena for open confrontation and 'achieving satisfactory outcomes is
unlikely, if not impossible. '225 Kolb and Faure appear to recommend building up
strong (as opposed to weak) organisations, such as the European Union (EU), to
negotiate. In the case of the Law of the Sea negotiation, however, a very weak
organisation, which lacked paicipants' long-term commitment, such as is the case
with EU members', produced a satisfactory agreement and this is inconsistent with
Kolb and Faure's argumènt. Furermore, their framework focuses on states' actions
at the negotiation, not states' domestic factors. As a result, it does not explain the
shift of preferences brought about by domestic factors.
The other attempt to look at the context of negotiation was by Ian E. Morley. He
emphasised the need for historical viewpoints, namely why parties negotiate, what
they are negotiating and how they do SO.226 Morley saw negotiation as an event
within an ongoing relationship in which the parties decide whether, and in what
direction, to change their relationship. This view is a rejection of the dominant
theoretical paradigm that negotiation can be understood as a sequence of tactics
employed by two parties on the road to an agreement. 227 Morley has defined
225Ibid.,p.13L.
226Ian E. Morley, 'Intra-organizational Bargaining', in 1. F. Harley and G. M. Stephenson (eds),
Employment Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1992). p. 206.
227See Pruitt and Carevale, op. cif., p. 202.
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negotiation as 'a process of joint decision-making used to handle issues as they arise
in particular social contexts,'228 and he states that negotiation 'functions to define the
terms on which persons or parties will do future business. The end point of the
process is a set of rules. There may also be an agreed story about what happened,
and why.'229 According to Morley, the effect of the negotiation is to add some new
rules or to change some of the old ones.230 If it is accepted that the product of
international negotiation, such as the Law of the Sea negotiation, is a set of rules
which are changed by states, then Morley's framework could be used to analyse
international negotiations. Morley has also identified internal and external
negotiations and the cyclical relationship between them. Although his view has the
potential to explain international negotiation, including the negotiation itself and the
relationship between it and domestic politics, his model has the same problem as
Anthony and Putnam's, in that it misses the' fact that the infuence of activities' of
individuals or organisations is not limited to those within states' borders. According
to Morley's model, negotiators who represent states are the 'intermediate' between
domestic politics and interntional negotiation and these negotiators take domestic
politics and the other side's actions into considerations when negotiating. As a
result, Morley's model also falls into the category of 'horizontal analysis' and
excludes the possibilty that factors in a state might influence other states' actions
directly, which is what happened during the Law of the Sea negotiation. In addition,
although he emphasises the context of the negotiation, it is not clear that he
recognses the changes in preferences durng the negotiation, since he only
228Ian Morley, 'Negotiating and Bargaining', in O. Hargie (ed.), A Handbook of Communication
Skills (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 303.
229Italics in originaL. Morley, Ibid., p. 303.
23ûMorley,1992,op. cif., p. 206.
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mentioned that 'negotiation begins when someone sees change, or the possibility of
change, in the status quO'.231 For Morley, it is clear that changes occur between
previous negotiations which produced existing rules and the next negotiation which
will change the rues, and that the end point of a negotiation is to set new rules by
joint decision-making. Changes, however, could also happen during the negotiation.
Even if a negotiation starts because someone sees change, as a result of changes in
preferences during the negotiation, paries might not want new rules any more.
Morley has not stated this case. It can therefore be concluded that Morley's model
also has limitations in explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation.
In terms of the relationship between the negotiation and its context (which is
sometimes called the environment), Spector pointed out that each negotiator's
behaviour is a response to the circumstances.232 Certin circumstances influence a
negotiation and the negotiation produces other circumstances. Spector based his
view on that '(t)he dynamics between personality and environment account for
locomotion toward the achievement of need satisfaction and tension reduction,'233
and stated that 'the preferences of the negotiator are elicited directly in the
immediate negotiation environment.234 Spector's view points out the circular
relationship between the negotiation and its circumstances and this is an importnt
point in terms of explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation, since his view has the
potential to explain the change in preferences. The problem is that his view
concentrates primarily on the negotiation itself and its circumstances, namely the
negotiator's perception of the circumstances and his opposites' behaviour. As a
231Ibid., p. 205.
232Spector, 1976, op. cit., pp 344 347.
233Ibid., p. 344.
234Spector, 1994, op. cit., p. 75.
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result, Spector's model does not appear to account for domestic factors. As shown in
Section 2, the internal process of a negotiation, namely domestic factors, is as
importnt as the external process, and it is sometimes more importnt than the
external process in determining a policy before and during the negotiation. It is not
clear that Spector considered the context of a negotiation to include the internl
process, since he did not define the environment. Even if it did include the internal
process, as long as the negotiators are considered to be playing the role of
'intermediaries' between the internl process and the external process, the analysis is
a 'horizontal analysis', the problems of which were outlined earlier. It can be
concluded that Spector's model, particularly the circular relationship between the
negotiation and its circumstances, has the potential to explain the changes in
preferences in the case of the United States' rejection of the Law of the Sea
Convention, however, it has defects.
In short, negotiation theory cannot fully explain the Law of the Sea negotiation.
A summary of the theories is outlined below in Table 3-1. As examined above, the
game theoretic model in general, including the specific models of Raiffa and
Sebenius, is limited in explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation since it basically
considers states as unitary actors. For this reason, the shift in preferences by the
United States is not explained. Developed behavioural theory explains the
relationship between domestic politics and negotiators' behaviour at the negotiation,
however, it considers representatives of states, such as negotiators or chief decision
makers, as 'intermediaries' so that domestic factors and the negotiation are linked
via them. There are, however, various communication channels that link domestic
factors and the negotiation, and these are not covered by behavioural theory.
Organisational theory explains influences of organisational settings on states'
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behaviour at the negotiation, however, it does not explain infuences on the
negotiation from outside of the organisational settings, nor the relationships
between domestic politics and the negotiation. Morley's model. explains the
infuence of context on the negotiation, and explains the relationship between the
internal and externl process of the negotiation, however, it has the same problem as
behavioural theory in that it does not explain the various communication channels
that exist between domestic factors and the negotiation. Finally, the influence of
context on negotiation was examined by Spector, however, his view does not
explain the internl process nor the influence of circumstances on domestic factors.
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. The shift of preferences
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Table 3-1. Summary 0
Model
. Raiffa's model
. Sebenius's model for the
Law of the Sea negotiation
analysis
. Sebenius's
Analysis model
. Putman's
games model
. A network model
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. Morley's model
. Spector's model
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As explained above, the models examined in this chapter have two basic
problems. First, game theoretic model, organisational theory, and Spector's model
have diffculty in explaining the relationship between domestic politics and the
state's behaviour. Second, Putnam's two-level games model, network model and
Morley's model can explain the relationship between domestic politics and states'
behaviour, however, these models do not cover the various communication channels
which infuenced the negotiation. The context of the negotiation is dealt with by
organisational theory, Morley's model and Spector's model, however, organisational
theory has limitations in explaining the influence of external organisational settings.
The theories can be summarised by 1) to 3) of the Table 3-2.
Table 3-2. Evaluation of the theories.
Model 1) 2) 3) 4)
Relationship Communication Context of Shift
between channels other the (change) in
domestic than between negotiation preferences
factors and domestic politics caused by
state's and the state's the context
behaviour behaviour of the
negotiation
including
domestic
change
Raiffa's model X X X X
Sebenius's X X D X
model
Sebenius's X X X X
negotiation
analysis
Putman's two- 0 X X X
level games
model
A network 0 X X X
model
Organisational X X D X
theory
Morley's 0 X D X
model
Spector's X X 0 X
model
X: cannot explain; 0: Can explain; D: Can explain but not enough.
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As shown in the Table 3-2 the diffculties which all the models examined here
have is that they are unable to explain the communication channels other than
between domestic factors and state's behaviour at the negotiation. In addition, when
the shift in preferences is considered as being caused by changes in the context of
negotiation including domestic factors, as Sebenius described above, the above
models also have diffculty in explaining the shift in preferences. (See, 4) of the
Table 3-2.) Considering the above examination, in analysing the Law of the Sea
negotiation it would be necessary to examine the various communication channels
between the context of the negotiation including domestic factors and states'
behaviour at the negotiation.
4. Conclusion
Negotiation th~ory has problems in explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation.
Game theoretic models and behavioural models have static assumptions. Most of
these tys of model require the setting up of stages of negotiation. Thereafter
negotiation analysis can be conducted by analysing the process by which an
agreement (or alternatives to agreement) was reached. When these models are used
to analyse the Law of the Sea negotiation, these static assumptions create particular
diffculty in explaining change in negotiators' preferences durng the negotiation as
well as the influences on the negotiation, made, for example, by various individuals
or groups within the domestic domain. These infuences not only affected the
United States' Law of the Sea policy but interacted directly with states' behaviour at
the negottation. Negotiation theory cannot explain ths fact. In addition, due to the
length of the Law of the Sea negotiation, the circumstaces or environment of the
negotiation chaged dramatically and this change also influenced the negotiation. It
is also diffcult to explain this using most negotiation theory.
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The problems of negotiation theory in explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation
are largely characterised by the following two unanswered questions. First, how
domestic changes, the process of the negotiation and the outcomes of the
negotiation can be reconciled in one framework. As shown in section 2 of this
chapter, various factors in the domestic domain which influence states' actions are
confined to the relationship between international negotiation and domestic factors
through decision-makers or negotiators. Durng the Law of the Sea negotiation the
infuences of these various factors were not confined to this relationship and factors
present in the domestic domain directly influenced states' actions at the negotiation
without being channelled through an intermediary. Second, how the influence of the
context of negotiation including the infuence of domestic factors can be explained.
Solving both of these problems has been attempted but no theory has achieved
. .
success on both counts. In order to investigate these questions, the negotiation
process is examined in further detail in chapters four to eight.
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Chapter 4 Why the negotiation started
In the previous three chapters, the inabilty of theories to explain the Law of the
Sea negotiation was highlighted. In chapters 4 to 8 the Law of the Sea negotiation
process is examined in further detaiL. Chapters 4 and 5 examine the causes and
importnt features of the negotiation and chapters 6 to 8 examine the process of the
negotiation from 1967 to 1994.
This chapter examines why the negotiation startd. This is relevant to the context
of the negotiation and as a result to the formation and a1teration of preferences.
These preferences in tur dictated the actions of states at the negotiation. For these
reasons, the question of why the negotiation started needs to be examined. Causes
of the negotiation include speifically, changing perceptions of sea use, Arid
Pardo's initiative of 1967, and the actions by three Latin American states.
1. 1967 Pardo's initiative and changing perceptions of issues of sea use
The direct cause of the Law of the Sea negotiation was Ma1tese Ambassador
Pardo's initiative at the United Nations General Assembly in 1967. Pardo proposed
the creation of a new ocean regime in order to develop or use the ocean and its floor
orderly and peacefully. The main element of his proposal was the concept of
'Common Heritage of Mankind', which aimed to recognse the deep seabed as
belonging to all of mankind. Pardo also emphasised the need for establishing a new
international agency or organisation to regulate ocean activities and deep seabed
mining beyond the clearly delineated national boundaries. The First Committee of
the United Nations General Assembly discussed Pardo's proposal, and, in order to
discuss it furher, went on to establish an Ad Hoc Seabed Committee (which
ioo
became a standing committee in the following year) and which was followed by the
Law of the Sea Conference in 1973.
Pardo's proposal came on the back of several other developments. First, John
Mero's book The Mineral Resources of the Sea (1965)235 highlighted the possibilty
of deep seabed development, thus intensifying discussion about it. Many people
realised that development of deep seabed mining in the foreseeable future was now
possible and, indeed, some American companies had already started a R & D
programme in the early to mid-1960s.236 The Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) of the United Nations put forward a resolution in 1966 to request the
Secretary-General to survey the knowledge of, and technology for, seabed
resources.237 In the same year, at the first annual conference of the Law of the Sea
Institute at the University of Rhode Island, legal debate about deep seabed mining
started and the United States President Lyndon B. Johnson emphasised that 'the
deep seas and the ocean bottom are ... the legacy of all human beings.'238 The
possibilty of deep seabed exploitation had been highlighted and under these
circumstances, Pardo's speech was both timely and well conceived.
Deep seabed mining was not the only reason for the Law of the Sea negotiation,
there were many other contentious issues with regard to sea use. The perceptions of
sea use had changed rapidly, particularly after the Second World War. The United
States had identified the need for unilateral action to protect its interests in its
adjacent seas and acted accordingly. In 1945 the United States issued the Truman
235Mero started to proclaim the manganese nodule a potential resource in 1952. Jack N. Barkenbus,
Deep Seabed Resources: Politcs and Technology (New York: The Free Press, 1979), p. 7.
236Markus G. Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common Burden?: The United States Position on the
Development of a Regime for Deep Seabed Mining in the Law of the Sea Convention (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 19.
237Ibid., p. 66.
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Proclamation which declared its ownership of its continental shelf Before the
Second World War man's use of the sea was considerably limited, concentrating
activity on its sudace for navigation and for fishing. Navigation interests were
mainly held by maritime states, such as the United Kingdom and the United
States,239 which had either strong navies or numerous commercial vessels for
foreign transporttion, or both. In order to secure their free movements on the sea,
these states had a strong interest in maintaining the principles of both the three-mile
territorial seas and freedom of the high seas. These principles were advocated in the
17th Centur by Hugo Grotius, widely considered the founder of international law.
The principles worked to encourage international trade by sea because before that
time some states, such as Spain and Portugal, claimed ownership of the sea
throughout the world. Three miles was said to be the firing range of a canon, thus
the principle of the terrtorial sea was implemented for security reasons, and beyond
three miles every vessel was given free navigation.240 This framework of three mile
terrtorial sea and freedom of the high seas lasted for thee centues. Despite these
principles, some states had claimed their national jurisdiction beyond the three miles
limit. They had various reasons for doing this, inter alia, for their fisheries interests.
These claims were, however, not an importnt problem at that time because the
areas claimed were limited and the number of states making such claims was
minimaL.
The United States made an infuential challenge to the principles of the three-
mile terrtorial sea and freedom of the high seas in 1945. The Truan Proclamation
238Address given by President Johnson at the commissioning of the Ship Oceanographer, July 13,
1966, cited in Barkenbus, op. cit., p. 40.
239This 'maritime state' excludes some states, whose registration are called flags of convenience,
such as Panma and Liberia, which have many registered vessels. because of their lenient regulations.
240These principles were accepted only during peace time and not during wars.
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of 1945 separated the adjacent sea into three parts: the territorial sea; the continental
shelf; and the water column above the continental shelf The concept of the
continental shelf was new, and the United States claimed that its continental shelf
was an extension of the land-mass of coastal states, and that no one was allowed to
exploit it without the United States governent's consent. The United States aimed
to promote domestic investment in offshore mining by assuring domestic industry
security of tenure.241 The Proclamation implied that the water column above its
continental shelf was stil in the area belonging to the high seas, namely the area in
which free navigation was guranteed. This concept was quite a complicated one,
produced through long internal discussions in the United States governent. The
discussions started in 1937, mainly because of adjacent fishing interests.242 The
United States governent's intention was to protect its fishing resources at that
time, however, during the course of the discussions two importnt points were
realised. First, the continental shelf had resources which could replace those which
had been used in large quantities for the war effort. With regard to mineral
resources, especially oil, the technology for exploiting offshore oil existed before
the Second World War. The technology was used only in the shallow sea of 'not
much more than a dozen feet' although it was used more than a mile from the
shore. 243 This exploitation capability strongly suggested wider and furer
exploitation of the continental shelf was possible. The second point was that if the
United States claimed a fishing zone over its adjacent sea other states would follow
suit and this would daage United States' navigational freedom, especially for navy
241See Barkenbus, op. cit., p. 30. Ross D. Eckert, The Enclosure of Ocean Resources: Economics
and the La of the Sea (Stanford: Hoover Institutions Press, 1979.), p. 33. The press release which
accompanied the proclamation stated the outer limit of the United States claim was two hundred
metre isobath line.
242Ban Buzan, Seabed Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 7.
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vessels, because it would give coastal states power of intervention against passing
vessels. This was a strategically important question when considered in the light of
strait passages for navy vessels, especially in international straits. If the breadth of
terrtorial sea became wider than three miles, many importnt international straits,
such as the Strait of Gibraltar, which is only eight miles wide,244 might be
overlapped on both sides by coastal states.
At the time the Truan Proclamation was made, therefore, the major concerns of
the United States' policy-makers were threefold: navigational interests; the
ownership of the resources of the continental shelf and fishing interests. After the
internal discussions of the United States' governent, the first two items were
separated from the third. At the same time as the Truan Proclamation, Truan
issued a Fisheries Proclamation to establish conservation zones to cover the third
issue. This Fisheries Proclamation was mainly targeted at Japanese fishing vessels
which were thought to be entering the Alaskan salmon fisheries.245 This
Proclamation did not assert United States' jursdiction or their exclusive use of the
area, which was far beyond three miles, rather it tried to establish the United States
authority over the fisheries resources.246 The United States' adjacent seas then
consisted of three pars: three miles terrtorial seas, continental shelves beyond three
miles and water column beyond three miles. Terrtorial seas were the area within
three miles, which were traditionally recognsed, and they included the continental
shelf and the water column. The area beyond three miles were high seas and within
243/bid., p. 35.
244Spain had historically claimed its six mile terrtorial sea although other states did not recognise it.
245Eckert,op. cif. pp. 128-129.
2460uring the Law of the Sea negotiation, the United States tried to convince other states to accept
ths idea, however, it was not supported and a simple two hundred mile Exclusive Economic Zone
was preferred. In the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, fishing in the high seas is in principle open to
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that area freedom of the high seas were recognised. According to the concept of
freedom of the high seas, the continental shelf beyond three miles could not be
claimed as the area of national jurisdiction, however, the United States made this
claim. In addition, the United Statès declared that the water column beyond three
miles, and within their claimed continental shelf was in principle the area of high
seas, however, it also claimed authority over fisheries resources beyond three miles.
When the Truman Proclamation was made, there were virtually no objections to
it.247 This was significant. The fact that there is no objection against a state's claim,
is one of the most favourable factors in supporting the claim to become legally
effective in internationallaw.248
After the Truan Proclamation many states followed suit and extended their
national jurisdiction over their continental shelf beyond the three-mile terrtorial
sea.249 This trend caused conflicts between states in many places, especially in
relation to oil resources. Although the Abu Dhabi Oil Arbitration, which started in
1949 and ended in 1951,250 concluded that the continental shelf right was not yet an
all states (Aricle 87), although in the Convention some rules relating to paricular species were
incorporated (Aricle 116).
247Eckert,op. cif. p. 3.
2481nternational law is ( a) interntional conventions, or treaties or agreement by states, (b)
international custom, ( c) the general principles of law, and (d) judicial decisions and others. See
Statute of the Interntional Cour of Justice, Aricle 38. Treaties are binding only on states which are
party to them, however, the provisions of treaties may become binding on other non-party states
when they pass into customar law. Statute of the International Court of Justice refers to
international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law. There usually needs to be two
factors for something to be judged as international customar law. These are first a general and
consistent practice adopted by states; secnd, opinio juris, the conviction that such a practice is
required or allowed by international customar law. If a state persistently objects to a practice, it will
not be bound by the practice if it becmes customar law. This means that even if a state has not
specifically assented to the practice, unless it represents its objection to it, it may be bound by the'
customar law. See R. R. Churchil and A. V. Lowe, The La of the Sea, revised. (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1988), pp. 5-10.
249The nature of claims vared. Some states claimed jurisdiction and control over the resources of the
shelf, others claimed sovereignty over the shelf.
250 
See Buza op. cit., p. 10; Said Mahmoudi, The Law of Deep Sea-Bed Mining: A Study of the
progressive Development ofInternational Law Concernng the Management of the polymetallc
Nodules of the Sea-Bed (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987), p. 58.
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established rule of internationa1law, the trend of enlarging the national jurisdiction
over the continental shelf continued. For example, Australia claimed its continental
shelf in 1953, to which Japan protested. The First Law of the Sea Conference in
1958 eventually confirmed coastal states' jurisdiction over their continental shelf
A change in the circumstances surrounding fishing was the most common and
the strongest motivation for coastal states extending their national jurisdiction. This
was caused mainly by foreign distant water fleets catching fish in other coastal
states' adjacent seas. Coastal states were worried about the depletion of their fish
stocks by the overcatch of other states' vessels. The catch of fish increased
dramatically, especially after the Second World War, in accordance with
technological development of fishing, such as sophisticated fish-finding equipment.
The total catch of fish world-wide in 1967 showed a 300 per cent rise from 1950.
The Soviet Union began energetic distant-water fishing in 1956 to provide its nation
with suffcient protein and soon extended its operations world-wide. In the early
seventies, Russian ships had more than half the total tonnage of all the fishing fleets
in the world. Japan was second in tonnage with ten per cent.251 The dispute about
fishing became a serious matter in some quarters, with Britain and Iceland starting a
cod war.252 In 1953, Iceland extended its fishing zone to four miles and in 1958, to
twelve miles. The United Kingdom retaliated and closed its ports temporarily to
Icelandic fish imports.253
251Wiliam Wertenbaker, 'A Reporter at Large: The Law of the Sea, Part 1', The New Yorlær, (l
August, 1983), pp. 46-47. One reasoned this the persistent failure of the Russian wheat crop. ¡bid.
252The cod war stared in 1958 and ended in 1976. See Churchil and Lowe, op. cif., p. 310. Eckert,
op. cít., p. 130, p. 151, note 48.
2531n 1973, Iceland again extended to fifty miles and in 1975 to two hundred miles. On the last
occasion, both states employed some force and Iceland broke its diplomatic ties with the United
Kingdom.
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By 1968 the number of states which claimed fishing zones to twelve miles or
more was more than sixty.254 The more states extended national jurisdiction
unilaterally, the more states followed suit. Russian distant water ships catching fish
world-wide was the result of national policy, however, other states' distant water
fishing, particularly in pluralist states, were conducted by private entities. States
tried to accommodate fishermen's demands as much as possible so that states acted
to protect their fishermen's interests. This was paricularly true for the states whose
fishermen were being threatened by foreign distant water fishing boats. Local
fishermen lobbied their governents to protect fishing stocks.
Interests in the continental shelf also changed and these changes were mainly
brought about by the development of the offshore oil industry. Although technology
existed before the Second World War, development after it was rapid. The first oil
well beyond the three mile terrtorial sea limit was driled in 1947 in the sea
adjacent to the United States.255 The United States had been an exporter of oil until
that year, however, as a result of increasing domestic oil consumption it began to
import oiL. This spured the rapid development of the offshore oil industry. By 1953,
drillng rigs were extended up to twenty five miles from the shore. Technological
development went furer from the shore and deeper into the sea. M. W. Mouton's
report, which was submitted to the First Law of the Sea Conference in 1958, stated
that a consensus within the industry was that commercial drillng would be possible
in depths up to 600 feet within a decade.256 This potential for offshore oil
exploitation prompted some states to attempt to make an agreement delimiting the
boundares with neighbouring stàtes; Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in 1957 are one
254Buza,op. cit., p. 60, p. 64 note 7.
255It was only 17 feet deep. Ibid., p. 35.
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example. After the First Law of the Sea Conference in 1958, coastal state's
jurisdiction over the natural resources of the continental shelf was formally
recognised, however, the boundary disputes on the sea among neighbourng states
became a very serious problem. This was paricularly true for the offshore oil
industry when it came to obtaining exploration and exploitation permits from
coastal governents.
By 1968 the development of offshore oil had spread to over twenty states and oil
and gas exploration was undertken by more than fift states. By 1970 oil and gas
had been discovered off the coasts of twenty-eight states, and prospecting activity
was under way on the shelves of seventy-five states.257 Around this time offshore oil
development was enthusiastically conducted. Barr Buzn has stated that '(b)y the
mid-1960s offshore oil was well on the way to rivallng fishing as a( n L interest of
coastal states. '258
During the 1960s, some serious accidents and incidents occured at sea. The
increase in world shipping, especially oil transport, was rapid and it coincided with
an increase in the number of accidents. The Torrey Canyon wreckage in the English
Channel in 1967 opened a new phase of ocean accidents. Torrey Canyon was a
super tanker transporting bulk oil and the accident caused massive pollution. The
Santa Barbara Spil from an offshore oil well off Californa in 1969 also created
concern about pollution, as well as the coastal state's control of the water column.
These accidents were harbingers of massive environmental problems. Before this
stage, there were many minor environmental problems on the sea, such as the
dumping of oil from boats. These however could have been ignored since awareness
256Ibid., p. 62.
257Ibid., p. 125.
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of environmental problems was stil low and the problems individually did not seem
to cause serious destruction of the environment. The incidents of the Torrey Canyon
wreckage and the Santa Barbara Spil were quite different from past incidents.
First, they were notable for their huge size. In addition, given the rapid increase of
oil consumption, the expeditious technological development and the rapidly
spreading offshore oil development, these tyes of accident were bound to happen
more frequently and cause even greater environmental daage. Along with the
development of ocean research, which brought more information about
environmental problems caused by human activities at sea, came an enhanced
awareness of the effects on the environment of sea use. Given the possibility of this
tye of incident happening on their adjacent seas, people and particularly
environmental activists, demanded that governents control activities in the
adjacent seas.
The changes in perceptions of sea use were mirrored by action taking place in the
international arena. Before the First Law of the Sea Conference, the International
Law Commission (ILC) discussed issues related to sea use and it proposed to hold
the First Law of the Sea Conference which was eventually held in 1958. The ILC
prepared the draft convention for the Conference. During this discussion the
decisions of the ILC on the continental shelf drifted. In 1951 the ILC accepted
exploitabilty criterion, which meant that coastal states' jurisdiction would cover the
continental shelf to the point of capabilty of exploitation. On the contrary, in 1953,
it abandoned the exploitability criterion and adopted the two hundred metre isobath
criterion259 which meant that coastal states' jurisdiction could reach up to the point
258Ibid., p. 61.
259It is on average fort miles from the shoreline.
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where the depth of seas is 200 metres. This change occurred because it was
considered to be more certin if the limit of national jurisdiction on the continental
shelf was numerically decided as opposed to being based on exploitability criterion.
Exploitability criterion could, and was expected to, change due to technological
development, since the technology for exploiting offshore resources was developing
rapidly. In the end, the ILC produced an article of compromise for the Conference
on the limit of coastal state jurisdiction over the continental shelf, which contained
both criteria, exploitabilty and 200 metre isobath.260
Some developed states thought that the flexible limit, exploitability criterion,
would avoid the problem of obsolescence of the agreement, and would prevent the
fixed limit, the 200 metre isobath criterion, becoming the framework of 'creeping
jursdiction' into the water column. Creeping jurisdiction was coastal states' actions
to extend their national jurisdiction gradually seawards beyond three miles. The
developed states were afraid that if the limit over the continental shelf was fixed,
coastal states might extend their national jurisdiction over the water column up to
the point where coastal states would have jurisdiction over the continental shelf,
namely 200 metre isobath line. On the other hand, the Latin Americans, some of
whom had claimed 200 miles national jurisdiction, wanted a definition of the limit
of the continental shelf which did not confict with their national legislation and
preferred the exploitability criterion.261 At the time when the above discussion was
taking place, technological development over the continental shelf was stil limited.
260The aricle stated that the area is 'to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth
ofthe superadjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said area'.
Aricle 1 of Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958.
261 Especially for states situated on the west coast of South America, which have only a narrow
continental shelf, the two-hundred metres isobath criterion had serious implications: the area over
which they would have jurisdiction would have been very narrow. On the other hand, the east cost of
South America has a shallow broad continental shelf.
110
Nevertheless, the extension of the coastal states jurisdiction over the continental
shelf beyond three-mile territorial sea already had substantial support and it was
formally implemented in the First Law of the Sea Conference by the Continental
Shelf Convention of 1958. Many states which had not ratified the Convention also
claimed the same. In the end, in February 1969, the decision of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) for the North Sea Continental Shelf case decided that Articles
1 and 2 of the Continental Shelf Convention262 were customary international law
and said that 'the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of
its land terrtory into and under the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its
sovereignty over the land ... There is here an inherent right.' This decision helped
states which had claimed their jurisdiction up to the continental shelf margin to
retain that jurisdiction. 263
Contrary to the compromise reached on the continental shelf, the ILC was unable
to reach an agreement on the breadth of the terrtorial sea. The breadth of the
terrtorial sea was a more serious issue than the continental shelf Most martime
states opposed an extension to the breadth of territorial sea because it would daage
the navigational freedom of their commercial and navies' vessels.
Eighty-six states attended the First Law of the Sea Conference in 1958. Western
states accounted for twenty nine; the Soviet Group, ten; Latin American, twenty;
Arab, nine; Asian, sixteen; and African, twO.264 Reflecting the distribution of
attendants, the negotiation of the Conference was, in reality, among developed
262 Aricle 2 states sovereign rights of the coastal states over the area of continental shelf for
exploration and exploitation of natural resources.
263By the end of 1967, the North Sea continental shelf was completely divided up among six
countries by the median line principles, although a small part of it stil needed to be decided by the
ICJ. This delimitation was motivated by the offshore oil exploitation. The United Kingdom and
Norway acquired a large area of the continental shelf and the border between them was up to one
hundred seventy miles from the coas. See Buzan op. cif., p. 121. .
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states and some developing states which had strong interests in fishing. The
interests of the developing countries were at that time often tied to the interests of
the developed countries. Accordingly, the interests of the developing countries were
vulnerable to pressure from the developed countries. There was also a division of
the Western states and Eastern states, reflecting the difference in the maritime
capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union under the atmosphere of the
Cold War. The Soviet Union was not a maritime state at tht time,265 although it had
already started to build up its maritime capacity. The Western maritime states
generally supported three-mile up to six-mile terrtorial sea. The Soviet Union and
its allies, on the other hand, supportd the twelve mile territorial sea.266 The
positions of developing states were far from unified and among them there were
largely four different positions: two hundred miles supporters; twelve miles
supporters; middle range expansionists, who used distance or depth or exploitability
criteria furher than three miles terrtorial sea; and non-or weak position states
which could not, or were not willng to, state their own position.
The 1958 Conference produced four Conventions on the terrtorial sea; the
continental shelf; fishing; and the high seas.267 Two of the most importnt issues,
however, the breadth of the territorial sea and the coastal states' jurisdiction over
fisheries were unresolved. These important items led to the Second Law of the Sea
Conference in 1960. As a result of the discussion held at the First Law of the Sea
264Ibid., pp. 37-38.
265The Soviet Union's navy had remained weak since its defeat by Japan in 1905. See Keohane and
Nye,op. cif., p. 133. The Japanese Navy 'annihilate(d)' the Russian Baltic fleet. Esmond Wright
(ed.), History of the World: The Last Five Hunded Years (Feltam, Middlesex: Newness Books,
1984), p. 551.
266Buzn, op. cif., p. 49. Russia extended its jurisdiction to twelve miles in 1909 mainly for fishing.
Ibid., p. 4.
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Conference, the choices which the participants had to decide between were focused
on two options. A twelve mile territorial sea or a combination of six mile territorial
sea plus six mile fishing zone. The former was supported by the Soviet Union, the
latter was sponsored by the United States and Canada. Both failed to be adopted.268
In the end, there was no agreement about the breadth of the territorial sea or fishing.
As they could not adopt a new agreement, the traditional three mile territorial sea
was supposed to be stil in effect.269 In 1962, Canada tried to persuade the United
States to re-negotiate the outstanding issues. It did this by showing the United States
the supporters' list of the combination proposal of six mile territorial sea plus six
mile fishing zone, which had been sponsored by the United States in the Second
Law of the Sea Conference but the United States rejected the idea of a combined
limit.270 Regardless of the absence of formal agreement many states unilaterally
claimed various zones beyond three miles.
Before the First and Second Law of the Sea Conferences, concerns about sea use
were stil limited to a relatively small number of states. This situation changed
substantially because of the Conferences. Attending an international conference is
an opportunity to examine partcipants' own interests in the topic in detail.271 Of the
fift-one terrtorial sea claims made by states between 1960 and 1970, thirt six
267The four Conventions were carefully separated. This was highlighted by the fact that many
paricipating states did not ratify all of them. The four Conventions were careful to preserve the
doctnne of the high seas. See Schmidt, op. cit., p. 21.
268The latter combination proposal collected fifty-four votes in favour in the plenary and it had
twenty eight opposing votes and five abstained. If the opposing votes had been twenty seven it would
have been adopted because the Conference procedure required two-thirds majority votes.
2691n this respect, Churchil and Lowe have suggested that if 
the number of supporters of the new
rules, such as the two hundred mile zone, increases, then legality may shift because of the shift of the
general rule. Churchil and Lowe, op. cit., p. 8.
270Buzan, op. cit., p. 59.
271Gunnar Sjöstedt, Bertar I. Spector, and, I. Wiliam Zarman, 'The Dynamics of Regime-building
Negotiations', in Bertram i. Spector, Gunnar Sjöstedt and i. Wiliam Zarman (eds), Negotiating
International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (London: Graham & Trotman, 1994), p. 13.
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states claimed a twelve mile limit. Of the seventy-seven states which had claimed
more than three miles, fift states claimed twelve.272 Eleven states claimed more
than twelve miles.273 Twelve mile territorial sea claims were therefore gaining
support. The width of twelve miles was not agreed interntional law, however, it
was the width of the terrtorial sea which many states felt they could claim because
of the negotiation at the First and Second Law of the Sea Conferences.
Maritime states, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, which had by
now become a maritime state, were worried about these expanding claims. This
trend threatened maritime states because it would impede their naval and
commercial vessels' mobilty, especially in international straits. In addition, it meant
that submarines could not pass through those straits while submerged and aircraft
could not fly through straits without consent. Maritime states, especially the United
States which had global naval capabilities, tried to stop the extension of coastal
states jurisdiction, but without success. In 1965, the Soviet Union made tentative
overtures to several maritime states, aimed at containing expansive claims to broad
terrtorial sea. In the United States, Defense Department offcials argued that the
United States should discuss 'creeping jurisdiction' and the straits issue, preferably
on a bilateral basis with the Soviet Union. In 1967, the United States and the Soviet
Union informally discussed at a technical level the creation of a High Seas Corridor
through all international straits which would otherwse be overlapped by the
terrtorial seas. The United States also discussed this with its alles. 274
The Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States led to another
.
development in the sea. The two superpowers were competing in space and also on
272Buzan, op.cif., p. 118 Table 6.1.
273Ibid., p. 117.
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the ocean. The Soviet Union and the United States were committed to ocean
research. The Soviet Union started its ocean research programmes enthusiastically
in the 1950s, equallng United States levels by the mid-1960s.275 This brought a
rapid expansion in fishing capabilty, especially distant water fishing, and the
expansion of naval and commercial capabilty followed in the 1960s. Similarly, the
United States built the first nuclear-powered submarine in the 1950s. This brought
additional importnce to the sea because of the development of submarine-launched
ballstic missiles as secure second strike strategic weapons. One of the notable
events durng this time was the loss of the United States' nuclear submarine
Thresher, which sank in deep waters, in April 1963. The United States realised that
the technology to salvage wrecked submarines in deep waters was limited and in the
following year it began a new programme to develop relevant technology for
retrievaL. This had a significant impact on the technological development of deep
sea bed exploitation. Subsequent accidents involving American submarines in 1966
and 1968276 added to the momentu of technological development. In addition,
'Sealab', a research project into the feaibilty of human dwelling underwater, also
commenced in 1964. This created fears that the United States was planning to build
permanent miltary bases on the seabed because the United States Navy was
involved in and fuded the Sealab project. 277 This undoubtedly spured the Soviet
Union's ocean development and the Sealab project itself helped to develop the ocean
technology of the companies involved. The United States also energetically
274Schmidt, op. cif., p. 22.
275Buzan,op. cif., p. 55.
276Ibid., p. 57.
277Ibid., p. 57, p. 63 note 3.
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encouraged ocean research by the Marine Resources and Engineering Development
Act and the National Sea Grant Colleges and Programs Act, both in 1966.
2. The actions of three Latin American states
Just after the 1945 Truman Proclamation had been issued, there was a further
development in Latin America. Chile and some other states claimed a two hundred
miles maritime zone over their adjacent seas. These claims, made by states situated
on the west coast of the continent, were made because of fishing interests. This
move was concerted and spread quite quickly throughout the continent. Chile's
claim ofa two-hundred miles zone in 1947 was brought about in order to protect its
infant whaling industry. The whaling industry which had been mainly situated in
Europe and operating in Antarctic waters, had ceased to function because of the
Second World War. This led to shortges of soap and cooking oil in Chile, and in
order to produce these goods themselves, Chileans began their own whaling
industry. There was little threat of war to Chilean whaling vessels because Chile's
adjacent sea was far from the war zone. After the Second World War the European
whaling industry revived and threatened the Chilean whaling industry. In addition,
there was then some prospect that the Chilean governent might become a part to
an international agreement which would regulate whaling in the offshore zone
beyond territorial seas.278 A Chilean whaling company consulted Jermán Fischer, an
interntiona leg~l expert, and he advised that the company should lobby the
governent to implement a two-hundred miles maritime zone according to a
'precedent'. The Chilean company consequently lobbied the Chilean, Peruvian and
278 Ann L. Rollck, 'The Origins of 200-mile offshore zones', American Journal of International La
Vol. 71, (1977), pp. 494-500. In the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, coastal states or international
organisations may limit or prohibit exploitation of marine mammals, such as whales, seals and
sirenians, in the EEZ. See Aricle 65.
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Ecuadorian governents. In order to protect its whaling industr, Chile, in fact,
needed just a fift miles zone, however, the Chilean governent in June 1947 made
the larger claim, based on a mistaken interpretation by Fischer of a 'supposed
precedent'. The precedent was the securty zone adopted in the 1939 Declaration of
Panama, which in fact had delineated about a three-hundred miles securty zone off
the Chilean coast. The zone had been established at the United States' initiative on
the outbreak of war in Europe in order to serve as a neutral or safety zone, which
had not in fact worked.279 The account of the Declaration which Fischer had, was
accompanied with a rough sketch of the security zone. The rough sketch indicated
to Fischer that the extent of the zone was somewhat less than three-hundred miles.
These interpretations made Fischer advise the whaling company that the two-
hundred miles zone was a precedent and persuaded the reluctant company of the
necessity of a precedent in order to take international action.280
Peru followed the Chilea claim shortly afterwards in August 1947, and Ecuador,
in Februar 1951, also took formal steps. Their reasons for doing so were slightly
different from those of Chile. Neither Peru nor Ecuador engaged in fishing more
than twenty five miles from their coastline, but Peru was interested in developing an
anchovy industry and both states wanted other states' fishing vessels away from
279Rollck noted that '( w Jithin the limits of this zone, bellgerents were to be prohibited from
engaging in hostilties. The security zone ... ceased to be relevant when the United States became a
bellgerent. Even before then, it was apparent that the zone served as a hiding place for bellgerent
vessels and that its neutrality was not in fact observed.' Rollck, op. cif., p. 498.
280Ibid., pp. 498-499. See also Churêhil and Lowe, op. cif., p. 135. In interntional law precedents
are very importnt. When the 1994 Implementation to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention was
adopted, Sohn noted that, becase the negotiation by all nations was proved to provide new
international law, '(tJhe law of the international community need no longer be discarded by seaching
through archives for state practice or be dependent on submission to the International Court of
Justice of the cases that would crystallse a few rules of international law.' Louis B. Sohn
'International Law Implications of the 1994 Agreeent', American Journal of International La, No.
88, (1994), p. 701. This shows that international lawyers tend to search for precedents in all cases.
117
their adjacent seas because of the prospect of American tuna fishing in the area.281
For these states, Chile's idea seemed to succeed in protecting their own interests and
the reasoning shown by Chile was persuasive, especially on the point of whether
they should follow the precedent.
The Truman Proclamation also encouraged these three Latin American states to
extend their national jursdiction seawards, even though they were not particularly
interested in their very narrow continental shelves at that time.282 Contrar to the
United States' argument about the status of the continental shelf, which was very
sophisticated since the adjacent seas were separated into three parts, the Latin
Americans' argument was quite straightforward because their claims were not much
different from the extension of terrtorial seas. Their action was an apparent breach
of existing international law since it hampered the principle of freedom of the high
seas and it invited a great deal of opposition from maritime states, such as the
United States and the United Kingdom. Despite the objections, other coastal states
in South America followed the actions taken by the above Latin American states.
By 1950, 15 of 17 Latin American states claimed more than three miles jursdiction
over their adjacent seas in various different ways.283 Buzan has pointed out five
reasons for this. First, the tradition of nationalism gave a highly positive value to
sovereignty. Second, the geographical character of the area meant that most states'
borders are on the open ocean and do not have delimitation problems with bordering
281Hollck, op. cif., p.499.
282These three states were n.ot considering the breadth of their continental shelf, especially when
Chile claimed a two-hundred mile zone. The reason for this was firstly because these states were not
paricularly interested in resources on the continental shelf. The continental shelf was a major
concern for prospective or existing oil producing states who had potential wells in their continental
shelf, but other states were not paricularly interested in the continental shelf at that time. Peru, for
example, later legislated petroleum law on the continental shelf in March 1952. See United Nations,
National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the La of the Sea (New York: United Nations, 1974),
p.163.
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states. Third, was the fact that these states were less preoccupied with recovering
from the war. Fourth, and particularly for Chile, Ecuador, and Peru whose
continental shelf was narrow, the new continental shelf idea, which was provided by
the Truan Proclamation, was not attractive. Fifth was the fact that the Truan
Proclamation worked as an incentive to extend national jurisdiction seawards.284 As
Latin America was isolated from the Second World War, 'old' Latin American states
(as many of them who became independent in the 19th century were called) were
ready to seize the opportunity of developing their own interests.
Against much opposition to their extending national jurisdiction, the Latin
American states were dauntless in keeping their unilateral position and continuously
insisted on maintaining their position in the Organisation of American States
(OAS).285 the ILC and other places. Chile, Ecuador, and Peru sought to strengthen
their common stand on the maritime zone, which covered the whole sea area and the
seabed within two-hundred miles, by the Santiago Declaration in 1952.286 These
states then began to seize United States tuna boats that continued to fish in the zone.
The United States tried to stop their seizure by diplomatic means although there
were opinions in the United States that the governent should send its navy to the
area to protect its tuna boats. The Latin American states would not change their
position. When the United States stopped its aid to Peru to force it to stop its seizure
of American fishing boats, the Peruvian governent expelled United States miltary
attachés from Peru.287 In the end, the United States reacted to this situation by
passing the Reimbursement of Fines Act in 1954. This Act provided United States
283Buzan, op. cit., p. 10.
284Ibid., p. 1 i.
285The GAS was founded in i 948.
286Schmidt noted, it 'seemed like to indicate that what they claimed was equivalent to a 200-mile
terrtonal sea.' Schmidt, op. cit., p. 21.
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fishermen, who were arested in the area which the three governents declared as
their jurisdiction, with repayment of the fines. Since the United States did not
recognise the area it could not prevent its fishermen from entering it. This reaction
by the United States was significant. Although the area was not importnt for naval
activities,288 the decision of the United States governent appeared to cause further
unlateral claims by other states because it gave other states the impression that the
United States might possibly allow them to do SO.289
There were, it can be argued, reasons for the United States allowing the Latin
Americans to claim two-hundred miles national jursdiction. First, during the
Second World War the Latin American states were supportive of the United States
and the United States did not want to daage these relationships. On the other hand,
the three Latin American states must have thought that they deserved some reward
from the United States for the support they had given it durng the Second World
War and that compared with European states, which were supported by the Marshall
plan the United States had not given them the assistance they deserved. For
example, when in 1948 United States Secretary of State George Marshall attended
the Conference of Bogota, which established the OAS, Latin American leaders told
him that the Marshall Plan would be better applied to Latin America than to Europe
because they were poorer than European states and they were supportive of the
United States durng the War. Robert A. Pastor stated that 'Latin Americans felt that
they deserved help and that the United States owed it to them'.29o This feeling must
287See Wertenbaker, Par 1, op. cif., p. 47.
288Soo Eckert, 1979, op. cif., p. 324.
289If a state claims wider jurisdiction over its adjacent seas, it also owes more responsibilties on the
widened area. This means that it needs more funds to sustain its claims. This fact put many
developing countnes off declaring wider jurisdictions.
290Robert A. Pastor, Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean
(pnnceton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 173.
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have been part of the justification for the seizure of United States fishing boats in
their maritime zones. Under these circumstances, it was not easy for the United
States to react with force. In addition to this, the period was one in which the Cold
War was at its most virulent. The United States did not want to antagonise this area
because of their unlateral actions. Pastor stated that '(alftr World War II, the
United States feared that a Latin American nation would align with the Soviet
Union' and, when the United States' fear came true, the United States feared that
other states would align with Cuba.291 The United States did not want to push any
Latin American states towards the Soviet group. Moreover, the United States had a
declared interest in Latin America since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. At that time
the United States warned the European powers not to intervene in the Americas and
in retu the United States would likewise refrain from interference in Europe.292
Adding to the above three reasons, two other reasons are also possible. The Truan
Proclamation itself was a United States' unlateral claim. If the United States had
used force against those Latin American states which made unilateral claims, it
would have been very diffcult to justify its own conduct. Luard has pointed out that
for the Latin Americans the basic principle in both the Truan Proclamation and
their own two-hundred miles zone was the right of a coastal state to the resources in
its immediate vicinity. 293 Chile, Peru, and Ecuador in fact have very narrow
continental shelves, so the Truan Proclamation which was related to the width of
continental shelf, was not in their interest. In addition, the United States itself was
also interested in its fisheries conservation albeit in a different manner. The United
291Ibid., p. 20.
292In addition to this there was a precedent in Latin America. Although Ecuador levied fines on a
United States ship in 1935 the United States did not react by using force. See Robert O. Keohane and
Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependnce, 2nd ed. (HarerCollns Publishers, 1989.), p. 101.
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States probably did not want to deny all the rights of coastal states in terms of
fisheries in their adjacent seas. As a result, the unilateral claims of Latin Americans
went untouched. This had two importnt consequences. First, the unilateral actions
by those states triggered other states' unilateral claims, initially in Latin America
and then in other continents. Secondly, after the Law of the Sea negotiation started
in 1967, and particularly at its early stages, the Latin American states attempted to
tu the discussions to their advantage and finally they succeeded in turnng other
states' opinions to support the idea of 200 miles national jurisdiction.
The states' actions highlighted above were brought about by the changing
perceptions of policy-makers. Before the Second World War the perceptions of
policy-makers on sea use were limited to sudace transporttion and fishing. Afer
the Second World War perceptions on fishing, resources of the sea, and
environmental impact of sea use brought about changes in the traditional rules of
sea use, namely three miles territorial seas and freedom of the high seas. Policy-
makers' concerns about the sea also brought about further development of
technology for sea use and prompted its fuher development. This need to change
the rules of sea use promoted states' actions in the international arena-both in the
form of unilateral action and also in the convening of conferences.
3. Discussion
The perceptions of policy-makers of each state in terms of sea use changed
dramatically due to technological development, increased information and other
factors. As a result, states' policy on sea use changed and coastal states started to
enclose their adjacent seas in order to protect their own interests in the area. Many
293Evan Luard, The Control of the Sea-Bed: Who Owns the Resources of the Oceans?, revised.
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coastal states wanted to enlarge their national jurisdiction seawards, however,
maritime states wanted to restrict the area of coastal states' jurisdiction to be as
narrow as possible since extension of coastal states' jurisdiction would hamper their
navigational freedom. This situation, coupled with interests in deep seabed mining~
finally led to the Law of the Sea negotiation.
With regard to negotiation theory, neither game theoretic models or behavioural
models, generally consider why the negotiation startd and analysis begins when a
set of issues, parties and evaluation of issues are defined and then concentrates on
the process of actual negotiation. This may be a satisfactory approach when
preferences of the parties do not change but the above shows that before the Law of
the Sea negotiation started preferences of the parties were changing and continued
to do so during the negotiation. States altered their preferences on the width of
national jursdiction for example, according to the situation (context) prevalent at
the time. In the case of the Law of the Sea negotiation what began as a need to
delineate national boundaies based on the firing range of a canon became an arry
of complex and overlapping factors ranging from the views of individuals, such as
a Chilean lawyer, to the current status of the Cold War. With regard to these types
of models it can therefore be concluded that their inabilty to consider preference
change makes their application to the Law of the Sea negotiation diffcult.
In terms of negotiation theory Morley's model seems to ilustrate an
understading of the importnce of preference change. Morley states that a
negotiation starts when someone sees change, therefore suggesting that change is an
importnt factor in a negotiation. In addition, and unlike the above models, Morley's
model also examines why parties negotiate. Morley states that in order to devise a
(Lndon: Heineman, 1977), p. 145.
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new set of rules parties need to identifY what happened and establish a unified
'story'. Morley's model focuses on negotiation as being the transformation of rules,
from one set of rules to another and this process is considered to be a alteration of
the parties' relationships. This idea of negotiation being the transformation from one
set of rules to another, appears to be much more applicable to the Law of the Sea
negotiation. Morley's model, however, has problems in identifYing who the 'parties'
who undergo a shift in rules and change in their relationship are. For example, the
principles of three miles terrtorial seas and freedom of the high seas were
established before the independence of the United States or Latin American states.
Although these states accepted such principles after their independence, these
principles were established by 'old' states. In addition, parties are diffcult to define
in other ways. States who at first did not consider the ocean issues as relevant later
became heavily involved in the negotiation. Morley's model does not appear to
include the fact that the parties may change and that there may be many of them. In
addition, many states, for many different reasons, were making unilateral claims of
national jurisdiction without having agreed new rules first and it is not clear whether
this type of 'transition of rules' is within the locus of his modeL. Although Morley's
model seems to be capable of embracing some elements of the negotiation it is stil
far short of a comprehensive model which can be applied to the Law of the Sea
negotiation.
With regard to interntional relations theories an examination of the causes of the
Law of the Sea negotiation reinforces the view that they have diffculties to
adequately explain the process. In terms of the change in sea use, although the
conventional realist model views the world as static, Keohane and Nye's complex
interdependence model clearly states that the world is changing from a realist model
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to one of complex interdependence.294 Accordingly, the complex interdependence
model may explain the change of perceptions of sea use. Keohane and Nye stated
that issue area which is relevant to public policy is subjectively judged by policy-
makers.295 As a result change in perceptions of sea use brings about policy change.
On this point, the changing perceptions of sea use can be explained by the complex
interdependence modeL. In addition, the unwillngness of the United States to
deploy force against the three Latin American states seizing its tuna boats could be
said to be one manifestation of the minor role of milita force which was
characteristic of complex interdependence. There are, however, some problems with
the complex interdependence modeL. Firstly, although the United States did not
employ military force against the three Latin American states which infringed the
United States' economic interests, the primary objective of the United States at this
stage was securing its naval mobilities through international straits and building up
its military capabilities at the sea. The minor role of military force therefore does
not hold true. In addition, the influence of the Chilean whaling company's lobbying
of three governents is not within the model's scope. The Chilean whaling
company lobbied the three governents to support its interests, and this suggests
that communications between individuals and policy-makers of states may not be
limited to within a state's boundary. This is very diffcult to explain by the complex
interdependence model since this ty of communication is not included in the
model's assumption.
294Krasner's international regime is also based on perception that regime can change. Stephen D.
Krasner, 'Structal causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening varables', in Stephen
D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 3-4. See also
Ernst B. Haas, 'Words can hurt you; or, who sad what to whom about regimes', in Krasner, Ibid., p.
57.
295Keohane and Nye, op. cit., pp. 64-65.
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In terms of the level-of-analysis problem, this chapter showed that various
factors brought about the Law of the Sea negotiation. These factors include
individual levels, states' levels and international levels. These levels were
interwoven. For example, Mero's idea of deep seabed mining, coupled with, among
others, the United States' interests in the deep sea bed, led to Pardo's initiative at the
United Nations General Assembly. Consequently states set up a seabed committe
in the United Nations, which was the beginning of the negotiation. A Chilean
lawyer's advice to a Chilean whaling company led to the company's lobbying three
Latin American governents. These governents extended their national
jurisdiction seawards. They were not forced to abandon their unilateral claims
because of the relationship that existed between these states and the United States.
As outlined in chapter 2, although the level-of-analysis problem recognises that this
may indeed be the case, how the mechanism of these inter-relationships operates
has yet to be established.
4. Conclusion
An examination of the causes behind the Law of the Sea negotiation shows that
the overwhelming features were change and complexity. Change occurred not only
in the 'context of the negotiation', but in states' actions. Complexity is shown in the
way that factors caused other factors to occur and they in turn had an infuence on
other factors. With regard to international relations theory and negotiation theory,
an examination of the causes of the Law of the Sea negotiation has shown that in
this area negotiation theory is inadequate in explaining this element of the process.
The work of Morley goes some way to incorprating the process of change but even
this model is not fuly developed. In the sphere of international relations theory the
most significant factors are the inability of theories to explain the complexity of the
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communication network and the inabilty of the level-of-analysis problem, despite
recognising the interrelationship between factors, to offer an explanation of the
mechansm by which these interrelationships operate.
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Chapter 5 Major Issues of the Negotiation: The Basic Structure
for the Analysis of the Negotiation Process
In this chapter major issues of the negotiation are examined. This includes the
core issues of the negotiation, the Group of 77, and the implicit coalition between
the United States and the Soviet Union.
The main issues, as outlined in chapters 1 and 4, had come to light before the
negotiation had even started. For the maritime states navigational freedom was of
primary importnce and the United States and the Soviet Union were particularly
concerned about 'creeping jurisdiction' which was hampering their navies' mobility.
On the other hand, coastal states wished to extend their national jurisdiction
seawards in order to protect their interests in their adjacent seas. Despite the issue of
deep seabed mining being new, it was considered a 'bonanz' at' the time the
negotiation started, and almost all states were concerned about the economic
benefits which might be derived from the development of deep seabed mining.
These three issues, navigational freedom, national jurisdiction seawards, and deep
seabed mining, were eventually compounded and became the core issues of the
negotiation. The 'antagonists' of the negotiation were constrcted according to their
preferences on these issues.
The Group of 77 was the driving force behind the developing states and aimed to
establish a new interntional system in their favour. Although the Group of 77 was
not consolidated at the beginnng of the negotiation, they gradually became so
through activities inside and outside of the negotiation.
Finally, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is
examined. The objectives of the Soviet Union in terms of core issues were, up until
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the Reagan Administration rejected the Law of the Sea Convention, the same as the
United States and it is argued that these two superpowers formed an 'implicit
coalition' against the Group of 77.
1. The core issues of the negotiation
The Law of the Sea negotiation started following Pardo's initiative at the United
Nations General Assembly. Pardo advocated a new ocean regime, particularly
concernng the deep seabed, by introducing a new concept of Common Heritage of
Mankind. Deep seabed mining was considered to be a 1Jonana' so that almost all
states were concerned about the economic benefits which might be derived from its
development. Developing states paricularly favoured the concept of a Common
Heritage of Mankind since it suggested that disproportionate benefit might be given
to the poorer states. On the other hand, developed states, particularly states with
potential technology and financial capability to conduct deep seabed mining, did not
necessarily favour the concept since if the benefit from deep seabed mining went to
developing states it would be to their detrment. In addition, developed states
wanted to avoid any restrictions on deep seabed mining which might be imposed by
a Common Heritage principle.
Apart from the issue of deep seabed mining, maritime states, such as the United
States and the Soviet Union, were particularly concerned about 'creeping
jurisdiction' which was hampering maritime states' navigational freedom, and
particularly that of their navies. As a result, the United States and the Soviet Union
attempted to organise a conference to establish new rules of the breadth of national
jurisdiction and navigation, particularly for international straits, but they failed to do
so.
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These three issues, navigational freedom, national jurisdiction seawards, and
deep seabed mining became the core issues of the Law of the Sea negotiation. As
Pardo stressed in his speech at the United Nations General Assembly, states needed
to . clearly delineate the national jurisdictional boundary in order to establish the
deep seabed area. If the exploitabilty criterion which was established in the 1958
Continental Shelf Convention was used as a basis for the boundary, national
jursdiction could extend to the middle of oceans,296 and consequently there might
not exist any deep seabed areas outside national jurisdiction. This suggested that
solving the issue of the area of deep seabed, which was proposed to become the
Common Heritage of Mannd, would also solve the issue of the breadth of national
jursdiction. As a consequence this would also solve the problem of navigational
freedom and paicularly strait passage, since without resolving the issue of strait
.
passage the breadth of national jurisdiction seawards would not be able to be
agreed. As a result, the deep seabed issue and navigational freedom were combined
as a 'package deal' in the 1970 Conference Resolution which decided to convene the
Third Law of the Sea Conference in 1973. A package deal meant that in order to get
a par of the package, the whole package would need to be agreed.
The acal trade-off in the package deal, although widely accepted, was however
never explicit and there were some arguments about what constituted the trade-off
Friedheim stated that the package deal in the Law of the Sea negotiation was a
trade-off between navigational rights and twelve-mile terrtorial sea in return for the
two-hundred miles Exclusive Economic Zone. The EEZ is the area in which coastal
states have jurisdiction ~ver living and non-living resources. The subject of ~hat
2%Soo Said Mahmoudi, The Law of 
Deep Sea-Bed Mining: A Study of the Progressive
Development ofInterntional Law Concerning the Management of the Polymetallc Nodules of the
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constituted the trade-off became a focal point when the United States rejected the
Law of the Sea Convention in 1982. Friedheim argued that 'territorial sea, straits
transit, and EEZ' were the core of the package,297 because '(n)ot even in the most
optimistic days of US participation in the negotiation was (trade-off between
'navigational right' and 'seabed mining regime') ever publicly conceded'.298
Similarly, Schmidt argued that there was no internal United States governent
agreement to approve such a trade-off, although he says that 'the assumption of the
intention to enter into such a trade-off existed, especially in Congressional and
industry circles. '299 On the other hand, Sebenius stated that the 'central trade' was
navigational rights and seabed mining regime. He argued that coastal, straits, and
archipelagic developing states generally do not have the means for exploiting the
deep seabed. In addition, developed maritime nations perceived that these states had
been restricting, and could continue to limit, valuable navigational freedom by
extending their national jurisdiction. Given these twn conditions, that is,
developing states without the means for exploiting the deep seabed, but with the
capabilty to restrict developed states' navigational freedom, coupled with developed
states with the means for exploiting the seabed, but without having succeeded in
stopping developing states restricting their navigational freedom, navigational
freedom and seabed exploitation became inseparably linked. Preventing creeping
jursdiction and achieving legal gurantees of navigational freedom, particularly in
Deep Sea-Bed (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987), p. 61.
297Robert L. Friedheim, Negotiating the New Ocean Regime (Columbia, South Carolina: University
of South Carolina Press, 1993), p. 334. See also pp. 222-224.
298Robert L. Friedheim, 'The Thrd United Nations Conference of 
the Law of the Sea: North-South
Bargaining on Ocean Issues', in 1. Willam Zartman (ed.), Positive Sum: Improving North-south
Negotiations (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1987), pp. 91-92.
299Markus G. Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common Burden?: The United States position on the
development ofa regime for deep sea-bed mining in the law of the sea convention (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1989), pp. 116-118.
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the strait passage, were predominant in United States policymaking and virtually
non-negotiable in the Law of the Sea conference as far as they were concerned. 300
The conditions on navigational freedom and the deep seabed mining were, for the
United States, the combination of an absolute requirement on one condition and a
flexible position on the other.301 This meant developing countries could allow
developed countries their navigational rights and in return developed countries
would concede the deep seabed mining regime in the developing countries' favour.
The difference between the views outlined above is that one requires explicit
accession of a trade-off of the negotiation, whereas the other observes general
conditions of the negotiation. Schmidt noted that his interviewees would admit that,
'if it is implied that ambiguities in the navigational provisions were traded off
against ambiguities in the sea-bed provisions, then trade-offs did occur-a process
that is in the nature ofintemational negotiations in general'.302 Even if there was not
a precise agreement about this trade-off, there was, as Schmidt suggested, a
cognitive understading about the trade-off between navigational rights and deep
seabed regime between the developed states and the Group of 77. Moritaka Hayashi
added that participants of the negotiation gradually perceived, and became
convinced, that the core issues for trade-off were the seabed regime and strit
passage, even if participants had not mentioned them explicitly.303 This was why the
United States engaged in the painstaking negotiation and conceded to the extent that
300James K. Sebenius, Negotiating the La of the Sea (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Haard
University Press, 1984), pp. 80-81. See also James K. Sebenius, 'Designing Negotiations Towards a
New Regime: The Case of Global Warming', Interntional Security Vol. 15, No. 4 (Spring 1991).
Mahmoudi,op. cit., pp. 248-250. Booth's view, particularly before the Reagan Administration,
seems to support this view. Ken Booth, La, Forth and Diplomacy at Sea (Lndon: George Allen &
Unwin, 1985), pp. 61-62.
301Sebenius, 1984, op. cit.
302Schmidt, op. cit., p. 117.
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their traditional values, free market, were compromised by accepting, up to 1980,
production control or technology transfer. This was shown in the 1982 Convention
text, namely the production control of seabed mining by the International Seabed
Authority and its mandatory technology transfer, which were contrary to the United
States' traditional values of a free market. Based on the history and process of the
negotiation it can be concluded that there was cognition of the trade-off between
navigational rights and deep seabed regime.
2. The Group of 77 and its objectives
The Group of 77304 as a group of developing states had two functions. First, it
formed and pursued the objectives of the group, and second, it was an association
aimed at mutual help. The resources of the member states, in financial and human
terms, were limited, particularly for the purpse of international negotiations. In
international negotiations, it is usual for committees or sub-committees to be held
simultaneously. When a state was unable to send a group of experts to negotiations
in which it had interests, the Group of 77 supported those states by arranging
different member states to attend these meetings in order to represent them, or in
order to prevent them missing importnt information.305 At the Law of the Sea
3031nterview with the author in Rome on 23rd September 1997. Moritaka Hayashi was a former
Director of the Offce of Ocean affairs and the Law of the Sea, the United Nations.
304When it was formed the number of participant countries was 77. Not all the developing countries
parcipated in it. There are some exceptions. For example, China (people's Republic of China) is not
a member, on the contrar, Rumania (UCT AD's category: Eastern European group) and Malta
(UCTAD's category: Western developed countries group) are members. During the Law of the Sea
negotiation, although China was not a member of the Group of 77, it supported the position of the
Group. That is why in this analysis China's position is not considered specifically, only the position
of the Group of77 is examined.
3050sca A. Avalle, 'The Decision-making Process from a Developing Country Perspective', in
Bertram I. Spector, Gunnar Sjöstedt and i. Willam Zartman (eds), Negotiating Interntional
Regimes: Lessons Leamedfrom the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(London: Graham & Trotman, 1994), pp. 135-147.
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Conference, the Group of 77 had its own officials and working methods to pursue
its objectives.306
The Group of 77 had been formed before the negotiation started and the Law of
the Sea negotiation became a part of its activities. Due to the fact that it was formed
prior to the negotiation, the Group of 77 had meetings outside the negotiation and it
was through these meetings that it consolidated its position. This consolidation,
which was not present before the negotiation startd, greatly infuenced the Law of
the Sea negotiation. For this reason the activities of the Group of 77 outside the
negotiation need to be examined as well as its activities within it.
The Group of 77 was formed in 1964 when the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development was established. After the Second World War the number
of independent developing states drastically increased and this changed the political
landscape of the world. The Group of 77 evolved from the discussion of the 'Non-
Aligned Movement' (NAM) which started in 1955, to demonstrate the possibilty of
a bloc action independent of either the United States or the Soviet Union. Reflecting
NAM's themes, neutrality and anti-colonialism, the Group of 77 distanced itself
from the two superpowers and tried to establish a bargaining power by its numerical
superiority in the United Nations. In the United Nations states are, in principle,
given sovereign equality regardless of their size or capabilties. All states have equal
voting power307 and as a result the United Nations system provided a major foru at
which developing states could present their demands.308 The precedents of the
Hague Conference of 1930, the First Law of the Sea Conference of 1958 and the
306Mahmoudi, op. cit., p. 126 note 34.
307The United Nations Security council and international financial institutions are exceptions.
308See Stephen D. Krasner, Strctural Confict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism
(Berketey, California: University of California Press, 1985), p. 8.
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Second Law of the Sea Conference of 1960 made the United Nations the natural
venue for a meeting to discuss issues on the ocean.309 By acting together durng the
Law of the .Sea negotiation, especially in the Seabed Committee, which lasted from
1968 to 1973, the Group of 77 acquired common objectives on issues in the
negotiation. For example, coastal developing countries wanted to secure their
sovereign right over their adjacent sea, and mineral producers (including potential
mineral producers) wanted to establish their sovereign right to their resources in
order to prevent the intervention of developed countries or multinational
corprations. There were many landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states
in the Group of 77, however, and they did not want coastal states to extend their
national jursdiction seawards, since this meant the area of Common Heritage of
Mankind would become smaller. .The Landlocked and Geographically
Disadvantaged States group however consisted of developing as well as developed
states and this group was unable to consolidate its position because developing
states' rights over their naturl resources were translated into extending their
national jurisdiction to prevent developed states' intervention. Therefore, despite the
fact that there were differences in opinions about the breadth of national
jursdiction, above all, the Group of 77 wanted to obtain more fuds to develop their
countries. In order to protect the Common Heritage of Manknd from developed
states' exploitation and acquire funds, the Group of 77 needed to consolidate its
position. As a result, the position ofthe Group of77 was gradually consolidated.
When a New International Economic Order was advocated in a number of
.
United Nations General Assembly resolutions, the Group of 77's position became
very strong and the NIO subsequently influenced the Law of the Sea negotiation.
309Ibid., p. 249.
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The Group of 77 saw the Law of the Sea as an issue between developed and
developing states, mainly because one of the main issues of the negotiation was the
deep seabed mining regime. Some developed states had the capability to exploit the
deep seabed. The developing states, however, did not have such capability in
technology and finance and as a result there was hardly any confict of interests
among member states of the Group of 77 because none of them had either the
relevant capabilities. The Group of 77 therefore attempted to establish an
international system in their favour to obtain benefit from deep seabed mining.
Contrary to this, developed states generally supported the existing international
economic system. The deep seabed mining issue was essentially between developed
states benefiting from the current international system and developing states tring
to change the interntional system in their favour.
. .
The fact that there was hardly any conflict of interest among member states on
the deep seabed regime made it easier for the Group of 77 to tae a firm position. In
order to pursue their objectives in terms of deep seabed mining the Group of 77
considered that they would need a strong independent seabed authority to prevent
the developed countries' intervention in the authority's decisions. The United States
and some other developed countries tried to weaken the solidarity of the Group of
77 by offering aid to some states in return for withdrawing support for the Group of
77. These tatics, however, did not work.
As mentioned above, the Group of 77 attempted to change the international
system in its favour. It claimed that the existing international economic system was
establišhed by developed countries. They claimed that as' a result the system
benefited developed countries and increased the economic gap between developing
countries and developed countries, and that this system needed to be changed in
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order to make the gap smaller. The oil crisis, which occured in 1973, bolstered the
solidarity of the Group of 77. The oil crisis was caused by the Arab Petroleum
Exporting Countries' oil embargo and it showed the power of group action of
developing states against developed states. In 1974, two resolutions of the United
Nations General Assembly which expressed NIO principles were linked to the
Law of the Sea Conference. Former UNCTAD officer Weiss described the
atmosphere in UNCT AD at the time as, '(b Juoyed by the energy crisis and the boom
in the prices of raw materials, the Group of 77 was confdent of its ability to utilize
the UN system to foster the establishment of a more just international order'. 310
The Group of 77 also considered that existing international law had been made
by the Western States and most developing countries had not taken part in its
formation. Anand noted that existing interntional law is 'a product of the European
or Western Christian civilisation' and that Asian and Afcan countres could not
play any role in its formation in the most creative period of its history-the last two
or three centuries.311 It was for this reason that the Group of 77 insisted on making
new international laws to accommodate their demands. This was partially
influenced by the Soviet Union's opinion, which 'tended to limit the law to what has
been expressly accepted by States'312 This was the Soviet Union's way of avoiding
international law when it was convenient and also seemed a good reason for most
developing states to denounce existing international law. Reflecting on these views,
Paul Berthoud emphasised the need to establish new international law to help the
development of developing states and he advocated an Interntional Development
31OThomas G. Weiss, Multilateral Development Diplomacy in UNCTAD: The Lessons of Group
Negotiation, 1964-84 (Hampshie: Macmilan Press, 1986), p. xiv.
311R. P. Anand, Origin and Development afthe La of the Sea (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1982), pp. 1-2.
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Law as a new international economic system.313 Berthoud argued that the three legal
pilars of the current international economic order, equality, reciprocity, and non-
discrimination, were unfair and unjust to developing states and that they were three
obstacles to development. He argued that
'equal treatment among unequals is inequitable towards the weaker partner;
reciprocity among unequals breeds injustice; non-discrimination among unequals
is in effect discriination in favour of the stronger partner. ... real equality of
opportunity implied the acceptance of unequal treatment to correct inequalities in
real terms.' 3 14
These ideas influenced the process of the Law of the Sea negotiation until the
mid-eighties because the Group of 77 attempted to implement and secure these
ideas in the Law of the Sea Convention. These ideas were not accommodated by
developed states and the negotiations between the Group of 77 and developed states
became very diffcult, not only at the Law of the Sea negotiation but at other
international negotiations. Weiss has pointed out that since the mid-seventies,
'international negotiations have stagnated and come to a complete halt. '315 Later, in
the 1990s, Michael P. Todaro stated 'la) 'new world order' was being proclaimed.
But poor nations began to sense that it might not be a hospitable place in which to
reside. They feared that the end of the cold war would redirect foreign investment
and aid away from them and toward the emerging new democracies of Eastern
Europe and the former USSR'.316 When the Implementation to the 1982 Law of the
312C. Wilfred, Jenks, A New World of 
Law?: A Study of the Creative Imagination in International
Law (London: Longmans, 1969), p. 141.
313Paul Berthoud, 'UCTAD and the Emergence ofInterntional Development Law', in Michael
Zammit Cutajar (ed.), UNCTAD and the South-North Dialogue: The First Twenty Years (Oxford:
Pergamon Press, 1985), pp. 72-73.
314/bid, pp. 72-73.
31SWeiss,op. cit., p. xiv.
316Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development. 5th ed. (New York: Longman, 1994), p. xxi. Todaro
advocated a New Interntional Economic Order in his book until its 1989 fourth edition. Michaei P.
Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World. 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 1989).
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Sea Convention was adopted in 1994, in order to accommodate the United States'
demands, most of the ideas of the NIO had in fact evaporated.
In sumary, the Group of 77 was formed separately from the Law of the Sea
negotiation, however, it worked as the vehicle to convey developing states' demands
in the negotiation. This was because the Law of the Sea negotiation included, as
issues, the rights of coastal developing states over their adjacent seas as well as the
deep seabed mining regime, both of which were considered as issues between
developed states and developing states. The Group of 77 considered that all its
member states had the right to protect their natural resources from the developed
states' intervention and in order to do this the Group of 77 allowed its coastal states
to extend their national jurisdiction. The Group of 77 consolidated its position in the
negotiation both inside and outside of the negotiation and the oil crisis and NIO
particularly bolstered the solidarty of the Group of 77 in the 1970s.
3. Implicit Coalition between the United States and the Soviet Union
Said Mahmoudi stated that, up to 1974, the Soviet Union and Eatern European
states had the 'same standing' in the negotiation as the Western industrialised states,
and later that they shifted their position so as to be in harmony with the developing
states.317 Friedheim also stated that although East-West factors were not as
importnt at the Law of the Sea Conference as they had been at the previous
Conferences of 1958 and 1960 they played a 'measurable' role in preventing
consensus on the ocean regime issue.318 In my view, however, the relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union can be described as an 'implicit
317Mahmoudi,op. cit., p. 21.
318Robert Friedheim and Tsuneo Akaha, 'Japan and the Ocen', in Robert L. Friedhiem et al. (eds)
Japan and the New Ocean Regime (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 13.
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coalition' in that in terms of the two core issues of the negotiation, navigational
rights and the deep seabed regime, their positions were identical until 1980.
Considering the fact that the United States was the most visible and influential
actor,319 therefore, the negotiation can be considered as the negotiation between the
United States and the Group of77. The implicit coalition between the United States
and the Soviet Union is examined below in greater detaiL.
In the mid-sixties the United States and the Soviet Union were bipolar military
powers on the sea.320 The Soviet Union was determined to achieve party with the
United States in all aspects of power and influence.32 If its naval power equalled
that of the United States, the mere existence of it could well be the most effective
way of checking American use of its own navy, which was hitherto an unchallenged
sea power aimed at furhering global interests. 322 The concept of peaceful
coexistence with capitalist states had been legitimatised by Nikita S. Khshchev,
who was First Secreta of the Soviet Communst Part from 1953 to 1964,
although he had simultaneously sought to weaken capitalist states by all means short
of war.323 As a result of Khshchev's concept, the Soviet Union felt relatively
secure in a bipolar world. 
324
As the maritime capabilties of the United States and the Soviet Union became
bi-polarised, their interests in freedom of navigation at sea became almost identicaL.
The Soviet Union was worred about the creeping jursdiction by coastal states, as
was the United States, because of the possibilty of it hampering its navy's freedom
319Schmidt,op. cit., p. 1.
32ûRobert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown and
Co., 1977), pp. 144-145.
321Bryan Ranft and Geoffey Til, The Sea in Soviet Strategy, 2nd ed. (Hampshire: The MacMilan
Press, 1989), p.53.
322Ibid., p. 48.
323Ibid., pp. 42-45.
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of navigation. This was coupled with the fact that the Soviet Union also intended to
protect its distant-water fishing. These situations enabled the Soviet Union, in 1965,
to make tentative overtres to several maritime states aimed at containing expansive
claims to broad territorial seas. In 1966, the Soviet Union and the United States
agreed to consult all nations on the question of whether they would agree to a new
global conference on the law of the sea. The aim of the conference was to fix the
limit of the territorial sea at twelve miles and to provide for freedom of navigation
through and over international straits overlapped by the new twelve miles limit. 325 If
the breadth of the terrtorial seas became twelve miles, it meant that up to 114 key
straits would be overlapped by territorial seas.326 This would hamper not only the
activities of their surace vessels, but also those of their submarines and aeroplanes.
The 'innocent passage' through international straits to ships of all states, including
warships,327 which was given in the Terrtorial Sea Convention in 1958, required
submarines to navigate on the sudace of the sea and to show their flags.328 This in
fact restrcts the submarnes' movement since they are visible to others. In addition,
there was a possibility that if a coastal state judged that the passage of a foreign
vessel was not innocent, the coastal state might intedere. Moreover, if the territorial
sea of a coastal state or the territorial seas of both sides of a strit entirely covers the
strait, the overfight of it would become very diffcult. Overfight is not covered by
the 1958 Convention and, therefore, it would be treated the same as overfight of
coastal states' territory. This means that pennission of overfight from the coastal
324Ibid., p. 50.
325Leigh S. Rainer, 'The Cost of American Rigidity', in Bernard H. Oxman et al. (OOs), La of the
Sea: U. S. Policy Dilemma (San Francisco, California: Institute for Contemporar Studies Press,
1983), p. 28.
326See Schmidt, 0p. cif., p. 22.
327The Convention on the Terntonal Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 1958, op. cif., Aricle 14, para
1 and Aricle 16, para. 4.
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state would be required. The United States and the Soviet Union therefore hoped to
make a new agreement in order to obtain free passage, including overfight, of
international straits. This meant no interference by coastal states, a right which had
not been given under the provision of innocent passage in the 1958 Convention. In
1967, the United States and the Soviet Union informally discussed the creation of a
High Seas Corridor through all international straits which would otherwse be
overlapped by the terrtorial seas.329 Booth noted that the United States and the
Soviet Union shared interests of limiting the expansion of the territorial sea and
acquiring free passage through straits. 330
In terms of navigational rights, in 1971 in the Seabed Committe the twelve
miles terrtorial sea was supported 'overwhelmingly'.33 The United States stated
that if free navigation through and over the international straits was guaranteed, they
could accept twelve miles terrtorial sea. The United States had the 'full
collaboration'332 of the Soviet Union on this demand. Some states bordering
importnt international straits, however, insisted that a right of innocent passage in
the terrtorial sea sufficed for the passage of merchant ships and that because the
United States and the Soviet Union intended to secure free navigation for military
puroses, they could not accept it from a securty stadpoint. These states also
thought that they should have powers to control navigation, mainly because of the
potential danger of nuclear-powered ships and oil-tankers. Many developing
328/bid, Aricle 14, para. 6.
329Schmidt,op. cit., p. 22.
330¡en Booth, La, Force and Diplomacy at Sea (London: George AlIen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 63-
67.
331Shigeru Oda, The Law of the Sea in our Time-II: The United Nations Seabed Committee 1968-
1973 (Lyden; SijthotI 1977), p. 175.
332/bid., p. 176.
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countries supported 'innocent passage' as well as other restrictions on passage, but
they did not support free passage.333
The argument about the status of international straits continued and in 1973 eight
strait states presented a proposal in which traditional innocent passage of ships was
guranteed. The United States and the Soviet Union, however, wanted to have free
passage and overfight through straits, not 'innocent passage'. At the same time, the
idea of the two-hundred miles EEZ was gaining support, not only from developing
countries but also from some developed countries. This situation made the Soviet
Union and the United States nervous because there was, at this stage, a possibility
that the negotiation might result only in the extension of coastal states' national
jurisdiction as a form of EEZ, without solving their primary concern, strait passage.
The idea of the EEZ had very serious implications for both the United States and the
Soviet Union because it included the entire water column of adjacent seas. In 1968
at the Ad Hoc Seabed Committe, in a discussion of delineating the international
area from national jurisdiction, there was an arguent about whether the water
column was included. The United States, the Soviet Union and some other maritime
states strongly opposed this. This question of the status of the water column had two
meanings. First, if the water column of the high seas were included in the new
international regime of sea use, the freedom of the high seas, namely free
navigation, might be restricted. This could possibly hamper the movement of navy
and non-miltary vessels. In addition, if the water colum of adjacent seas was
included in the discussion as part of the national jurisdiction, this would also
hamper navigational freedom. The United States' 1945 Truan Proclamation
carefully separated the continental shelf from the water column over the continental
333Ibid.
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shelf because the United States was worried about the possibilities of interference
with its vessels by coastal states. In addition, the idea of EEZ meant for the Soviet
Union that the activities of their distant-water fleets, which were at that time an
importnt provider of protein for its nation, would be substantially restricted.334
When the Law of the Sea Conference started, the two-hundred miles EEZ was
supported by nearly all, apart from the Landlocked and Geographically
Disadvantaged states, although the natue of rights within the zone was stil under
dispute. The United States accepted EEZ in exchange for 'unimpeded transit of
straits used for international navigation'.335 The intention of the United States was to
focus the discussion on the issue of strait pasage and it used the discussion of the
EEZ to do this. At the same time it hedged its position so that if the issue of strait
passage could not be solved, it would not recognse the two-hundred miles EEZ.
The military use of the seabed was also one of the United States and the Soviet
Union's concerns. There were some fears that these two superpowers might start
milita development on the seabed. This fear was one of the primary reasons that
Pardo took the initiative at the United Nations General Assembly in 1967 and the
reason why the issue was first discussed in the Seabed Committe. Military
development of the seabed was in fac too costly for either of them to engage in.
Eventully in 1971 the two states concluded a negotiation outside the Law of the
Sea negotiation and made the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the
Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. This treaty prohibited the emplacement of
334When the idea of control of the high seas fisheries by an international regime surface, the United
States and the Soviet Union strongly opposed it. This idea was supported by the Organisation of
Afican Unity (OAU) in 1973 and 1974. The United States and the Soviet Union were afaid that the
controllng power ofISA might be extended to the water column of the high seas.
335 Department of State Bulletin, 5 Aug. 1974, p. 233. cited in Schmidt, op. cit., p. 117.
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weapons in the area beyond twelve miles from the coast. 336 The relationship
between the two states was, at this time, backed up by an atmosphere of détente.
Afer the severe Cold War, détente, a concept denoting a relaxation of tensions, was
developed and its peak was between 1969 and 1976.337 One of the symbolic events
of détente was the Nixon-Brezhev summit in June 1973, in which the United States
and the Soviet Union agreed to broaden their co-operation on oceanographic
mattrs. Trade between them enlarged signficantly during the 1970s.338
With regard to the deep seabed regime, when Pardo's initiative was made at the
United Nations General Assembly in 1967, the Soviet Union responded cautiously.
Pardo advocated the Common Heritage of Manind concept for the deep seabed and
the creation of an international machinery to govern seabed activities. The Soviet
Union rejected the Common Heritage proposal as a notion which lacked clarity and
precision from the stadpoint of international law. The Soviet Union stated that,
those who interpreted seabed under the concept of Common Heritage of Mankind as
common propert, failed to tae into consideration the realities of the contemporar
world. In the following year, the Soviet Union stated at the General Assembly that
thnkng of the Common Heritage in terms of collective ownership was just an
ilusion and the whole idea was utopian.339 This statement was backed-up by the
Soviet Union's ideological theory that the present world was divided into three
socio-economic systems: Capitalist, where ownership was concentrated in the hands
336See Schmidt, 0p. cit., p. 25. Due to the fact that negotiation for this treaty was conducted outside
the Law of the Sea negotiation, the issue of seabed disarmament is not examined here, however, in
my view, the negotiation leading to this treaty itself fostered a better relationship between them. For
a discussion of the process of the negotiation, see, Evan Luard, The Control of the Sea-bed: Who
owns the resources of the oceans? revised.(London: Heinemann, 1977), pp. 97-112. See also United
Nation, Sea-Bed-A Frontier of Disarmament (New York: United Nations, 1972).
337Mohammed Abid Ishaq, U. S.-Soviet Relations 1980-88: The Politics of Trade Pressure. PhD
Thesis, 1994, Glasgow University, p. 11.
338/bid., p. 10.
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of monopolies~ Socialist, which was the system of national ownership~ and the
Third World, where the majority of states were in the process of shaping their
national economic structures. 
340 This meant that as long as capitalist states existed
there would be no chance that collective ownership would happen, so that there was
no common ground on which to agree. The Soviet Union's position did not change
on this until 1971.
In addition to the Soviet Union's argument on the Common Heritage of Manknd,
the Soviet Union and its group had a long-standing aversion to the establishment of
new United Nations committees or bodies of any kind, paricularly those which
might eventually acquire substantial authority in particular fields. On this point
Roderick Ogley argued that the logic of the Soviet Union was as follows. To
establish a powedul international authority controlled by developing states, most of
which are stil dominated by their economic relations with the capitalist world, and
can therefore hardly be called 'socialist, is to create an instruent which could be
used against socialism, as the United Nations had been in Korea.341 Instead of
forming new bodies or committees the Soviet Union called for fuher detailed
studies by existing United Nations bodies, such as the Interntional Oceanographic
Commission (IOC).342 It therefore opposed founding a committee to study Pardo's
initiative. Eventually, the United Nations General Assembly set up an Ad Hoc
Seabed Commtte as a compromise, since many other states, including the United
States, supported the establishment of a permanent committee.
339Mahmoudi, 0p. cif., p. 125.
340lbid, note 27. With regard to this theory, Roderick Ogley made reference to a book published in
1977. Roderick Ogley, Internationalizing the Seabed (Aldershot, Hampshire: Gower, 1984), p. 35. It
is not certain that the Soviet Union clearly had this theory at the beginning of the Law of the Sea
negotiation. The Soviet Union stated at the General Assembly in 1968 that there coexisted States
with different social structres and different systems of ownership. Mahmoudi, op. cit., p. 125.
3410gley,op. cif., p. 34.
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At the Ad Hoc Seabed Committee the Soviet Union opposed the Common
Heritage concept and argued that the question of interntional machinery be
excluded from the agenda of the Committee. The United States did not support the
concept of Common Heritage, nor machinery, although the developing states
generally did support these. At this stage, the positions of the United States and the
Soviet Union were the same, although the reasoning behind their positions was
quite different. They rejected a priori the concept of Common Heritage. The
alterntive for the Socialist States to the Common Heritage concept was the same as
that of the technologically advanced countries of the West. Both argued to adopt the
principle of freedom of the high seas and legal norms established by the High Seas
Convention of 1958,343 since freedom of the high seas meant states could use the
seas freely, including exploitation of the deep seabed. The United States and the
western industralised states argued from the beginning that the concept of Common
Heritage was contrary to existing norms and principles of interntional law,
meanng, the principle of freedom of the high seas. In addition they insisted on
freedom of access to, and use of the resources of the seabed, without any
discrimination.344 When, in December 1968, the United Nations General Assembly
decided to make the Ad Hoc Committee a permanent committee,345 the Soviet
Union and some of its Eastern European alles abstained from voting. The Soviet
Union and the United States however on the same day, opposed, without success,
another General Assembly resolution requesting the Secreta-General to undertke
342Luard, op. cif., p. 88.
343Mahmoudi,op. cif., pp. 125-126. ef Ibid, p. 152.
344/bid., pp. 124-125. .
345General Assembly Resolution 2467 A on 21st December 1968.
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a study on the question of establishing appropriate international machinery for
control of the seabed.346
After the ad hoc committee became a standing committee in December 1968, the
United States participated in it actively. In the committee, the question of machinery
now became one of ty, as opposed to whether to have it at all, even though the
Soviet Union stil opposed the Common Heritage concept and interntional
machinery. The activity of the United States in the committee showed that it had, in
order to get a quick solution to the breadth of the terrtorial sea and navigational
freedom, changed its stace from opposing the concepts of Common Heritage and
machinery, to accommodating them to some extent. In addition to the United States'
activity in the committee, the United States considered that collaboration with the
Soviet Union was essential in terms of the breadth of terrtorial seas and
navigational freedom. As a result, the Soviet Union joined the Western states in
favour of establishing a boundary for the international seabed area.
The question of convening a new conference on the ocean was also controversiaL.
The developing countries insisted on holding a comprehensive conference whereas
the United States, the Soviet Union and some other industrialised states favoured
convening a new conference for only the breadth of the terrtorial sea and related
straits passage. In 1969 the discussion was moved from the Seabed Committee to
the General Assembly, where decisions are made by the majority, and not by
consensus as in the case of the Seabed Committee. The General Assembly adopted
the Resolution347 requesting the Secreta-General to consult states on an early
convening 'of a comprehensive conference on the law of the sea. the United States
346General Assembly Resolution 2467C on 21st December 1968.
347The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2S74A, December 1969.
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and the Soviet Union voted against this resolution. They understood that once this
resolution was adopted, holding a comprehensive conference could become a fait
accompli. The United States was convinced that considering all marine legal issues
at one conference would multiply the difficulties of making progress on any.348 The
Soviet Union did not want to discuss issues of the Common Heritage and
machinery. In discussions concerning another resolution requesting the Secretary-
General to underte 'a furher study on various typs of international machinery'349
that included the exploiting machinery which the developing countries favoured,350
the Soviet Union opposed the whole idea of machinery. The Soviet Union repeated
its position that international co-operation in ocean research should be primar and
that expectations about exploiting the seabed were prematue. The Western states
also opposed the idea of exploiting machinery. In the vote, however, no state
opposed it and the Soviet group abstained351 since developed states did not want to
be seen to be uncompromising. There was also a heated discussion at the United
Nations General Assembly on the 'Moratorium Resolution',352 which created a
moratorium on all activities of exploitation of the resources of the interntional
seabed area until the establishment of the interntional regime.353 This resolution
was supported by the developing states. The United States and the Soviet Union
voted against this. Buzan pointed out that durng this period, '(t)he Soviet Union
was stil bearing the brut of the opposition to the developing countries, with the
348See Schmidt, 0p. cif., p. 26.
349The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2574C.
35Üßarr Buzan, Seabed Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 98.
35/bid., p. 115 note 7.
352The General Assembly Resolution 2574D.
353Lay S. Houston, et al. (Compiled and eds), New Directions in the La of the Sea: Documents Vol.
II (New York, Oceana Publications, 1973), p. 737.
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United States in close second place',354 The United States vigorously opposed the
resolution because it ran directly counter to the res nullus355 principle (a thing or
land belonging to no one and open to effective occupation and claims to exclusive
right) espoused by many industrial states.356
In the following year, in the discussion of the Declaration of Principles,357 the
Soviet Union continued to oppose the inclusion of the concept of the Common
Heritage of Manind into the declaration. The Common Heritage and the
international machinery were, irrespective of the Soviet Union's disagreement, put
into the Declaration in 1970. The United States voted for it, however, the Soviet
Union and most of the Soviet group abstained. At the same time the Soviet Union
also opposed another resolution.358 This resolution requested a study of, and
proposals for a solution to, the problem of price fluctuations for the mineral
exporters, which might be caused by the exploitation of seabed minerals. The Soviet
Union disagreed with this because it implied a strong machinery to control prices. It
once again, however, abstained in the vote. In the voting for the 'Conference
Resolution,'359 which decided to convene a conference on the law of the sea in 1973,
seven states opposed and six abstained. The conference would deal with the
establishment of an international regime, including an interntional machinery, the
regimes of the high seas, the continental shelf, the terrtorial sea, including its
354Buzan, op. cif., p. 94.
355There had been an argument about the status of the deep seabed. There were two principles which
were argued. They were res nullus and res communis. Res nullus means a thing or land belonging
to no one and open to effective occupation and claims to exclusive right. Res communis means a
thing owned by everyone in common and unsusceptible of unilateral appropriation. See Schmidt, op.
cif., p. 31; Mahmoudi, op. cif., pp. 85-86.
356Jack N. Barkenbus, Deep Seabed Resources: Politics an Technology (New York: The Free
Press, 1979), p. 34.
357The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2749.
358The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2750A.
359The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2750C.
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breadth and international straits.36o All the oppositions and half the abstentions were
made by the Soviet Union and its allies. The Soviet Union opposed a
comprehensive conference and favoured a limited item conference, which was to
discuss only the territorial sea and continental shelf limits, straits navigation and
coastal state fishing rights.361 The United States changed its position and joined the
list of sponsors of this Resolution. It did this because a comprehensive conference
would give it an opportunity to establish new rules of navigational freedom.
Despite early opposition, the position of the Soviet Union was changing
gradually since it did not wish to oppose explicitly proposals made by developing
states in the voting at the General Assembly. The Soviet Union was afraid of being
isolated from developing states. Since Khshchev became leader of the Soviet
Union, it aimed to take advantage of the emergence of a great number of newly
independent states and the struggles for freedom from colonialism. By backing
these developing states, the Soviet Union intended to weaken the economic and
political influence of capitalist-imperialism. This was in order to establish its own
leadership of a global movement of progressive states and to increase its world
infuence.362 This would mean that the position of the Soviet Union in the world
would change from one of being permanently on the losing side, due to the limited
number of its allies, to one of being on the winning side, aided by the numerical
superiority of the developing states. It was for this reason that the Soviet Union,
even though it objected to the concept of Common Heritage of Mankind which was
supported by developing states, did not vote against it.
360Lay S. Houston, et al., op. cif., p. 738.
36!Buzan,op. cit., p. 113.
362Ranft and Til, op. cit., p. 42.
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After the 1970 Conference Resolution, the Soviet Union changed its position
from one of brut opposition to the concepts of the Common Heritage and
international machinery, to one of accommodating some aspects of them. The
Soviet Union realised that a comprehensive conference was inevitable and it
attempted to find some way of getting what it wanted, namely navigational freedom,
by using the Conference which was a 'package deal'. This attitude was ilustrated in
July 1971 in its proposal for an interntional regime and machinery. The Soviet
Union's proposal supported the establishment of a machinery for seabed regime,
however, the detail of it was 'extremely vague'.363 Afer this proposal the Soviet
Union generally avoided committing itself too much on the issues of deep seabed
regime. Instead, the United States led the discussions with the Group of 77 and the
Soviet Union generally did not disagree too strongly with the Group of 77, apart
from issues where it felt its interests were at stake.
When the United States accepted, as a basis for negotiation, the Group of 77's
idea that all activities were to be conducted by the ISA, the Soviet Union
disagreed,364 since the Soviet Union objected to the idea of such a controlling ISA.
The Soviet Union's position, however, finally became the same as the United States
in 1975. In that year, the Soviet Union submitted a proposal, which although
containing minor differences was generally in line with those of the other developed
states. 
365
As the Soviet Union and some of the Eastern European states had substantial
land sources of seabed minerals, they would not need to mine the seabed in the
363Buzan, op. cif., p. 164.
364Ibid., p. 225.
365Ibid., p. 250. The differences basically came from a lack of enthusiasm for any future Soviet
ventue into dee seabed mining, and a lack of concern for the capitalist sensitivities of Western
mining companies.
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immediate future. This was reflected in their attitudes towards deep seabed
mining366 and the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states acted in a
somewhat generous manner with the financial conditions in order to gain favour
with developing states, however, they did not wish to be saddled with onerous terms
in the future. 
367
The Soviet Union started its research activities in deep seabed mining in the
seventies and formed the state enterprise Yuzorgeologiya. From 1977 it cared
out research programmes in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, but even so its
technology was not well enough developed to engage in actual exploitation. The
Soviet Union was reported to have directly and indirectly approached some of the
multinational deep seabed mining consortia to purchase the necessary technology. 
368
In reality, the technology of the Soviet Union was behind the western industrialised
states. For example, after the Conference, when the prospective mining states held
discussions about the overlapping claims made by their deep seabed miners in the
Preparatory Commission, it was revealed that the Soviet Union's claims overlapped
with others, even though the Soviet Union had done no prospecting. The Soviet
Union seemed to have learned about the most promising areas prospected by other
states through satelltes.369 These facts showed that the Soviet Union was not as
interested in deep seabed mining as the United States.
Contrary to the self-sufficient Soviet Union, the United States was importing
deep seabed minerals.370 If deep seabed mining started, the reliance on imports of
366The Soviet Union did later enact domestic legislation for deep seabed mining in 1982, following
the United States' domestic legislation for deep seabed mining in 1980.
367Sebenius, 1984, op. cif., p. 17.
368Mahmoudi,op. cif., p. 34 and p. 34 note 54.
369Schmidt,op. cif., p. 298 note 155.
370In 1976, the United States imported one-hundred percent of its manganese, which is critical to
steelmaking; one-hundred percent of cobalt, which is used in powerfl magnets, aviation alloys and
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those minerals would have been lessened and it would have helped to reduce
international payment for them. Moreover, it would create more jobs for United
States' citizens. It was for this reason that the United States wanted reasonable
conditions of exploitation of the deep seabed for its prospective miners.
There was, therefore, a difference in both the need for deep seabed mining and
also in deep seabed mining capabilty between the United States and the Soviet
Union. This fact, however, did not prevent them from attempting to establish the
deep seabed mining regime based on as favourable conditions for them as possible.
When the Informal Single Negotiation Text was issued at the end of the 1975
session, the United states and the Soviet Union found that it contained articles
concernng the twelve miles terrtorial sea, the two-hundred miles EEZ and most
importntly free passage of international straits. The fact that the text included the
provision of free passage of international straits encouraged both the Soviet Union
and the United States to continue the negotiation, although the provisions relating to
the deep seabed regime were stil unsatisfactory to both of them. At this point, the
Soviet Union's objectives in participating in the negotiation were to maintain the
favourable provision on free passage until the end of the negotiation and to
conclude the negotiation successfully, since the negotiation was a package deaL.
As shown above, although there were some differences in their positions in terms
of deep seabed mining due to the varying degree of need for minerals, the United
States and the Soviet Union had the same interests in terms of navigational rights. In
addition, neither of them wanted onerous conditions for deep seabed mining and on
.
these points the United States and the Soviet Union collaborated. When in i 975, as
electronics; ninety-one percent of nickel, which is used for stainless and high-performance steels;
and twenty-four percent of copper, which is used for wire and electrical apparatus. Sebenius, 1984,
op. cif., p. 16.
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a compromise between the Group of 77 and the United States and other
industrialised states, the ISNT included the allocation of twelve out of the total
thirt-six seats on the Council to states with special interests, the Soviet Union
suddenly invoked the principle of the paty of East and West. Before this stage the
Soviet Union generally supported the position of the Group of77 with respect to the
composition of the Council,37 however, it changed its position and 'insisted that
(the East) should have special representation in the Council, and be accorded the
same protection desired by the West since they represented one of the major socio-
economic systems of the world. '372 In addition, the Soviet Union argued that in
terms of the decisions of the Council of the ISA, the formula of voting should be
one in which the East could protect their vital interests. In this sense, the Soviet
Union and the United States had the same common goal, that is to forestall the
developing countries from imposing their demands at wil in the CounciL. 373
The relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States became
considerably worse in 1977. This deterioration in the relationship meant that the
United States lost a lot in terms of the negotiation of scientific research in the
adjacent seas, since the Soviet Union, which had been in agreement with the United
States on the issue, chaged its position to support the Group of 77. This change by
the Soviet Union was caused by the fact that American President Ford signed the
bil of the two-hundred miles fisheries zone, the FMCA. 374 This caused problems
because up until this time the United States and the Soviet Union had both refused
to agree to the two-hundred miles EEZ until the rights of navigation were firmly
37lMahmoudi, op. cit., p. 263.
372E. L. Evrviades, 'The Third World's Approach to the Deep Seabed' in Ocean Development and
Interntional La, (1982), p. 233, quoted in Mahmoudi, op. cif.
373Ibid., p. 265.
374See chapter 1.
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protected in the Convention. The United States legislation on fisheries damaged
both states' position on this point, since the negotiation was stil continuing and they
had not acquired firm assurance of the navigational rights. In addition, the Soviet
fleets that had fished off the east coast of the United States for a quarter of a centu
were warned by the United States to leave and a few ships were seized.375 This
event changed the Soviet Union's attitudes towards the United States, however, its
attitude towards the core issues of the negotiation, namely, navigational rights and
the seabed regime, remained the same.
After the advent of Reagan Administration, however, the United States changed
its policy on the Law of the Sea and wanted to redress part of the seabed regime.
The Soviet Union warned the United States repeatedly that reopening the
negotiation of the seabed regime was dangerous and tantamount to undermining
them376 because reopening the negotiation might unavel the section dealing with
navigational freedom. The Soviet Union wanted to finish the negotiation as soon as
possible because some strait and coastal states stil wanted to restrct navigational
freedom in the terrtorial seas and international straits. In January of 1981 at a
Group of five377 meeting, the Soviet Union demanded the United States complete
the negotiation at the 1981 spring session. 
378
The Soviet Union and the United States delegations met before each session to
discuss any differences they might have, although they tried not to show that they
375Willam Wertenbaker, lA Reporter at Large: The Law of the Sea, Part 1', The New Yorker, (Aug.
1, 1983), p. 56.
376Schmidt, op. cit., pp. 234-5.
377During the negotiation the Soviet Union had regular meetings with the United States, France,
Japan and the United Kingdom. This was called the Group of Five whose existence was never openly
admitted by its paricipants. The Group met regularly before Conference sessions and intersessional
meetings, both at head-of-delegation and working-group leveL. This group was created because, for
example, Ellot L. Richardson, American ambassador-at-Iarge to UNCLOS from 1977 to 1980,
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were meeting. At the final stage of the negotiation, however, the Soviet Union and
the United States stopped meeting each other. This was because the Soviet Union
strongly disapproved of the Reagan Administration's negative views on the
Conference.379
At the final voting for the Convention the Soviet Union abstained380 and the
United States voted against. The Soviet Union however soon changed its position
and signed the Convention in 1982. The Soviet Union was not only the first
importnt state to sign the Convention, but also the very first to embody its main
provisions in domestic law, from which they made good propaganda by denouncing
the United States.381
The United States and the Soviet Union's concerns on navigational freedom were
identical and their interests in most items of the seabed regime also became similar.
This was due to the fact that the role of the ISA became signficant. The United
States and the Soviet Union shared the same basic interests in objecting to the
controllng of the ISA by the developing countries. In terms of the technology
transfer obligation, when the Group of 77 presented a proposal for the transfer of
technology in 1975 from the industrialised states to the Enterprise, the operating
arm of the ISA, the United States and the Soviet Union both opposed it. 382 This
issue was finally incorprated into the Convention, however, the Soviet Union and
sought to increase consultation and co-operation with United States' alles and the Soviet Union.
Ibid., p. 62.
378Ibid., p. 220.
379Wertenbaker, Part I, op. cif., p. 50.
380The Soviet Union claimed that its state enterpnse for seabed mining was discriminated agaInst.
To the ISA, Western consortia qualified as pioneèrs if one of their member companies' states was a
signatory to the Convention. On the other hand, the Soviet Union had to be signatory before its state
enterpnses qualified as pioneers. It viewed this as discrimination. See Schmidt, op. cif., pp. 174-175.
381Ranf and Til, op. cif., p. 60. This was despite the fact that some of the provisions of domestic
law were contradicted by what the Soviet Union had insisted on during the Conference. For example,
domestic law required foreign warships entering or deparing from its terrtonal seas to have prior
authonsation. See Butler, op. cif., pp. 334-339.
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other industrialised states hoped the obligation would be as light as possible.
Financial undertkings, namely, charges imposed by the IS A, relating to deep
seabed mining were also a problem. With regard to this and without specific
reference to it, the Western states' efforts to secure better conditions for their
corprations was automatically beneficial to the Soviet Union. Ken Booth also
pointed out that the Soviet Union's involvement in the Law of the Sea Conference,
like its involvement in most international organisations, had been for 'damage
limitation purpses and propaganda rather thn as a result of a commitment to
common principles about the development of international society' and the Soviet
Union sensibly adopted 'the low profie' policy.383 This was why, 'to a lesser degree
even than most Western states, the Soviet Union has not identified with the
evolution of a 'New International Economic Ordet. This played no part in its policy'
(at the negotiation).84 The Soviet Union seemed to have voiced its view only when
it had to and when it was convenient for it to do so. In 1980 the Group of 77, with
regard to the composition of the Council of the ISA, decided to negotiate only with
the United States and the Soviet Union was irate over its exclusion. The Soviet
Union always insisted on equal status with the United States in all things. 
385
Wertnbaker reported what one Third World delegate said that 'the Soviets didn't
count. They weren't importnt in the negotiation. But it may have been a mistake to
leave them out, because they were so angr they had to be pacified later. '386
382Buzan,op. cit., p. 259.
383Booth, op. cit., pp. 67-68.
384Ibid., p. 67.
385Wiliam Wertenbaker, 'A Reporter at Large: The Law of the Sea, Part IT', The New Yorker, (Aug.
8, 1983), p. 65. The Soviet Union was reported to have said 'all sorts of things' to one of the leaders
of the Group of 77 for its exclusion. Ibid., p. 67.
386Ibid., p. 65.
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It is concluded therefore that there was an 'implicit coalition' between the United
States and the Soviet Union in terms of the two core issues of the negotiation and
the United States was dominant in deciding the direction of the negotiation and in
determining the outcome of the negotiation. Towards the end of the Conference, the
Group of 77 negotiated only with the United States. After the Conference the United
States held the key to the final outcome of the Law of the Sea negotiation. Therefore
in chapters six to eight of this study the negotiation is analysed as one between the
United States and the Group of 77 in terms of two core issues.
4. Conclusion
This chapter has looked at the core issues of the negotiation, the Group of 77 and
the implicit coalition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the
core issues of the negotiation were not explicitly agreed by participating parties at
the Law of the Sea negotiation, trading the seabed regime for navigational rights
was a common understanding among the paricipating states.
The Group of 77 was formed to represent opinions of developing states in the
international arena. The Group of 77 was not a group formed only within the Law of
the Sea negotiation, however, in the Law of the Sea negotiation the Group of 77 was
used to align positions of developing states. On the other hand, the United States
and the Soviet Union had a relationship which can be described as an 'implicit
coalition' because of their almost identical interests on the two core issues. Both
states, due to their global naval power, shared a strong interest in navigational
freedom. In addition, the United States had interests in deep seabed mining.
Although the Soviet Union was self-suffcient in seabed minerals and it was much
less interested in seabed mining, it was more concerned about the implications of
creating the seabed regime. Both of these superpowers, nèvertheless, wished to
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avoid onerous obligations with regard to the deep seabed regime. They both
attempted to establish the deep seabed mining regime based on as favourable
conditions for them as possible. While the Soviet Union adopted a low profie
policy, the United States was the most visible actor and was dominant in deciding
the direction of the negotiation and in determining the outcome. Chapters 6 to 8 of
this study therefore examines the negotiation process between the United States and
the Group of 77 in terms of the core issues of the negotiation.
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Chapter 6 The Negotiation and its Changing Context
This chapter examines the process and context of the negotiation until 1980. As
argued in Chapter 5, the Law of the Sea negotiation can be considered as a
negotiation between two parties, the Group of 77 and the United States, and as
being a trade-off between the core issues of the deep seabed mining regime and
navigational rights. For this reason this relationship and these core issues are
concentrated upon. In addition, as previous chapters have demonstrated, a number
of domestic and international factors, which are 'the context of the negotiation',
influenced the negotiation and as such the changing context from 1967 to 1980 is
also examined.
1. Pre-negotiation stage: Before 1967
At ths stage, the Group of 77 did not have a consolidated position in terms of the
Law of the Sea issues. Established thee years earlier, it was not yet accustomed to
working as a group. The Latin American states group was the most radical on the
issue of the breadth of national jurisdiction seawards and other developing states
were not in agreement with them on this issue. It took some time for member states
of the Group of 77 to co-operate with each other to pursue common objectives. In
addition, at this stage most developing states did not have much interest in the
potentiality of deep seabed mining: an issue which later consolidated the Group of
77.
There were three basic factors in the context of the negotiation which existed at
this stage: the Cold War; rapid technological development; and the fact that the
number of developing states had increased. These affected both sides of the
negotiation. The ppsition of the developing states will be examined first. .
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The Cold War clearly influenced the attitudes of developing states towards the
superpowers. Many developing states chose independence from the two
superpwers, and their attitudes led to the establishment of the Group of 77. The
rapid development of technology in fishing and the exploitation of minerals after the
Second World War also infuenced the position of the developing states. After the
First Law of the Sea Conference in 1958, technological development accelerated
and this raised suspicion among developing states that technologically advanced
states might exploit their resources. In addition, especially after the First and Second
Law of the Sea Conferences (1958 and 1960), the number of newly independent
states soared and they collectively tred to develop a standpoint for their own
problems and needs.
The concerns of developing states about sea use were limited to fishing and
offshore oil in their adjacent seas at this stage.387 Many coastal states began to
realise their stakes in their adjacent seas, and many developing states started making
unilateral claims to extend national jursdiction seawards beyond the existing rule of
three miles territorial sea. Most coastal states with interests in fisheries, wanted to
avoid foreign fleets catching fish in their adjacent seas and the prospect of the
exploitation of oil on their continental shelf worked as an incentive for coastal states
to enclose the potentially exploitable area by extending national jurisdiction. The
reason the developing states felt able to do this was because during the First and
Second Law of the Sea Conferences, the maritime states, led by the United States,
proposed a six-mile terrtorial sea plus six-mile fishing zone as a compromise
between states hoping for wider national jurisdiction to protect resources in the
387Later, political considerations, such as the control of the machinery (International Seabed
Authority), was added.
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adjacent seas, and states hoping for the breadth of territorial sea as narrow as
possible. This six-mile plus six-mile figure was only an idea, not an expression of
their final position. The non-maritime states with some interests in their adjacent
seas took this proposal to imply that the United States and other maritime states
would allow them to extend their jurisdiction (not necessarily sovereignty) seawards
up to twelve miles. This was obviously not what the United States and other
maritime states intended, however, irrespective of their intentions, the general
perception of non-maritime states was formed in this way. The Soviet Union's
support of the twelve-mile territorial sea strengthened this perception. In fact, in
1960 the Soviet Union legislated domestically for twelve miles terrtorial sea. By
1968 the number of states which claimed fishing zones to twelve miles or more was
more than sixty. 388
Contrary to the position of the developing states, the policy-makers of the United
States perceived the above three factors differently. The relationship between the
United States and the Soviet Union was worsening. In addition technological
development enabled the United States to employ nuclear-submarines which were
used to secure second strie capabilty by their submarine-launched ballstic
missiles. These developments made free navigation for its navy more importnt than
it had previously been. Technological development also advanced the possibilties
of exploiting resources in the sea, which would help the United States' economic
development. In addition, the increase in the number of newly independent states
changed the political situation in the international arena substantially, especially in" .
the United Nations. In the First and Second Law of the Sea Conferences, the
388Barr Buzan, Seabed Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 60, p. 64 note 7.
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maritime states stil had a large influence, partly because of the small number of
independent developing states. The influence of the maritime states, however, was
decreasing substantially because of this political change. Not only did the number of
developing states increase but also the newly independent states often made
unilateral claims to extend national jurisdiction without taking into consideration
their former suzerain.
The Truan Proclamation in 1945 was a compound of balanced strategic and
economic interests.389 The strategic view of the United States' policy-makers was
based on the need to keep freedom of navigation for their navy. Their economic
view was to obtain financial and other benefit from the seas. When a number of
states stad extending their national jurisdiction the policy-makers of the United
States perceived the rampant unilateral claims to extend national jursdiction
seawards by coastal states (most of whom were developing states) as damaging their
navy's free movement. Although there were some considerations of fishing interests
at this stage, their main concern was their strategic interests in the sea, since
continental shelves had already been recognised as belonging to a state's national
jurisdiction in the Continenta Shelf Convention of 1958.
The pre-1967 stage can therefore be considered as the period in which policy-
makers of states staed identifying their interests in the sea. In addition the stage
was defined by three factors in the context of the negotiation, namely the Cold War,
rapid technological development, and increased number of developing states,
influenced states' actions.
389See in chapter 4.
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2. Pre-Conference Negotiation Stage I: 1967-70
At this stage, responding to Pardo's 1967 initiative, the United Nations General
Assembly set up the Seabed Committee withn which the negotiation was
conducted. The Group of 77 had already formed, however, at this stage, it did not
have an established position, particularly on the adjacent sea issues. At this stage,
the relationship between developing states and the United States changed
substantially. At the pre-negotiation stage, before 1967, states' interaction was stil
limited and their contention in relation to sea use was considerably vague, however,
at this stage, the Seabed Committee was set up in the United Nations, and the
problems between the Group of 77 and the United States were gradually clarfied.
Within the United States, Pardo's initiative was received negatively and industr
lobbied Congress and the Administration to act against the initiative. Over twenty
resolutions were introduced in Congress, almost all directed against the idea of
vesting control of seabed resources in an international body. Pardo's concept of
Common Heritage of Mankind was considered to handicap US industr and dampen
its enthusiasm. Some United States' mining companies had already started a R & D
programe in the early to mid-1960s. Technological development in deep seabed
mining was under way, and such developments along with industrial moves towards
deep seabed mining was reported publicly, so that interest in deep seabed mining
increased. In 1968, the American Mining Congress (AMC), an association of four-
hundred companies operating in mining and engineering, passed a resolution
recognising that 'deep ocean mining can proceed in reasonable fashion without
benefit of new legal arangements by recognising that accepted principles of
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international law governing high seas activity extend to ocean mining. '390 This
resolution declared that the traditional principle of freedom of the high seas would
be enough to carr out deep seabed mining.
Soon after this resolution, United States President Nixon issued a policy
statement on the ocean and stressed the need for ocean research and that
international co-operation should only take place when it was in the best interests of
the United States.391 These moves within the United States made developing states
worr about the prospect of deep seabed mining carried out by United States
companies without international agreement on the deep seabed development. They
reacted by adopting the Moratorium Resolution392 in 1969. This was despite the
United States' opposition to the resolution which was as an attempt to prevent
unilateral exploitation by companies of technologically advanced states. The
worries of the developing states were furher spurred by the moves of Summa
Corpration. Howard Hughes' Summa Corpration began exploration and
equipment testing in 1969.393 Since Summa Corpration was considered to be
financially capable of conducting deep seabed mining at any time when the
technology was ready, it looked for a time as if it was going to mine the deep seabed
in direct opposition to the Moratorium Resolution.394 Other companies needed huge
investments to begin mining, and in order to acquire investments they in fact needed
legally and politically secure circumstaces, either domestically or internationally.
3900S Congress (1969-70), 281, cited in Markus G. Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common
Burden?: The United States Position on the Development of a Regime for Deep Sea-Bed Mining in
the Law of the Sea Convention (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p.83 In terms of the status of high
seas, which is called freedom of high seas, see chapter 5 of this study.
391Buzan,op. cif., pp. 78-79.
392See chapter 5.
393Ibid., p. 80.
394Jack N. Barkenbus, Deep Seabed Resources: Politics and Technology (New York: The-Free
Press, 1979), p. 34.
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The res nullus principle395 was not strong enough for those companies, although
the AMC's resolution claimed that it was enough to exploit the deep seabed. The
news of technological development in deep seabed mining was frequently reported.
Companies were competing with each other and deep seabed mining companes,
especially United States companies, were the prime source of information on deep
seabed mining, and they optimistically advocated the prospect of deep seabed
mining in order to attract investments and governental support.
In the Seabed Committee, despite the mining companes' optimism, the United
States government emphasised the pessimistic aspects of deep seabed mining in
order to discourage the idea of an interntional body to control the deep seabed
development. This discrepancy in the prospects of deep seabed mining between the
United States governent and its industry meant that in the Seabed Committee the
delegates of developing states were reluctant to believe any of the information on
deep seabed mining that came from the delegates of the United States. Accordingly
the delegates of developing states thought that deep seabed mining would start soon.
The attempts by the delegates of developing states in the United Nations to forestall
deep seabed mining prompted the United States industr to act to protect their
interests and industr lobbied Congress and the governent. Lobbying by industr
was paricularly strong against the Moratorium Resolution of i 969, and, against the
Principles Resolution of 1970, in which the term of Common Heritage of Mankind
was inscribed. Overall United States' industry was generally pessimistic about the
outcome of the negotiation.
Examining the actions taken by the developing states the issue of deep seabed
mining inspired them to act collectively for two reasons. First, the area for deep
395See, chapter 5.
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seabed mining was beyond the national jurisdiction of coastal states. This meant
that the issue of deep seabed mining could be considered separately from the
interests of the coastal states. Secondly, developing states did not have a direct
interest in engaging in deep seabed mining. In order to commence deep seabed
mining, highly sophisticated technology and financial capabilities were required.396
No developing states had both of these. For this reason developing states were
worried about the possibilty that the industrialised states might monopolise the
seabed and its 'fortune', These two reasons provided the impetus for developing
states to pursue, as a group, the establishment of an international regime which
would enable them to derive benefit from deep seabed development. Later some
developing states, which were producing the same minerals as those on the deep
seabed, became worred about the prospet that their income from exporting those
minerals would be reduced. The Group of 77 then attempted to solve this problem
by devising a new proposal for the production and marketing control of deep seabed
minerals, coupled with a compensation scheme for the loss incured as a result of
deep seabed mining.
The above shows that the developing states at the negotiation and a United States
domestic factor, the mining industry, directly influenced the actions of each other.
In terms of technological development of deep seabed mining the developing states
were more interested in the moves of United States industry, than in the delegation
of the United States at the negotiation. The developing states reacted to the moves
of the industry by adopting resolutions. On the other hand, industry in the United
396To extract manganese nodules from the deep seabed requires sophisticated equipment. For
example, the seabed is not generally flat, it contains peaks which measured from the bottom are taller
than Mt. Everest. Changeable weather at sea, erosion by sea water also need to be considered. In
addition, processing also needs sophisticated technology because the composition of elements within
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States was looking at the negotiation and reacting to actions taen at the negotiation
by the developing states and then lobbying Congress and the governent. The
reactions of developing states and United States industr were not directly linked
since only states can negotiate at the negotiation. Nonetheless they influenced each
other. The information sources of the representatives of developing states were not
limited to their counterpart at the negotiation. They had access to a much wider
network including United States industry. When industry in the United States
realised the actions of developing states, it lobbied Congress and the governent in
order to influence the United States policy on the Law of the Sea, since only the
state can negotiate with other states.
The United States' position was gradually moving towards accepting the
developing states' positions. The Nixon Trusteeship Proposal397 of 1970 was
evidence that the United States would concede to the developing countries on the
issue of the deep seabed mining regime. The United States hoped to establish an
adjacent regime as quickly as possible and it, along with other developed states,
wished to improve the atmosphere of the committee. The Principles Resolution of
1970 was an example of their efforts to do this. The Principles Resolution was
vague and considered largely meaningless, but nonetheless it was adopted without
objection or abstention. Developing states interpreted this as meaning that the
concept of Common Heritage of Mankind was recognised and that they could
proceed with their arguent on this concept. When the Conference Resolution of
1970 to convene the conference in 1973 was adopted, the United States joined the
sponsors ofthe resolution.
mangnese nodules varies considerably from one seabed site to another and even the variabilty
within regions is significant.
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At the beginning of the pre-Conference stage a number of developing states were
doubtfu of the outcome of the negotiation, and they did not necessarily want a
strong international machinery. At the end of this stage, however, more developing
states considered that having a strong machinery to be a better option. 398
At this stage, most developing countries were interested in making a new ocean
regime, especially for deep seabed mining, however, they were not so keen on
making a new adjacent sea regime, such as the breadth of territorial sea or national
jurisdiction, because unilateral claims by coastal states were suffcient to satisfy
their needs at that time. The Continental Shelf Convention of 1958 basically
guaranteed their jursdiction over the natural resources on the continental shelf and
the entire continental shelf was grdually acknowledged as within the coastal states'
jurisdiction.399 In addition, the possible extension of national jursdiction to twelve
miles to protect their living resources from foreign fleets, eased the need for many
coastal states to make further unlateral claims. Even if coastal states had
unilaterally extended national jursdiction in the adjacent seas and received
objections from other states, the objections themselves would not directly harm
them. Some developing states, mainly Latin American, were anxous to make a new
rue which would allow coastal states to extend their national jurisdiction up to two-
hundred miles. They had been insisting on this since 1947 although many
developing states were not interested in such an idea. The Landlocked states
397See chapter 2.
398See Johan'Ludvik Lyvald, 'In search of an ocean regime: The negotiations in'the General
Assembly's Seabed Committee 1968-1970', International Organization, Vol. 29, No. 3, (Summer,
1975).
399The Continental Shelf Convention of 1958 ariculated as the limit of national jurisdiction two-
hundred metre isobath or the limit of exploitabilty. As a result of the International Court of Justice's
decision of the North Sea case in 1969, the entire continental shelf was generally considered to
belong to the coastal states although the limit of the continental shelf was not clearly defined at the
time.
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especially opposed the idea of wider national jursdiction because it did not benefit
them at all, and moreover, it meant that the area of the Common Heritage of
Mankind became much smaller. The Latin Americans, which belonged to the Group
of 77, saw Pardo's initiative as dangerous because they thought it might lay down
the limits of national jurisdiction quite narrowly. Other developing states viewed
Pardo's ideas positively.40o The Latin Americans in fact implored Pardo, both
privately and in the Assembly, to withdraw his initiative before it was made public.
Among various reactions to Pardo's initiative, the Latin Americans were 'profoundly
hostile'.401 They were hostile to any attempt to raise the question of the limits of
national jurisdiction because their two-hundred miles position was hardly supported
by other states outside of their own Latin American group. The Latin Americans'
attitude on the issue of the limits of national jurisdiction caused a rift among the
developing countries.402 The Latin Americans' actions prevented the Group of 77
from taking a more consolidated position. As a result, the Group of 77 ignored the
problem of the limits of national jurisdiction and insisted that deciding the deep
seabed regime would be the first thing to do, while the United States and other
developed countries insisted on the need to define the boundaries of national
jurisdiction first.
The above summarises the discussions between developing states and the United
States at the negotiation and it is clear that the perceptions of developing states and
the United States on the negotiation were quite different. The United States was not
ready to concede substantially at this stage in terms of the deep seabed regime,
400oss D. Eckert, The Enclosure of Ocean Resources: Economics and the La of the Sea (Stanford:
Hoover Institutions Press, 1979.), p. 41.
40lEvan Luard, The Control of the Sea-Bed: Who Owns the Resources of the Oceans?, revised.
(London: Heineman, 1977)pp. 88-89.
402Buzan.,op. cif., p. 73.
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although the United States showed its willingness to negotiate. The United States
avoided creating hostility between itself and the developing states. The reason it did
so was that it wanted to establish navigational rights by clarifying the adjacent sea
regime. The United States was ready to use the negotiation of deep seabed mining
regime as a bargaining chip. As a result the United States supported convening a
conference with a wide-ranging agenda in order to secure navigational rights. The
developing states did not have a common position on the issue of the breath of
terrtorial sea, however, they wanted to prevent the deep seabed from being
monopolised by the United States and other technologically developed states. When
the Group of 77 ignored the issue of the breadth of national jursdiction and
concentrated on the issue of the deep seabed regime the Group of 77 started to
consolidate. At this stage, not only did the developing states interact with the United
States at the negotiation but were directly interacted by domestic factors of the
United States, such as the deep seabed mining industry.
3. Pre-Conference Negotiation Stage ll: 1971-1973
In December 1970 it was decided that the Law of the Sea Conference would take
place in 1973 and as a result, the negotiation at this stage was one of preparation for
the Conference. At this stage, issues were gradually discussed in increasing detail,
and the understanding by participating delegates of the issues became deeper and
broader. Developing states had various meetings outside the United Nations and
eventually consolidated their position within the Group of 77. In the United States,
the mining industry continuously lobbied Congress and the governent,. and
Congress started considering domestic legislation for deep seabed mining. This
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influenced states' actions at the negotiation. 403 At the end of this stage, the
combination of the twelve miles territorial sea and the two-hundred miles Exclusive
Economic Zone took shape, although the United States stil disagreed with the main
body of opinion.
Developing states had many meetings outside of the United Nations. These
meetings influenced the negotiation which was being held inside of the United
Nations. These meetings bolstered the Group of 77's position in the negotiation.
Some of the meetings of developing states were attempts to unify participants'
positions in the negotiation. These were meetings of the Asian-African Legal
Consultative Committe (AALCC), meetings of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) and the ministerial meeting of the Group of 77. These meetings were
particularly effective because policy-makers of participating states learned what the
issues meant for them or for their region and how policy-makers of other states
considered issues. These meetings were one of the information sources. In addition,
policy-makers of participating states leared through these meetings, that they had
to align their objectives and act together in order to strengthen their position at the
negotiation. The negotiation was held in the United Nations whose system is based
on the principle of all states being equal, namely a one-state-one-vote system.
The attempts of representatives of the Latin American states to inspire an anti.
developed states' feeling among representatives of developing countries were
especially successful and this eventully formed the basic tone of the negotiation.
The Latin American states attempted to get support from other developing states by
403The discussion in the Seabed Committee was conducted in the three Sub-Committees. They were
respectively assigned deep seabed regime, traditional issues such as breadth ofterntorial sea, and
environment and some other issues. These Sub-Committees conducted discussions at the same time
so that they could produce separate outcomes. This system was kept in the Conference as well.
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creating a clear rift between the developing states and the developed states. In
August 1971 in the Seabed Committee, with regard to the deep seabed regime,
thirteen Latin American states proposed a strong autonomous machinery with
exploiting power. This proposal gave virtally all powers of initiative to the
Interntìonal Seabed Authority. This proposal was at the extreme end of the
proposals submitted to the Seabed Committee between 1970 and 1971.404 The Latin
American states intended to strengthen their two-hundred miles zone position by
using this proposal as a bargaining chip to secure the acceptance of the two-hundred
miles zone.405 Buzan reported that some delegates' view on this Latin American
proposal was that it was a mere adjunct to their coastal state campaign. He said that
'by creating Group of 77 support for a strong regime, the Latin American coastal
states would be able to make it suffciently distateful to the developed states,
paricularly the United States, to force them to adopt wide coastal state jurisdiction
in self-defence. '406 The view that making it distasteful to the United States by
inducing adoption of wider jursdiction might have been the case, however, in my
view, this proposal was also intended to produce a rallying point for the Group of
77. The Latin American states took this proposal to the ministerial meeting of the
Group of 77, which was held in Lima, in November of 1971. The Latin American
states inspired in the Group of 77 a 'feeling of anti-developed states' by saying that
the developed states were exploiting the developing states and that the developing
countres had to protect their own interests against the developed states. The
thinkng of Latin American states was that, in my view, by making a unified front
Regardless of this separation of issues, the attention of paricipants changed from time to time
depending on the topics or the surrounding situation.
404See Buzan, op. cif., pp. 162-170.
405Schmidt,op. cit., pp. 104-5.
406Buzan, op. cif., p. 178, note. 22.
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against the developed states they could argue other issues, such as their primary
issue of the two-hundred miles maritime zone, from a position of the Group of 77.
The number of supporters of the two-hundred miles zone was stil small and the
Latin American states were therefore unble to pursue this cause furher. They
therefore tried to build up a perception that the negotiation was one of developing
states against the developed states.
As a result, the Group of 77 affrmed the coastal states rights over the resources
in the adjacent seas within the national jurisdiction, without defining the limits of
national jursdiction. This was a compromise in the Group of 77 between states
wishing wider national jursdiction and states wishing narrow national jurisdiction,
however, it was an achievement for the Latin Americans. The assurance of the
coastal states rights within national jurisdiction strongly suggested that the idea of
two-hundred miles zone could surive in the Group of 77, since it was very diffcult
to overturn a decision or limit the meaning of the decision within the Group of 77
once it was agreed. By creating an anti-developed states feeling, coupled with the
encouragement of a strong international machinery, the Latin American states made
explicit the split between the developing countries and the developed countries. As
a result, wider national jurisdiction and the strong international machinery could
form a common ground against the developed states, and this would help the Latin
Americans to secure their two-hundred miles zones. This in fact happened and the
split between the developing countries and the developed states became clear.
Schmidt pointed out with regard to the machinery issue, whether a strong machinery
.
with exploiting power or a weak machinery without exploiting power, '(t)he
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protagonists of the different systems quickly split along a North-South line. '407 The
developing states started to interpret many issues from this viewpoint.
With regard to technological development of deep seabed mining American
companies took an early lead and organisations for deep seabed mining spread in
other industrialised countries, such as Japan, West Germany and France. Summa
Corpration in the United States was the front runner and in mid-1971 Summa
began constrction of what was thought at the time to be a 36,000 ton ocean mining
ship and a dredge-head launching barge. The start of deep seabed mining was
therefore thought to be imminent.408 (In 1975 it was reported that Summa
Corpration actually intended to salvage a wrecked Soviet nuclear-submarine from
the deep seabed with the 'mining ship'. It appeared then that deep seabed mining
was only a cover to carr out other activities.409) These activities were particularly
visible. In addition, in the United States some bils on domestic legislation for deep
seabed mining were introduced. These were initiated by the mining industry in the
United States.
These events within the United States made the position of the Group of 77
firmer at the negotiation. The Group of 77 wanted to benefit from deep seabed
mining. Once the problem of the land-producer members was solved by a proposal
of production and marketing control by the machinery, the Group of 77 was able to
concentrate on the debate of the deep seabed regime. At the negotiation, the
positions of the Group of77 and the United States became firmer and polarsed. For
the Group of 77 the benefits of the international seabed should be used for their
407Schmidt,op. cif., p104
408Barkenbus,op. cit., p. 18; Science Vol. 183, (15 Februar 1974), pp. 644-645.; Buzan, op. cit., p.
151.
409See Barkenbus, op. cit., p. 18.
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development under the Common Heritage of Mankind concept. The Group of 77
flatly opposed the idea of deep seabed mining being carried out before a treaty was
made. They were afraid that if deep seabed mining started without an interntionally
agreed regime, the United States and other developed states would take advantage
of it and eventually control the entire area. In order to prevent them from starting
deep seabed mining the Group of 77 strongly opposed starting any mining at all
without a treaty. The visible activities of Summa Corporation helped the Group of
77 to form a more coherent group. The Group of 77 argued that a strong machinery
with exploiting powers should be established and that the developed countries
should be satisfied with service contracts or joint ventures with the machinery. The
developing states believed the developed states and their companies were trng to
loot their treasures. This was paricularly felt when the developing countries were
.
given the Secretary-General's report on recent research on the deep seabed deposits.
The report stated that the manganese nodule did not exist evenly on the seabed, but
existed unevenly, and that there were some prime sites in the Pacific. Developing
states thought that if the developed states startd deep seabed mining they would
grab the prime sites and this was unacceptble to them.
The United States and other industrialised states opposed a strong machinery.
They thought that existing interntional law guranteed them the right to exploit the
deep seabed. The Common Heritage of Manind was, to them, legally meaningless
and the demands of the developing countres were unreasonable. This difference in
basic perceptions between the Group of 77 and the United States was reflected in
.
the negotiation. In order to control the machinery the Group of 77 wanted the
Assembly to be the real decision-making organ in the machinery, as within that they
had numerical superiority. For the United States, in order to engage in deep seabed
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mining effectively, control of the machinery was criticaL. They preferred that the
Council of the machinery, which is the executive organ, rather than the Assembly
where all the member states attend, be the real decision making organ. The nature of
the controllng power of the machinery was a more importt matter than the
distribution of the benefits at this stage.
On the issue of the adjacent sea regime, at this stage almost all coastal states,
including the United States agreed to extend their national jurisdiction seawards.
The concerns of the United States centred around two issues, strait passage410 and
fisheries. The issue of strait passage divided states' opinions generally along the line
of developed states and the developing states, since vessels of developed states
frequently used international straits. Strait passage was the primary concern for
major naval powers, that is the United States and the Soviet Union. Due to the
actions of coastal states in extending their national jurisdiction seawards, the status
of many importnt international straits had become unstable. Contrary to the view
of the United States, strait coastal states insisted that innocent passage was
sufcient for the needs of navigation4I i and opinion on this issue became polarised.
The United States was stil struggling to acquire free navigation.
At this stage, deep seabed mining was considered imminent, which was clearly
visible due to the activities of Summa Corpration. Within the United States,
Congress started to discuss domestic legislation for deep seabed mining and this
influenced states' actions at the negotiation. The Group of 77, in turn, objected to
4IONo discussion was held on the question of straits used for international navigation in the Seabed
Committee until 1971. Discussion began after the United Nations General Assembly decided to
convene a conference on the Law of the Sea and assigned the preparatory work to the Seabed
Committee. United Nations Offce for Ocea Afairs and the Law of the Sea, The La of the Sea:
Straits Used for International Navigation: Legislative history of Part /II of the United Nations
Convention on the La of the Sea, Vol. I (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 21.
4 ii See chapter 5.
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the actions of Congress. As shown in the previous section domestic factors within
the United States and the Group of 77 at the negotiation were directly influencing
each other. The actions of the Summa Corporation clearly show how actions by
group or individuals directly influenced the negotiation. At the same time, the
Group of 77 tried to consolidate its position outside of the negotiation. This was
intended to utilise fully their numerical strength at the United Nations and the
United Nations' system.
4. Conference Stage I: 1973-75
At this stage, the perceptions of policy-makers of states changed substatially.
The oil crisis in 1973 brought about speculation about the shortge of minerals. In
addition, the success of the oil embargo by the Arab Petroleum Exportng Countries
bolstered the confidence of the Group of 77 and brought about hopes for developing
states that they could change the international system in their favour. This hope
produced a New International Economic Order which greatly influenced the
negotiation. At the same time, in the United States, the importnce of strategic
minerals was recognised and as a result deep seabed mining was treated more
importantly than before.
The Law of the Sea Conference therefore started amid an atmosphere of oil crisis
and fears of depletion of natual resources. The preceding Seabed Committee was
supposed to produce a draft treaty, but it only succeeded in making lists for
discussion. The discussion in the Seabed Committee also produced a general
framewQrk for the adjacent sea regime. This framework was reinforced by the
events surrounding the oil crisis, which caused the participants of the negotiation to
pay more attention to their continental shelves and economic zones, since these
areas contain natual resources. Under these circumstances, and coupled with the
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introduction of the concept of a NIO,412 the Group of 77's solidarity was furter
strengthened. With regard to the NIO, the United Nations special session on raw
materials and development was held in April 1974 at which the principles ofNIO
were adopted. The Group of 77 attempted to employ their commodity power,
namely the position as suppliers of natural resources including food products, to
acquire a more equitable economic relationship between developing and developed
states and the NIO represented their basic principles. This new wave of thinking
by the developing countries immediately influenced the Law of the Sea negotiation,
especially in the discussion of adjacent sea regime and more specifically with regard
to the continental shelf and the economic zone which was later called the EEZ. With
regard to the deep seabed regime the infuence of the new wave of thinking of the
NIO was stil limited413 since states' primary concern was their own national
resources and adjacent seas regime.
The oil crisis also made the United States and other developed states recognise
the importance of resource independence. This was compounded by the publication
of The Limit of Growth by the Club of Rome in 1972, which warned about the
depletion of natural resources. (The claims made in it were later found to be largely
groundless.) The United States and other developed states therefore moved towards
securing their continental shelves and economic zones as well as a favourable
framework for deep seabed mining. The turng of attention to the adjacent seas
ensured that the negotiation of the adjacent seas regime would include the 200 miles
412 See chapter 5.
413Schmidt,op. cif., pp. 107-108. Michael A. Morrs, 'The New International Economic Order and
the New Law of the Sea', in Kal P Sanvant and Hajo Hassenpflung (eds), The New International
Economic Order: Confrontation or Co-operation between North an South? (Lndon: Wilton House
Publications, 1977), pp. i 78-179.
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EEZ.414 As a result the internl conflicts relating to the adjacent seas regime
between coastal states, and the Landlocked and Geographically Disadvantaged
states group in the Group of 77 became less importnt and the Group of 77 became
ready to concentrate on the deep seabed regime negotiation. At this time, the Group
of 77 became the dominant power for the developing states in the international
arena and it held meetings, such as the conference on raw materials, in Dakar in
Februar 1975. As the issues to be discussed in the Law of the Sea Conference
became more technical and detailed, the role of regional groups in the Group of 77
became smaller, since individual member states were unable to cope with broad
ranged technical and detailed discussions. Instead, the Group of 77 which had its
own officials at the Conference, dealt with such matters.
Speculation about mineral shortge or depletion also influenced the United
.
States. The United States attempted to acquire favourable conditions in deep seabed
mining to satisfy its emerging concerns about resource independence. Congress was
;
particularly keen to establish resource independence. On the other hand, although
the Group of 77 tried to acquire favourable conditions in deep seabed mining by its
numerical supremacy, it conceded in adopting the consensus method in the
Conference. This was due to the Group of 77's realisation that without developed
states' technology it would not be able to develop the deep seabed at alL.
The relationship between the Group of 77 and the United States was built on a
series of assumptions. First, as far as the Group of 77 was concerned, deep seabed
mining was ready to commence. In reality, however, the technology needed further
development, despite claims by mining companies that they were ready to be used.
In addition, in order to start deep seabed mining, a huge investment was required,
414Although at this stage, the issue of strait passage had not been solved.
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however, the then curent investment environment was not secure enough without
establishing a universal agreement of deep seabed development or having United
States governent's guarantee. The delegations of the United States appeared to
have used the Group of 77's perception of imminent commencement of deep seabed
mining as a leverage to negotiate other issues, namely adjacent sea regime, and
especially strait passage. In the negotiation, the relationship beteen the United
States and the Group of 77 became hostile. This was particularly the case with
reference to the issue of deep seabed mining and other areas related to technology
transfer and investments. The United States would not concede anything easily, and
early in the negotiation of this stage, the United States wanted 'everyhing and to
give away nothing. '415 The Group of 77 stuck to their position which was bolstered
by the NIO principles. The objective of the Group of 77 was to control the ISA by
a one state one vote system. There was not, therefore, much room to make a deal.
As for the issues of the twelve miles terrtorial sea and the two-hundred miles EEZ
there was not much difference between the two sides at this stage, apart from the
issue of strait passage. With regard to strait passage, the Informal Single
Negotiating Text, which was produced in 1975, incorprated free passage in
international straits, although strait coastal states stil opposed this and therefore it
was stil unstable.416
The context of the negotiation in the form of the oil crisis and speculation of
minerals shortge influenced states' actions at the negotiation. These events also
produced the NIO principles which strengthened the solidarity of the Group of 77
and further influenced states' actions at the negotiation.
415Schmidt,op. cit., p. 125.
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5. Conference Stage ll: 1975-80
In response to the outcome of the negotiation conducted in the previous stage,
states started to enact the agreed twelve miles terrtorial sea and the two-hundred
miles EEZ417 without waiting for the negotiation to be completed. The United States
was one of the states which domestically legislated two-hundred miles fisheries
zone.418 At the same time, the belief in the deep seabed as a bonanza gradually
faded. Before this stage, member states in the Group of 77 often held meetings
outside of the Conference, however, at this stage, the activities of the Group of 77
were concentrated within the Conference. On the other hand, in the United States
domestic legislation for deep seabed mining became imminent, largely reflecting
the resource independence arguments.
At this stage, in order to secure navigational freedom, which was incorprated in
the ISNT, the United States engaged in tough negotiations on the issue of the seabed
regime. At the first part of this stage, negotiations reached an impasse. The
influences of the NIO became very strong at the negotiation in 1976, since
member states of the Group of 77 recognised the importnce of incorprating the
NIO principles into the Law of the Sea negotiation. The Group of 77 and the
United States thought each other intransigent. As the negotiation went on, the issues
were negotiated in more and more detail and new issues were added.
At the previous stage, the negotiation on the deep seabed regime became hostile
and neither side would concede. This was basically the same at this stage, although
416See United Nations Offce for Ocean Afairs and the Law of 
the Sea The Law of the Sea: Straits
Used for International Navigation: Legislative history of Part il of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, Vot. n. (New York: United Nations, 1992), pp. 79-80.
417Legislations of these were basically based on the Informal Single Negotiation Text, which was in
fact provided as a basis of negotiation. See United Nations Division for Ocean Afairs and the Law
of the Sea Offce of Legal Afairs, The La of the Sea: National Legislation on the Exclusive
Ecnomic Zone (New York: United Nations, 1993), p. Hi.
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In 1976 United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made a signficant
concession on the 'parallel system', which was the system to exploit the deep seabed
by both the ISA's mining arm, the Enterprise, and private miners.419 As a result, the
most importnt and contentious issues of the ISA's strcture and voting system,
especially the Council's structure and its voting system, were not negotiated
seriously for quite a long time. These very importnt questions, which would decide
the whole power balance in the ISA, only revertd to serious negotiation in 1980.
Before 1980, negotiators concentrated on other issues. This meant that negotiations
were developed on two tracks, on one track was the discussion of detailed terms of
deep seabed mining in order to eliminate the possibility of abuse of power by the
ISA, and on the other were fundamental questions, such as the strctue of the
Council and its voting system. The two track negotiation produced very complicated
negotiating texts. At one time, in 1978, the United States delegation sought to
simplify the provisions of the texts,420 however, its attempt was opposed by others.
The Group of 77 interpreted the suggestion to simplify the text by the United States
as an intention to introduce a preferential voting system, such as weighted votes.
The preferential voting system was against the Group of 77's basic principle of one-
state-one-vote, and for other developed countries such a suggestion would open the
way for the abuse of power of the ISA. Behind these attitudes lay the serious
distrst that both sides had for each other and this negative relationship did not
change at this stage. At the last par of this stage, in 1980, the issues of the Council's
structure and its voting system had to be resolved in order to go onto the final stage
which would conclude the Conference. The gap in positions between both sides was
418Soo chapters 1, 2 and 5.
419See chapter 2.
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considerably narrower than it had been before 1980 and fine tuning of interests was
made. In the end, on the issue of the Council's structure and its voting system, both
sides were dissatisfied with the outcome of the negotiation, however, they reached
an agreement on the issues.
Behind the scenes there was manoeuvring by the United States chief negotiator.
The United States Congress was discussing the bils of unilateral legislation for
deep seabed mining. At this stage, the attmpt by Congress became much more
serious than before. The Group of 77 feared United States' unlateral legislation
most of all because it would encourage deep seabed mining without internationally
agreed rules for it. Before ths stage, the bils had not mustered much support in
Congress because the issues were considered minor. After the oil crisis, however,
members of Congress gradually saw deep seabed mining as importnt in supplying
.
essential minerals to the United States. Whenever a bil was introduced into
Congress the Group of 77 became nervous and criticised the United States openly.
On the contrary, in the United States, in accordance with the progress of the
negotiation in the Conference, industry became nervous. It objected particularly to
the deep seabed regime in the ISNT. Industry lobbied the governent to influence
the negotiation and tred to persuade politicians to legislate domestically to protect
their deep seabed interests. Before October 1977 the United States Administrations'
position was opposed to enactment of legislation, however, the Administration did
not try to stop the discussion in Congress. The Administration considered that
discussions in Congress were a threat to the Group of 77 and it might be able to
. .
obtain some concessions from it. The United States chief negotiator did, in fact,
exploit the fear of the Group of 77 and manoeuvred the progress of those bils in
420Schmidt,op. cif., pp. 140-141.
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Congress according to the progress of negotiation in the Conference. Whenever the
negotiation was deadlocked this type of manoeuvring was carried out to move the
negotiation forward. This meant tht Congress and the Group of 77 directly
influenced each other, that is there was an interrelationship between a domestic
factor and states' actions at the negotiation. This was evident because the United
States chief negotiator's manoeuvring was so successful that he used it repeatedly.
In the end, although in 1980 the United States had introduced domestic legislation
for deep seabed mining, participants of the negotiation agreed to produce the 1980
Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The perceptions about the prospects of deep seabed mining also changed
significantly at this stage. The negotiation started based on the assumption that the
commencement of commercial deep seabed mining was imminent. At this stage,
negotiators grdually realised that the future of seabed mining was not as bright as
originally thought. When the Conference staed, immediately after the oil crisis,
deep seabed mining was thought of as profitable because of the sudden increase in
minerals prices.421 On top of that, deep seabed minerals were considered
strategically importt since the United States, for example, was importing
minerals. The high price of minerals, however, other than oil, did not last long, and
expectations about deep seabed mining decreased.422 The developed countries, in
order to achieve better conditions for their miners, emphasised that profitabilty of
deep seabed mining was expected to be quite low. On the other hand, mining
companies advocated its high profitabilty in order to attract investments. For the
.
developing states, reliable information sources were therefore limited and as such
421 The Secretary-General's reports on the prospec of deep seabed mining had shown dim pictures
for the prospect of deep seabed mining.
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they were reluctant to believe that the deep seabed mining might not be profitable.
This situation changed when MIT's model of economics of deep seabed mining was
introduced to the Conference. It revealed that the profitability of deep seabed
mining might be limited.423 At the end of this stage, the developing states eventually
understood the possibility of low profitabilty. This change in perception of
profitability brought about a deal between the Group of 77 and the United States in
terms of financial arangements of seabed mining.
In summar, at this stage the context of the negotiation changed in that the belief
in a deep seabed mining 'bonanz' faded and the negotiation was, as a result,
conducted in a more accommodating manner at the end of this stage. There was also
another factor in the surounding context which influenced the negotiation and that
was that the twelve miles terrtorial sea and two-hundred miles EEZ were now
.
being enacted by many states. As states had concentrated on the negotiation of the
deep seabed mining regime and other unresolved issues, they did not realise the
meaning of states' enacting these. At this stage, states' actions at the negotiation and
factors within the United States influenced each other and the whole negotiation
was greatly infuenced by changes in its surrounding context. So powedully in fact
were United States domestic factors able to influence the Group of 77 that this was
deliberately manipulated by the United States chief negotiator.
6. Discussion
In negotiation theory, the context of the negotiation is regarded as an importnt
factor in aialysing negotiations, however, the means by which the context of
422Whenever mineral prices went up, the enthusiasm for deep sebed mining in general came back.
423 
See James K. Sebenius, Negotïating the La of the Sea (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harard
University Press, 1984).
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negotiation is to be analysed is not fully documented. In this chapter, the negotiation
process was described and the chapter shows that the Law of the Sea negotiation
was greatly influenced by its context both before and during the negotiation.
Negotiation theory sets the preferences of negotiating parties at the beginnng of
analysis and these preferences are assumed not to chage during the negotiation.
This study however has ilustrated that this is not the case. The problem that
remains is that if the context is recognsed as infuencing the negotiation how can
the factors that exist within the context be assessed.
In international relations theory, the 'context of negotiation' can be understood to
mean the given conditions which define the issues at a certn point in time. Issues
are, as Keohane and Nye defined, 'problems about which policymakers are
concerned, and which they believe are relevant to public policy. '424 Issues are
therefore defined subjectively,425 as are given conditions. This could cause a
problem in analysing the negotiation, since as Jervis pointed out 'rational or not,
people interpret incoming information in terms of what is of concern to them at the
time the information arrves. '426 In other words it is not easy to understand what the
policy-makers actually perceived. To overcome this, international relations theorists
tend to investigate states' actual actions as 'proof of what policy-makers perceived.
For example, Krasner has suggested that only examining the final policy decisions
of states, namely states' actual actions, will suffce.427 When this position of
examining only states' actual actions is felt unsatisfactory other theorists, for
example, might analyse the foreign policy-making process. Even if this reveals the
424Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power an Interdependence (Boston: Little-Brown,
1977), pp. 64-65.
425Ibid., p. 65.
426Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 204.
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wrangling within a governent, however, issues are stil defined subjectively, as are
given conditions. As a result it is stil not easy to quantify the degree of influence
that the context of the negotiation has.
In addition, if the context of the negotiation is considered to be given conditions
which define what are issues at a specific point in time, the context need not be
limited to outside of the negotiation or outside of the state to which the policy-
makers belong. It could include anytng which influences the decisions of policy-
makers (or negotiators). Negotiators of developing states perceived what was
happening in the United States, and reacted to it. Policy-makers of the United States
were lobbied by people who saw what was happening at the negotiation and reated
to it. This means that policy-makers of the United States were influenced by the
negotiation, domestic factors and international factors. The domestic factors of the
United States were influencing the actions of the developing states at the negotiation
and domestic factors of the United States were being infuenced by developing
states' actions at the negotiation and international factors. These relationships were
very complicated. Therefore although the context of negotiation is considered to be
importnt in analysing the negotiation, it is not easy to quantify or theorise the
judgement of policy-makers, since that is decided subjectively.
7. Conclusion
Various factors in the context of the negotiation, along with United States
domestic factors, influenced the Law of the Sea negotiation in the period 1967 to
. 1980. At the same time, the negotiation influenced domestic factors within the
427See chapter 2 of this study.
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United States and there was also a relationship between international factors in the
context of the negotiation and domestic factors of the United States.
This complexity of relationships is not recognised by either negotiation theory or
international relations theory. It is clear from the examination of the changing
context of the negotiation that context, namely domestic factors and international
factors, and the negotiation itself, infuence each other continuously and produce
outcomes which furer infuence context and the negotiation. Stil furher, the way
in which these influences occur is diffcult to assess, since the judgement of policy-
makers may be subjective.
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Chapter 7. The Rejection of the Convention by the United States
The Law of the Sea negotiation continued to progress and the Draft Convention
was produced in 1980. There were few outstanding issues at this stage428 and it was
thought these could be solved in the next session scheduled for 1981. The
negotiation had developed and although the issues had once been vague, they were
now identified and detailed, and almost all were by now resolved.
At this time, when the participants of the negotiation felt that it was reaching the
final stage and ha agreed to produce the Draft Convention, a political change in the
United States occurred. The new Reagan Administration started to review the
negotiation and finally, in 1982 rejected the Convention. There were several factors
in the context of the negotiation which influenced the United States' decision to do
this. First, the demise of détente changed the pòlitical climate in the United States.
Second, the Reagan Administration's ideology, particularly the policy of free
enterprise, was tied to the concern about strategic minerals, propert rights and
other strategic concerns. Third, the Reagan Administration judged that navigational
freedom, which past United States administrations had been most concerned about,
was in fact practically achieved by states' practices world-wide. The above factors
resulted in the United States' rejection of the Convention and in this chapter these
factors are examined in detaiL. In addition, the relationship between the changing
context of the negotiation and actions taken by the United States are examined.
428See Wiliam Wertenbaker, 'A Reporter at Large: The Law of the Sea, Par IT', The New Yorker,
(Aug. 8, 1983), p. 67.
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1. Changes in the context of the negotiation and domestic factors
Two factors in the context of the negotiation influenced the decision of the
United States to reject the Convention. They were the demise of détente and the
states' practice of navigational rights world-wide. With regard to the demise of
détente the relationship beteen the United States and the Soviet Union became
problematic and in 1979 there were several events which finally marked the end of
détente. These were: United States accusations in September concerning the
construction of a Soviet combat bridge in Cuba; Nato's approval of the two-track
plan for deployment of United States medium range missiles in Europe made at the
same time as arms control with the Soviet Union; and, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan.429 With regard to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, United States
President Carer made a package of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union
and eventually pulled the United States out of the 1980 Olympics games which
were held in Moscow. In addition' the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II
Treaty signed by Carter and Brezhnev in June 1979 was not ratified in the Senate.
Moreover, the United States Congress, for the first time in thrteen years, increased
the defence budget in keeping with the Carter Administration's suggestion. The
problem for the United States was that by the late 1970s, when the Soviet Union
claimed miltary parity with the United States, many of the proposed American
weapons systems had either been delayed or cancelled.430 On the other hand, during
the 1970s, the Soviet Union substantially improved the quality and quantity of its
Intercontinental Ballstic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine-launched Ballstic
429See Mohammed Abid Ishaq, u.S.-Soviet Relations 1980-88: The Politics of Trade Pressure. PhD
Thesis, Glasgow University, 1994, p. 14.
43UJavid L. Speare, Soviet Perceptions of the First Reagan Administration (Soviet Industry and
Technology Series SITS 2, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of
Birmingham, Discussion papers, 1985), pp. 10-11.
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Missiles (SLBMs) and in particular the number ofICBMs had exceeded those of the
United States.431 Many people in the United States had a sense that they had been
betrayed by the Soviet Union. They saw that the Soviet Union had exploited the
period of détente for its own ends432 and this feeling influenced the result of the
1980 elections. The voters opted for 'politicians whose chief foreign policy
prescriptions were more defence spending and a tougher stance against the
Soviets',433 and the Republicans achieved the majority in the Senate for the first
time in twenty-six years. This feeling also affected the result of the United States
Presidential election in 1980 and the Republican candidate Ronald Reagan won the
election.434 In the Reagan Administration that took offce, the Law of the Sea
negotiation was part of a total reassessment of foreign policies.
When the Reagan Administration came to power top offcials in the governent
were changed. This changed the thinkng of the Department of Defense and the
Navy on the strategic importnce of navigational freedom which had been the
primary issue for the United States in the Law of the Sea negotiation. They viewed
that the Convention's navigational provisions reflected customary international law
because of states' practice and thus a treaty repeating those rights was not essential
to United States' securty interests. As shown in Chapter 6, the navigational rights,
431Ibid., p. 35.
432Ishaq, op.cit., p. 20.
433Congressional Quarerly Almanac 1980, p. 309, cited in Ibid.
434The reans why Carter was defeated have been argued from many different perspectives. The
energy crisis and the failure to get back the hostages from the United States embassy in Iran have, for
example, been given as reasons for his defeat. Cr. Austin Ranney (ed.) The American Elections of
1980 (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981). If Carer
had been re-elected would the Law of the Sea Convention have been signed by the United States and
ratified by the United States Senate? Due to the personal infuence of the chief negotiator of the
United Staes, Ellot L. Richardson, the United States would probably have signed it even though he
had resigned from the position in October 1980. The Senate, however, might not have ratified the
Convention because many senators considered that the provisions of the deep seabed mining were
objectionable to the United States interests. See Markus G. Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common. ..
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particularly rights of strait passage and overfight of it, twelve miles territorial sea
and two-hundred miles Exclusive Economic Zone were incorporated in the Informal
Single Negotiation Text in 1975. After the United States enacted the two-hundred
miles Fisheries Zone in 1976, many states followed suit and two-hundred miles
jurisdiction became widely accepted. As a result the navigational rights, particularly
straits passage, were also practised by passing vessels. Given these states' practices,
coupled with the confidence that had developed due to Navy vessels sailng in
newly claimed waters without disturbances, Navy vessels were ordered by the
Carter Administration in the spring of 1979 to sail in newly claimed waters
whenever possible.435 Navy vessels had avoided entering disputed areas in order to
make the United States appear as a good negotiating party,436 however, this now
changed and the new practice hardly caused any problems. Under these
circumstances, by the summer of 1981, offcials of the Departent of Defense and
the Navy came to view the Convention's navigational provisions as reflecting
customary intemationallaw and that a treaty repeating those rights was not essential
to United States' securty interests.437
The possible change in evaluation of the strategic importnce of the Law of the
Sea Convention was first suggested by Richard G. Darman, Vice Chairman of the
United States Delegation to the 1977 session of the Conference. Darman argued in
his 1978 article438 in Foreign Affairs, which was wrtten after he resigned from the
position, that transit through straits was no longer necessar to assure strategic
Burden?: The United States Position on the Development of a Regime for Deep Sea-Bed Mining in
the La of the Sea Convention (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 146-147, and p. 147 note 142.
435Soo WiIiam Wertenbaker, fA Reporter at Large: The Law of the Sea, Part 1', The New Yorker,
(Aug. 1, 1983), p. 47.
436Sehmidt,op. cit., p. 144.
437Ibid, pp. 223-224.
194
deterrence due to the increased range and sophistication of the United States'
missiles and missile-launching submarines. He argued that the legal status of coastal
states waters would not be a determinative constraint, mainly because there were
neither straits nor thrd-part economic zones separating the United States from its
alles.439 When the United States sought free navigation a decade previously, the
reach of submarine-launched strategic missiles was limited and the United States
sought maximum mobility for its Navy.44o Darman claimed that the situation had
now changed. He also argued that serious intederence to commercial navigation,
such as oil transporttion, would be unlikely, since major powers and the global
community would not tolerate such abuses.441 As a result, Darman argued that the
United States would not need to stick to the internationally agreed Treaty in order to
obtain navigational freedom. In addition, the implications of the Law of the Sea
Treaty, in terms of deep seabed mining regime, becoming a precedent would be far
too great, since the strong autonomous International Seabed Authority would
jeopardise the United States interests. For this reason, Daran argued it would
suffice to make a Mini-Treaty to conduct deep seabed mining among interested
states. His article 'persuaded some people in the Pentagon and Congress' and 'many
people in the United States were very impressed with it' but it did not persuae
anybody in the Group of 77442 nor did it impress the Soviet Union.443 The article did
not influence the negotiation in the Conference, however, it influenced people in the
United States and a sitution developed, which changed the thinking of offcials in
438Richard G. Dannan, 'The Law of the Sea: Rethinking U.S. Interests', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 56,
(1978).
4391bid., pp. 376-377.
440Ibid., p. 375.
441Ibid., pp. 381-382.
442Schmidt,op. cif., pp. 137-138.
443Ibid., p. 138, note 110.
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the Pentagon. The belief that the provisions of navigation and overfight in the
Convention had already become customary international law, coupled with the
relative decrease of strategic importnce of the seas, made offcials in the Navy and
the Departent of De fen se look at the Law of the Sea Convention differently.
The advent of the Reagan Administration was partly a consequence of the
worsening relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. One analyst
has stated that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 'drastically affected the
international climate of the 1980s, deepening fears that the Soviet Union was
embarked on a course of expansion through force of arms'.444 In addition, several
conservative leaders claimed that the SALT process had failed to produce adequate
restrctions on the Soviet Union's offensive strategic forces and that in the early
1980s the Soviet Union was on the verge of achieving a first strike capability
against the United States' ICBMs. There was a plan in the United States to promote
the development of the MX missile which would, supposedly, offset gains in the
Soviet Union's offensive power. The MX mÌssile was developed in response to the
vulnerabilty of the concrete underground silos in which other ICBMs were housed.
It was however very difficult to find a secure and politically acceptable basing mode
for the MX missile. President Cartr decided the location of the MX missiles,
however, he was unable to start building them because of strong opposition from
states where they would be located and also from many national citizens
organisations. When Reagan came to offce, the MX missile issue had become a
particularly diffcult one in Congress. At the end of 1981 the Reagan Administration
.
faced a situation in Congress which was 'Byzantine'. Some conservatives doubted
196
the system's capabilty to reduce the United States' strategic vulnerability. In
addition, there were disagreements between members of the Departent of Defense
and elements in the Ars Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the State
Department. National support for strategic modernisation was tenuous and the
infuence of the freeze movement, which was opposing any new weapon in the
nuclear arsenal, was increasing. As a result it was becoming diffcult to start
building up major strategic modernisation. Opposition to the MX programmes also
came from people who usually supported a strong defence programme because
there was some doubt about the capabilities of the MX missile system. In addition,
in March 1982, the Senate Ared Services Committee voted to withold all funding
for the MX deployment until the Reagan administration decided on a permanent
basing mode.445 It was a very diffcult situation for the Reagan Administration
because the Administration was unable to take action against the growing
vulnerability of the United States even though it knew that the Soviet Union's
strategic capacity was growing. This was a serious 'strategic crisis'.
Under these circumstances, the Reagan Administration could have secured
navigational freedom by signing the Convention and this would have eliminated the
possibilities of intederence by coastal states with its Navy's mobility. Despite the
fact that the United States claimed that navigational rights were customary
international law, the provisions in the internationally agreed Treaty were stronger
than those of quickly built-up customary international law. If the Soviet Union
became part to the Convention it would benefit by enjoying mobilty for its Navy
. .
which was articulated in the Convention. If, therefore, the decision by the United
444Don Oberdoder, The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era-The United States an the Soviet
Union, 1983-1990 (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991), p. 235, cited in Donald R. Baucom, The
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States to reject the Convention was taken in isolation from any other strategic
considerations, it might have added even greater vulnerability to the United States
strategic defence.
There was, however, another development in terms of the United States strategic
policy. It was the Strategic Defense Intiative (SDI). The objective of SDI was to
find technologies which would make it possible to intercept missiles soon after they
were launched, and to have many different intercept opportnities throughout the
missile's flight.446 If SDI was achieved in practice, it would virtually eliminate the
worres of the United States in terms of Soviet first strike and would drastically
lessen the strategic importance of the seas, which was supported by the submarine-
launched missiles as a second strike strategy. By claiming that the SDI was aimed at
defence, namely, a policy shift from mutual assured destruction to mutual assured
surival, the ideas of SDI could ultimately overcome problems. SDI did not need to
find its location on earth. It did not need to build up new weapons in the nuclear
arsenaL. It therefore seemed an ideal solution and as a result the SDI was publicly
presented on television by President Reagan on 23rd March 1983.
The decision making process that led to Reagan's SDI decision was in fact linked
through Edwin Meese, the President's domestic policy adviser, to the final decision
of the United States to reject the Law of the Sea Convention. Meese was not only
the moving force in the Whte House on Law of the Sea matters but also the driving
force behind SDI. The SDI in the Reagan Administration started in spring 1981.447
Origins of SDI, 1944-1983 (Jwrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansa, 1992), p. 217 note 17.
445Ibid, pp. 171~178.
446Simon Peter Worden, 'A Global Defence Against Ballstic Missiles', in Hans Günter Brauch (ed.)
Sta Wars and European Defence: Implications for Europe: Perceptions an Assessments
(Hampshire: MacMilan Press, 1987), p. 12.
447The Joint Chiefs of Staf proposed the SDI to the President in February 1983. See Baucony, op
cit., pp. 181-192.
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Daniel O. Graham, a former director of the Defence Intelligence Agency, believed
that the United States should take a new national strategy at the heart of which
should be the development of space-based missile defences. 
448 Graham met
President Reaga in February 1981 through Meese and explained to the President
his ideas. Graham also met Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger.449 Graham's
idea was not noveL. For example, Senator Malcolm Wallop, from 1980 onwards~
repeatedly called for the progress of the Air Force programme for space-based high-
energy lasers for missile defences, however, the Air Force were reluctant to proceed
with this because it considered that space weaponr would be very expensive450 and
would consume resources from other more importnt servces.451 At the time there
was no overarching vision to direct the strategic initiative.
In order to conduct a detailed techncal study of the strategy, which was
conducted secretly, Meese was given a list of potential donors to the project by
Graham's group. Meese agreed to approach the donors and the project became
known as the High Frontier Project.452 In September 1981 the High Frontier Panel
members met Meese and other White House advisers in Meese's office at the White
House.453 In January 1982, some members of the Panel met President Reagan with
Meese, White House Chief of Staff, James Baker, National Security Adviser,
Wiliam Clark, and the President's Science Adviser, George Keyworth.454 Afer the
meeting President Reagan wrote to the chairman of the Panel saying that he had
spoken to Meese, Weinberger and Keyworth about following up on the Panel's
448Ibid., p. 144.
449Ibid., p. 141.
450Defense Deparment seemed to have later calculated the cost as us $300 bilion. This was shown
in an article published in Februar 1982. Ibid., p. 161.
45/bid., pp. 135-137.
452Ibid., pp 145-149.
453Ibid., p. 150.
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recommendations and the President assured the chairman that 'we wil be moving
ahead rapidly with the next phase of this effort'.455 On 3rd May, Keyworth wrote to
the Panel, saying that a panel of the White House Science Council had been
established 'to urgently examine the issue of new military technology' and the first
focus of the panel was 'non-conventional weapons, including potential space-based
ballistic missile defense systems. '456
In terms of the Law of the Sea Conference, the United States voted against the
Convention on 30th ApriL. These events were overlapped by the development of the
SDI in the White House and Meese appears to have become convinced that he could
not recommend the Treaty to the President.457 At the point he had to decide whether
he should recommend the Law of the Sea Convention to the President, he must have
considered the strategic implication of rejecting the Convention. If SDI was
achieved, however, it would lessen the strategic importce of the seas. The
problem was that it might take some time to develop the technology of the SDI and
deploy it. On this point, Graham's publication of the High Frontier project in March
1982, a copy of which was handed to the Whte House in February,458 claimed that
the defence missile system was multi-tiered and that the first stage of the missile
defence system, which was to destroy an attcking warhead at a range of about
4,000 feet, could be completed within two to three years. At the second stage of the
defence, a global ballstic missile defence system which would attck Soviet ICBMs
during their boost, post-boost, and late mid-course phases, could be deployed in five
4541bid., p. 153.
455Ibìd., p. 166.
456Ibìd., pp. 167-168.
457Sehmidt,.op. cif., pp. 248-249.
458Baueom,op. cif. p. 162.
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to six years. Further improvements would follow.459 This statement made it appear
that the new defence system could be deployed soon, although the United States has
not yet developed such capabilities460 and in the end SDI was never achieved.
Nevertheless, Meese believed that the SDI could be deployed in the near future and
once it was achieved, there would be no strategic defence concerns about the Soviet
Union signing the Convention. Meese's thinkng was probably that the United States
would manage without the Law of the Sea Convention for the intervening period
since SDI would come soon. Meese reportedly remarked that he would 'not support
a Treaty with the words 'Common Heritage' in it.461 Although he was a conservative
and he personally felt strongly, his remarks were made possible only when he
became convinced that the United States would not need the assured free navigation
of the seas, since denying the words Common Heritage meant, in effect, that there
was no room for the Law of the Sea negotiation to be agreed.462 The more
conservative he was, the more he would have been aware of the danger of the Soviet
Union and he would never have allowed it to gain an advantage by signng the
Treaty when the United States did not.
The negotiation was therefore influenced by various factors. The advent of the
Reagan Administration was brought about by the demise of détente which could be
said to form part of the context of the negotiation. The Reagan Administration
assessed the Law of the Sea Convention and judged that the navigational rights in
the Convention had already become customary international law because of states'
practice. States' practice also could be said to be within the context of the
459Ihid., p.164.
460 See also Ibid., p. 199.
461New York Times, 21 Feb. 1983, A17, col. 1. cited in Schmidt, op. cif., p. 249 note 131.
462The words 'Common Hentage ofMankind remain in the 1994 Implementation of the Law of the
Sea Convention which the United States signed.
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negotiation. The development of SDI was not in the public knowledge, however, it
influenced the Law of the Sea negotiation. Therefore this could also be included in
the context of the negotiation, since SDI itself was not an issue at the negotiation.
Given these factors it can be concluded that at this stage the negotiation was greatly
influenced by its context.
2. The Reagan Administration and domestic factors
President Reagan was sworn into offce in January 1981. In March, before the
Conference session for the year started, his Administration made a statement
anouncing its policy review of the Draft Convention. It replaced the head and other
members of the delegation and sent a much smaller delegation to the Conference
than had previously been the case.463 The United States delegation under the Carter
Administration generally believed that the Law of the Sea negotiation had to be.
completed successfully since this would benefit the United States by establishing an
internationally agreed regime of sea use. They believed that if this did not happen
the navigational freedom of the navy would not be guranteed. This belief made the
delegation engage in very tough and serious negotiation for many years. As a result,
the provisions of the deep seabed regime were constrcted on a subtle balance of
interests between the United States and the Group of 77. This situation, however,
did not satisfY the mining industry in the United States. People in industry, some
politicians and others who were not satisfied with the negotiation, attmpted to alter
its direction. Conservative critics of the negotiation stated that in the 1980 Draft
Convention on the .Law of the Sea 'the articles governng the exploitation of
463This reorganJsation of the delegation was unprecedented. See Ibìd., p. 225.
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minerals in the deep seabed were hostile (to the United States)'.464 This, coupled
with Republican ideology, conservatism and free enterprise, meant that the force
against the Law of the Sea negotiation gained ground and influenced the new
Administration's review of the 1980 Draft Convention.465
The ideological values of the Reagan Administration were not born when the
Administration began. As early as 1978 Reagan himself made a tough stance
against the deep seabed mining regime negotiation based on the importnce of
strategic minerals.466 Republican policy on ocean policies and assured access to the
seabed minerals was built up before the election. Industry was particularly frustrated
with the Law of the Sea negotiation from 1977 to 1980 and was dissatisfied with the
compromises the United States had made. Shortly before the election, Reagan set up
a Task Force for strategic minerals, which highlighted the strategic importnce of
seabed mining. The Task Force submitted a report in December 1980 which stated
that the Draft Convention gave major political and strategic advantage to the Soviet
Union, to the direct disadvantage of the United States, and that immediate steps had
to be taken to re-examine United States' goals at the Conference.467 This report
reflected the ideological opposition to both the Convention and the Common
Heritage of Manknd concept since these were incompatible with the free enterprise
philosophy of the Republicans.468
The perceptions surrounding the importnce of certin issues, which were
bolstered by the Reagan Administration's ideological values, changed the prospects
464Ross D. Eckert, 'US Policy and the Law of the Sea Conference, 1969-1982: A Case Study of
Multilateral Negotiations', in Roland Vaubel and Thomas D Wilett (eds), The Politcal Economy of
International Organizations: A Public Choice Approach (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p 186.
465See Wertenbaker, Part n, op. cif., pp. 67-68.
466Schmidt, op. cif., p. 217.
467Ibid., p. 218.
468Ibid.
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for the Law of the Sea negotiation. In reality many allegations made by the
conservative critics against the Convention were largely groundless.469 For example,
'burdensome obligation', such as royalties and technology transfer, imposed on
prospective deep seabed mining companies by the Convention were in fact no more
than the obligations imposed on United States based mining companies involved in
exploitation in developing states. Strategic mineral arguents were also not
practical because the United States in fact had most of the resources derived from
manganese nodules and if the resources of its alles were taken into account, there
was no shortge in the supply of seabed minerals. Perceptions of critics coloured by
superfcial arguents prevailed however and influenced United States' policy.
A furer problem in the Draft Convention concerned technology transfer.
Technology essential to national securty was excluded from transfer obligations in
the Convention, however, it stil did not protect sensitive technology transfer. For
example, high security sensitive devices similar to the acoustic technologies used by
the Navy in its Anti-Submarne Wadare progrmme were required for deep ocean
floor mapping. If the Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
(COCOM) rules or other relevant regulations were applied, an operator would have
been prohibited from using technology that he could not transfer to the Enterprise,
that is the mining arm of the ISA. Eventully, 'technology transfer became the bête
noire of infuential Reagan Administration offcials.'47o Another problem was that
the United States was not given a guaranteed seat on the Council of the ISA. In
addition, the Reagan Administration was strongly against the supreme policy-
making powers of the ISA and the Council's composition. The Eastern European
469800 Wertenbaker, Par n, op. cit., pp. 68 .
470Sehmidt, op. cit., pp. 168-9.
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states group was given three seats and this in fact meant that the Soviet Union
would be automatically given a seat in the CounciL. The United States, on the other
hand, had to compete with other western industrialised states for a seat out of a total
of between six to nine seats.471 For conservatives, a guaranteed seat for the Soviet
Union made the regime look like a regime controlled by the Soviet Union and the
developing countries.
At the beginnng of this stage of the negotiation , the head of the United States
delegation believed tht 'the Conference was beyond the point where it was possible
or even desirable to negotiate significant amendments to the Draft Convention'. 
472
This judgement was also supported by the attitude of the Soviet Union. In their
meeting of Janua 1981 the Soviet Union urged the United States to complete the
Treaty in the spring.473 With regard to the policy change of the United States, many
states, including the Soviet Union, warned that reopening the negotiation of the
sea bed regime was dangerous. The Reagan Administration, however, held a senior
meeting in early March and decided that the United States should look very closely
at the Draft Convention and decide whether it was in its best interest and that if it
was not, it ought to abandon the negotiations.474 It then announced the policy
review. This surprised the Group of 77 since they were unaware of the Republican
policies on the Law of the Sea475 which had been adopted in July 1980.
471See Wertenbaker, Part IT, op. cif. Depending on the categorisation of 
states, the number of seats
for which the United States could be a candidate for Council membership, differed.
412Letter from G. Aldrich to J. Barnes and A. Yurchyshyn, i 5 Dec. 1980. cited in Schmidt, op. cif.,
p.220.
473Ibid.
474/bid., pp. 222-3.
475Ibid., p. 216.
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Without the United States it was almost impossible for the Group of 77 to
negotiate even though the other states were stil ready to do S0476 and the spring
1981 session of the negotiation was held under these circumstances. Although the
United States had indicated in the previous year that a satisfactory Convention
provision on the protection of investment made by miners477 was a prerequisite for
its acceptance of the deep seabed regime, the United States withdrew this proposal
in order 'not to convey to the Group of 77 the impression that the United states
could be bought off.'478 Instead the United States made a different proposal upon
which the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom)479 would deal with the protection of
investment. The Group of 77, however, refused to discuss this until the United
States completed its policy review. At the same time, some developing countries'
delegations expressed an alterntive to a provision concerning the navigation of
warships through the territorial sea. They wanted to impose on warships the need
for prior notification and authorisation by the coastal state. This might have been a
threat from the Group of 77 to force the United States to get back to the negotiation.
All the maritime states, including the Soviet Union, resisted any attempt to change
the provision,480 however, the United States had already begun to shift its position
because it considered the navigational provisions of the Convention to be less
importnt than before.
In the following summer session, the Group of 77 recognised that the United
States wanted to re-negotiate fundamental issues. This made the Group of 77 reunite
476See chapter 5. See also Wertenbaker, Par n, op. cif., pp. 68.
477This is called the Preparatory Investment Protection (PIP).
478Schmidt,op. cif., p. 171.
479This was then to be established for discussions of rules and regulations for deep seabed mining
regime.
480Schmidt, ¡bid., p. 229.
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and it became determined to finalise negotiations in the spring of 1982.481 As a
result, in this session, delegates decided to formalise the existing texts as an 'Offcial
Draft Convention' and the Convention became subject to voting in the next session.
The United States agreed to the normalisation482 and the Conference decided to
convene a final session in March-April 1982. After the session, United States
Secretary of State Alexander Haig, testified to Congress the governent's intention
to bring the Conference to a successfu conclusion.483 At this point in time the
United States was stil considering its position on the Convention.
When a cabinet meeting was held in the United States to discuss the Law of the
Sea only two options were discussed. They were to reject the Conference altogether,
or return to negotiate. President Reagan was reported to have said that the United
States should retur to negotiate.484 At this stage, Reagan favoured trying to get the
Treaty made more favourable. President Reagan finally announced the retur of the
delegation to the Conference with six objectives. The six objectives were: 1) no
deterrent for the development of deep seabed resources, 2) assured national access
to the resources, 3) a decision making system which reflects the political, economic
interests and financial contribution of participating states, 4) no amendments
without participating countries' approval, 5) no undesirable precedents for
international organisations (to the United States), 6) the provisions to be ones the
Senate, which has the role of examining treaties in the United States, would be
likely to ratify. No mandatory technology transfer and no funding for national
liberation movements. These objectives were considered to be the United States'
481Ibid, p. 239.
482Ibid., p. 237.
483/bid, p. 240.
484Wertenbaker, Par n, op. dt., p. 70.
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'bottom-line' position by its delegates.485 Late in January a Reciprocating States
Agreement between the states capable of deep seabed mining was ready to be
signed, however, signng was deterred for the time being because the final session
of the Conference was fast approaching.486 A Reciprocating States Agreement
meant a Mini-treaty whereby states with seabed legislation487 would mutually
recognse licences issued to their deep seabed mining companies. Negotiation of the
Reciprocating States Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom,
France and the Federal Republic of Germany had started after the United States
enactment of domestic legislation for seabed mining in 1980.488
In March 1982, the United States produced a document with specific proposals
for amendment to the Draft Convention. This document proposed sweeping changes
in the texts on technology transfer, production control, decision-making, contract
approval and the review conference. These proposals were called 'trckle down
Common Heritage'489 by a leading developing country delegate and the Group of 77
then rejected it as a basis for further negotiation. Afer furer negotiation some
compromises were made, however, it was not enough for the United States to agree
to the Convention. The United States was particularly concerned about its
representation in the Council of the ISA, since the United States had not been given
a guranteed seat. In the end, it was decided that the world's largest consumer of
seabed minerals be guaranteed a seat. This provision was aimed at guaranteeing the
485Sehmidt., op. eit., p. 241.
486Ibid., pp. 241-242.
487Domestic legislation for deep seabed mining was made in the United States and the Federal
Republic of Germany in 1980, the United Kingdom and France in 1981, Japan and the Soviet Union
in 1982 and Italy in 1985. See Said Mahmoudi, The La of Deep Sea-Bed Mining: A Study of the
Progressive Development of Interntional La Concerning the Mangement of the Polymetalle
Nodules of the Deep Sea-Bed (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987), p. 226.
488Schmidt,op. eit., p. 238.
489Ibid., pp. 244-5.
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United States a seat because naming it explicitly would have been unacceptable to
the African states. This provision, however, appeared to have a flaw in that in terms
of tonnage the Soviet Union was the worlds largest consumer, although in terms of
the value of the metals the United States would be largest.490
On the issue of Preparatory Investment Protection (PIP), many delegates thought
that PIP could play a key role in reducing the ideological objections of the Reagan
Administration to the provisions of the seabed regime in the Draft Convention and
the negotiation of this continued durng this session. PIP was the system of assuring
mining companies that invested in the deep seabed that they could continue their
operations in the invested sites. In the end, the final provisions relating to PIP
provided some improvements for the United States, such as exclusive mining rights
for pioneer operators that would not be affected by the implementation of site
allocation procedures by the ISA 491, but they stil did not fully satisfy the United
States. The United States judged that the provisions of PIP were not enough to
protect their pioneers and in the United States most of the deep seabed mining
consortia opposed the provision. They believed that if the United States' delegation
had secured acceptable terms for technology transfer, production control, automatic
access, and ISA decision-making in the Treaty itself, then there would have been no
need for PIP in the first place.492 The provisions of PIP were changed to the extent
that the African Group paricularly felt frustrated. Some of them said that PIP
provisions 'were a betrayal of what we had fought for for many years', and 'it
created what almost amounted to a new treaty under which pioneer operators could
490Ibid., pp. 185-186.
491/bid.,p.175.
492/bid., pp. 175-6.
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mine the sea-bed virtually unchecked, and paid little more than lip-service to the
(Common Heritage of Manind). '493
The United States Administration's Law of the Sea policy was not
straightforward and there were some moves aimed at reversing policies even in the
final stage of the negotiation. In the final session at the beginning of April, the
United States dropped its insistence on the elimination of production limitations and
on afrmative voting powers, that is, a veto. Secreta of State Haig was more
favourably disposed towards the Convention than any other offcial in a position of
power in the Administration.494 Haig telephoned the President of the Law of the Sea
Conference and agreed to moderate the negotiating instrctions for the American
delegation. Changes were approved at a Senior Interagency Group meeting.495 The
changes in the instructions alerted the conservatives in the United States since they
might have allowed the governent to agree to the Convention without acquiring
required provisions for meeting its objectives. Many Congressmen, White House
and National Securty Council offcials and the economic agencies disliked Haig's
instructions and tried to overturn them.496 A meeting between the President's
domestic policy adviser Meese and industry representatives was held on 19th April
at the White House. The meeting was aimed at overting Haig's instructions.
Darman, who advocated that the United States did not need to adhere to the
internationally agreed Treaty in his Foreign Affairs article in 1978, also attended the
meeting as a Presidential assistat. Although one of the company representatives
urged the United States to sign the Convention, the others were against it. Meese
493Ihid., p. 175.
494Ibid., p. 247.
. 495Ibid.
496Ibid., pp. 247-248.
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was 'strengthened in his belief that he could not recommend the Treaty to the
President. '497 This meeting was a strong push towards the United States' rejection.
News of the Meese meeting spread throughout the Conference within a day. 498
Although no formal decision was taken at the time, some days later Meese, James
L. Malone, who was Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs and Special Representative of the President to
the Law of the Sea Conference, and a National Securty Council (NSC) official,
discussed whether the United States should abstain if it came to a vote on the treaty
or whether it should vote against it.499 At this stage, the United States probably
would not have voted for the Convention under any circumstances. In the State
Department there was a strong current of opinion that the United States should
abstain in the vote,500 finally, however, the decision to vote against the Convention
at the Conference was taken.
On 30th April, on the final day of the session, voting on the Convention was
taen. 130 were in favour, the United States was against501 and 17 states abstained.
Abstention mainly came from the Western and Eatern European states. The signing
of the Convention was scheduled for December. In the United States some pro-
Treaty advocates tried to reverse the decision before December because the
Administration had not announced its decision offcially. Finally on 29th June, at a
497Ibid.
498Wertenbaker, Part IT, op. cif., p. 74.
499Schmidt, op. cif., p. 249.
500Ibid., p. 252.
501Three other staes voted against. Turkey had boundary problems. Israel was against a provision
that could be regarded as making the PLO eligible for ISA revenues. Venezuela had a dispute with
Columbia over delimitation. 'All three would probably have accepted a consensus' if there was no
voting. Wertenbaker, Part IT, op. cif., p. 78.
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National Security Council chaired by Meese, it was decided that the United States
would reject the Convention and would not sign it. 502
The United States rejected the Convention even though it included the provisions
of navigation and overfight which the United States wanted most at the beginning
of the negotiation because they decided that the deep seabed regime which was
inscribed in the Convention was against the interests of the United States. With
regard to the provisions relating to the deep seabed regime, Malone stated that the
deep seabed mining regime section of the Convention had fudamental problems
for the United States. He argued that;
'the Law of the Sea Treaty's provisions establishing the deep seabed mining
regime were intentionally designed to promote a new world order-a form of
global collectivism known as the new international economic order (NO)-
that seeks ultimately the redistribution of the world's wealth through a complex
system of manipulative central economic plannng and bureaucratic coercion'.503
He argued that the Third World now hoped to apply the NIO to other
international arrangements. This was unacceptable to the United States since it
would mean that the management of the resources of the oceans and other areas
would be tured over to new international bureaucracies controlled by the Third
World and Soviet bloc countries. This would seriously jeopardise the United States
interests.504 Malone pointed out six issues which the United States could not accept.
The issues within the Convention, which were about the deep seabed mining
regime, were as follows: 1) There was a provision regarding a review conference
which in future could modify the provisions in the Convention. The numerical
superiority 9f developing states within this review conference çould ultimately
502Sehmidt, op. cit., p. 257.
503James L. Malone, 'Who Nees the Sea Treaty?', Foreign Po/icy, Vol. 54 (Spnng, 1984), p 45.
504/bid., p. 46.
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change the provisions to the United States' disadvantage. In addition, the review
conference would deny the United States Senate a role in the treaty process. 2) The
provisions of the parallel system of exploitation which meant that the Enterprise,
that is the operational an of the ISA, and state or private operations would exploit
the seabed simultaneously, might discriminate against state or private operation.
This might restrict the United States access to minerals of strategic importance. 3)
Production and marketing control by the ISA would hamper the production of
mineral resources. 4) The financial and regulatory burdens on the United States
industry and governent would be huge. The state part would have the financial
responsibility of supporting the Enterprise and the ISA. For the United States
governent this would amount to around $1 bilion. The financial responsibilties
on the United States were too great. 5) Mandatory technology transfer would be
enjoined to the developing states and the Soviet bloc states. 6) The ISA might fund
institutions, such as national liberation organisations, which were hostile to the
United States, by using the profits from deep seabed mining. 
505
The prime reason for the United States' objection was its lack of control over the
ISA, although if the United States and some other western industralised states had
co-operated, they could have avoided almost all decisions made by the ISA. The
United States rejected the Convention basically because the preferences of the
United States shifted from navigation freedom to the deep seabed regime, and the
United States made a decision to reject the Convention from the view point of the
deep seabed regime.
5051bid. pp. 46-47.
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3. Discussion
Changes in the context of the negotiation changed the meaning of the Law of the
Sea negotiation for the United States. The states' practice of extending national
jurisdiction and the giving and enjoying of navigational freedom were in fact only a
provisional outcome of the Law of the Sea negotiation and they were yet to be
finalised. Nonetheless they became a factor in the context of the negotiation. This
influenced thinkng in the United States governent and led to its rejection of the
Convention. In terms of negotiation theory, a provisional agreement being activated
and determining the final outcome of the negotiation, is outside its scope. This is
because negotiation theory assumes that issues are set at the beginnng of the
negotiation and that they do not change during it.
Other factors in the context of the negotiation, such as the breakdown of détente,
infuenced people in the United States as well as its policy-makers. When people
felt the demise of détente in the United States, they chose Reagan as their President.
Policy-makers in the Reagan Administration formed a view that navigational rights
in the Law of the Sea Convention had already become customary international law,
so they did not need to stick to the Convention in order to obtain those rights. In
terms of SDI, policy-makers of the Reagan Administration, including the President
himself: believed that SDI would solve the problem of military vulnerability of the
United States. The background to the rejection was therefore that the United States
changed its position on navigational matters and also changed its evaluation of the
deep seabed mining regime. They came to believe that navigational matters had
become less importnt in relation to the deep seabed mining regime than they had
been in the past. The balance of the two core issues had in effect shifted and they
shifted because the context of the negotiation changed. At the final stage, the 'real'
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negotiation by the United States was not actually conducted at the Conference but
between the pro-Treaty and anti-Treaty groups within the United States itself
In international relations theory, when the analysis is concentrated only on states'
actions it becomes very diffcult to explain this ty of political change and its
influence on states' policy. One of the problems is that in international relations
theory, the international arena is clearly separated from the domestic domain, so that
it is not easy to analyse both domains simultaneously.506 In addition, a fuher
problem, also considered in chapter 6, is how to assess the subjective perceptions of
policy-makers. What made the top policy-makers believe that the United States did
not need the Convention in terms of navigational freedom was their belief that strait
passage was already customary international law and that SDI would overcome all
the problems with regard to sea use. In reality SDI was only an idea that so far has
.
n.ot been achieved. The judgement of policy-makers could be said to have been
based on subjective interpretation of an idea. The problem is how such a subjective
interpretation can be explained theoretically.
The above examination suggests that in order to analyse the United States'
rejection of the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982 many factors need to be
examined. International factors, state's actions by the United States at the
negotiation, domestic moves in the United States and perceptions of policy-makers
which exist in the context of the negotiation, as well as forming part of the process
itself, interacted with the negotiation and each other to influence the direction the
negotiation took. In addition, an outcome produced by the negotiation became part
l
of its context and further interacted with other factors to influence the negotiation
506See chapter 2.
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furher. Factors both inside and outside the negotiation were continually interacting
and could be said to be almost inseparable.
4. Conclusion
Changes in the context of the negotiation changed states' actions and this led to
the rejection of the Convention by the United States. The context of the negotiation
led to a change of governent in the United States. In addition, people dissatisfied
with the Convention lobbied the governent to alter the negotiation in their favour.
Policy-makers of the new Administration assessed the Convention and its
implications based on the Administration's policies, including SDI, and decided to
reject the Convention.
This process shows that the context of the negotiation, including political change
. in the United States, infuenced the negotiation greatly. It is diffcult to explain ths
process however, since the mechanism by which these factors influence the
outcome has not been established.
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Chapter 8 The 1994 agreement: 1982-1994
The Law of the Sea Conference ended in 1982 with the production of the
Convention, which the United States had rejected. In 1994, however, the United
States and the Group of 77 agreed to alter the provisions of the Convention in terms
of the seabed mining regime and ths finally produced an agreement between them
on sea use. This chapter therefore examines the thirteen year period from 1982 to
1994. At the end of this stage the Implementation to the Law of the Sea Convention
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, and the Law of the Sea
negotiation ended successfully. The most important factors at this stage were said to
be the 'changing circumstances,'507 that is the huge political and economic
changes508 which occured and which infuenced the negotiation.
Anick de Marfy-Matuo stated five' factors which spurred the United
Nations Secretary-General's informal consultations during this period. They were:
1) the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, 2) the Group
of 77 ceasing to exercise any substantial influence, 3) the recognition by developed
and developing states that free markets were the key to economic success, 4) the
prospect of the entr into force of the Convention and fears of developing states
which had ratified the Convention, 5) the establishment of the transitional regime
507Kenneth Rattray, 'Resolution and Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Par XI of the UN
Convention of the Law of the Sea: A General Åssessment-Comment', Zeìtschriffür anlänisches
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (ZöRV): Syposium on The Entr into Force of the Convention
on the La of the sea: A Redistribution of Competencies Between States and Interntional
Organisations in Relation to the Management of the International Commons?, Heidelberg, January
26-28, 1995 (Gesamtherstellung: W. Kohlhammer GmbH, 1995), p. 207.
508See, for example, D. H. Anderson, 'Efforts to ensure universal paricipation in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea'. Interntional and Comparative La Quarterly, Vot 42, (July,
1993).
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for deep seabed mining by PrepCom.509 In my view, de Marfy-Mantuano's work
mixes up factors which had been recognised before the Secretary-Generals informal
consultations, and factors which were only recognsed after the informal
consultations begu. Factors 4) and 5) paricularly were clearly recognised before
the informal consultations, but factor 1) occurred after it in 1991 and factor 3) was
also recognsed aftr it. These factors need to be considered separately because the
factors which originated the Secretary-Generals consultations and the factors which
enabled the negotiation to reach an agreement through the consultations were
different.
In my view, one of the most importnt influences during this period was the Law
of the Sea Convention itself. Both parties miscalculated the effects of the 1982
Convention, in that the Group of 77 expected that the very existence of the
Convention would eventully force the United States to accept it. The United States
on the other hand considered that it would be able to utilse the navigational rights
which were articulated in the Convention and that its industry would be able to
engage in deep seabed mining without intederence, despite its decision not to
accept the Convention as a whole. The calculation of both sides turned out to be
wrong and both of them realised that without a universal agreement the cost to
continue the present situation would be much higher than originally expected.
After the Conference the negotiation between the United States and the Group of
77 was not held formally. Despite the lack of a formal forum however the
'negotiation'51o between the two parties continued. At this stage changes in the
509 Anick de Marfy-Mantuano, 'The Procedural Framework of the Agreement Implementing the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea', American Journl of International La,
Vot 89, (1995), pp. 815-816.
510¡fthe Law of the Sea negotiation is examined from the perspective ofintemational relations
theory, whether states are engaging in a negotiation directly or not is not a critical issue. In
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context of the negotiation changed the preferences of both sides with regard to
seabed mining and navigational rights. These changes brought both sides back to
the 'negotiation table', this time not at the Conference, but at informl talks under
the aegis of the UN Secreta-General. In this chapter, what happened after the Law
of the Sea Conference is reviewed first. Second, factors in the context of the
negotiation which led to the UN Secreta-Generals informal consultations are
examined. Finally, the negotiation which brought about the 1994 Agreement is
reviewed.
1. The situation after the Conference
In December 1982, the Law of the Sea Convention was opened for signature and
when it closed in December 1984, 155 states had signed it.511 The United States and
only two other states in the gfoup of western industrialised states, the United
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, did not sign it. Afer its rejection of
the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982 the United States made strenuous efforts to
consolidate its camp. Its camp consisted of the group of states with deep seabed
negotition theory, however, whether states are engaging in a negotiation or not is a critical issue,
since negotiation theories usually only consider visible negotiations at the negotiating table to be
negotiations. Sebenius has attempted to link both international relations theory and negotiation
theory by expanding the concept of negotiation. Sebenius stated that, '(e)vidently, international
negotiations need not be discrete, explicit, or acknowledged by all the players, nor need they take
place around a table in accordance with diplomatic protocol and with the shared expecttion of
reaching a formalized agreement'. James K. Sebenius, 'Challenging Conventional Explanations of
International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case ofEpistemic Communities',
International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1, (Winter, 1992), pp. 351-352. It can be argued then that
even if states do not meet at the negotiation table, for example, the period between two parts of
negotiations at the negotiation table, providing they continuously make efforts on the same issues to
turn the situations to their adv~ntage, can be considered as par of a continuous negotiation.
Therefore the period between 1982 and 1993 of the negotiation, when the Group of 77 and the
United States did not formally negotiate at the 'negotiation table', but both sides were makng eforts
to turn the situation to their advantage on the same issues, would be recognised as a 'negotiation'. For
this reason, the Law of the Sea negotiation can be considered as a continuous negotiation lasting 27
years.
511E. D. Brown (00.), Sea-BedEnergyandMineral Resources 
and the La of the Sea, Vol. m.
(Lndon: Graham & Trotman, 1986),4.10. In addition, four other subjects of international law,
including the European Community (EC), signed it.
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mining capability within the group of western industrialised states and these states
advanced an 'Agreement Concernng Interim Arangements Relating To
Polymetallc Nodules Of The Deep Seabed' (Reciprocating States Agreement) in
order to enable them to engage in deep seabed mining outside the Convention. The
Group of 77 strongly objected to the Reciprocating States Agreement and claimed it
was an ilegal activity. At this stage the negotiation between the Group of 77 and the
industrialised states, apart from the United States, was continuing in Preparatory
Commission. The purse of PrepCom was to make rules or regulations, including
preparatory investments,512 for the International Seabed Authority and for the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, both of which were established by the
Convention. PrepCom's work staed in March 1983 but was not very fritful
because firstly, the United States was not participating in it and secondly, because
.
the role of PrepCom was to make rules or regulations according to the Convention,
not to negotiate the texts of it.
As mentioned above, the United States made considerable efforts to buttess its
position aftr its rejection of the Convention, which was offcially announced in
July 1982.513 The Reagan Administration sent a mission to its alles, Western
Europe and Japan, to persuade them to support its position and to prevent them from
signng the Convention. There was a sense of urgency in the United States because
in September 1982 the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany
512provisions for preparatory investments were wntten in Resolution IT of the Law of the Sea
Conference. See Said Mahmoudi, The Law of Deep Sea-Bed Mining: A Study of the Progressive
Development of Intemational Law Concerning the Maagement of the Polymetallc Nodules of the
Deep Sea-Bed (Stickholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987), pp. 310-1.
513In April of that year, the United States voted against the Convention, however, its offcial
announcement came after the decision taken at its National Security Council meeting held on 29th
June. There was stil an opinion favoured further negotiations at the meeting. See Markus G.
Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common Burden?: The United States Position on the Development of
a Regime for Deep Sea-Bed Mining in the La of the Sea Convention (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1989), p. 257.
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approached the Group of 11s14 to ask them to try again to negotiate improvements in
the seabed provisions of the Convention. SIS Regardless of the mission from the
United States, however, France signed it in December 1982, and Japan in 1983.
Before the signature to the Convention was closed in 1984, the United States
lobbied the governents of the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, and
the United Kingdom against signng the Convention, however, Italy and Belgium
signed it in that year.S16
The United States did not participate in PrepCom even though it was entitled to
do so as an observer.S17 The United States claimed that the Convention was 'fatally
flawed and PrepCom lack( ed) the authority to change the text (of the
Convention).'SI8ln December 1982, President Reagan decided to withhold 1 milion
dollars from the American contribution to the United Nations budget.sl9 This was a
firm signal by the United States that it would not allow the ISA to control deep
sea bed mining. The United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany did not
follow suit and neither did other non-signatories, continuing to pay their
contributions and parcipate in PrepCom's work. S20
S14The Group of 11, also known as the 'Good Samaritans', was a group of eleven developed states,
including Canada, Australia, Holland, the Scadinavian countries, and Austria, formed at the final
stage of the Conference to work out a compromise between the United States and the Group of77.
See Ibid, p. 245.
SISIbid., pp. 278-279.: WiUiam Wertenbaker, 'A Reporter at Large: The Law of the Sea, Part Il', The
New Yorlær, (Aug. 8, 1983), p. 80.
S161n December 1982 the United Kingdom expressed its view on the Convention in the House of
Commons and it stated that the provisions relating to deep seabed mining, including the transfer of
technology, were not acceptable because they were based on undesirable regulatory principles that
could constitute unsatisfactory precedents. H. C. Debs., Vol. 33, CoL. 404. cited in Anderson, op. cif.,
p. 654 note 4. It was rumoured that the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Offce favoured signing,
however, economic agencies opposed it. See Schmidt, op. cif., pp. 279-280.
SI7Ibid., p. 310. The United States had singed the Final Act of the Conference although it did not
sign the Convention. This gave the United States the right to paricipate in PrepCom.
Sl8Kronmiler, in US Congress (1982d), p. 8. cited in Schmidt, op. cif., p. 288.
519Ibid., p. 289.
S20These states paricipated in PrepCom as observers, however, they were treated as the same as
members and they participated in the discussions actively.
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In 1982 a Reciprocating States Agreement was made between the United States
and the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and France in order to
establish a system for deep seabed mining. This was not a treaty and its main
purse was to facilitate the identification and resolution of conflcts among pioneer
mining consortia by voluntary means.52 This system was not in fact strong enough
for mining consortia to engage in deep seabed mining since 'the option of mining
under the (Reciprocating State Agreement was) fraught with uncertinties of a legal,
political, and economic nature' although 'uncertainties also exist( ed) under the
Convention regime'.522 The United States furhered its efforts to establish a securer
system and four United States-based deep seabed mining consortia, a French
consortium and a Japanese consortium, engaged in negotiation on voluntary confict
settlement, reaching an agreement of site allocation in December 1983. In addition,
a Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Sea-bed Matters was agreed among
eight seabed mining states (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands) in
August 1984. This Understanding was aimed at co-ordinating and authorising
mining activities in the seabed areas523 and in the same year the United States
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) issued mining licences
to four United States based consortia.524 The 1984 Understanding however did not
erase the uncertinty surrounding deep seabed mining, since there was no agreement
with other potential miners, such as the Soviet Union.525 As a result, overlapping
claims of mining sites between the Soviet Union and some of the United States
52See Mahmoudi, op. cit., pp. 226-227.
522Schmidt, op. cit., p. 288.
523See Mahmoudi, op. cit., p. 227; Schmidt, op. cit., p. 281.
524United Nations Offce for Ocean Afairs and the Law of the Sea, The La of the Sea: current
Developments in State Practice, No. I (New York: United Nations, 1987), pp. 111-123.
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based mining consortia, which had already been granted licenses for sites from the
NOAA, became a problem in PrepCom in 1985. Overlapping site problems also
existed between the Soviet Union, Japan and France.
The Group of 77 strongly objected to domestic legislation for deep seabed
mining and the Reciprocating States Agreement. It repeatedly declared that
activities undertken under these would be considered to be without international
legal validity526 and would lead other states to adopt necessary measures to protect
their interests. The Group of77 described the 1984 Understading as 'wholly ilegal'
and contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention. The Eastern European group
also supported this argument. PrepCom subsequently adopted a resolution
designating as ilegal all mining undertken outside the Convention. 
527
PrepCom's taks included reconcilng conflcting claims among the pioneer
investors and also allocating areas to pioneers. Durng PrepCom's work the
developing countries, on the whole, displayed more flexibilty in negotiating rules
and regulations for the ISA and the Enterprise than they had shown during the
Conference.528 Nevertheless the Group of 77 formally continued to affrm that
changes in the Convention text were beyond the mandate ofPrepCom.529
The negotiation about overlapping sites was therefore conducted on two separate
tracks. One was the negotiation in PrepCom by participating states, whilst the other
was through individual negotiations by the United States. While PrepCom was
525The Soviet Union established domestic legislation for deep seabed mining in 1982.
526See Aricle 137 para. 3 of the Law of the Sea Convention. It says that 'No state or natural or
jurdical person shall claim, acquire or exercise rights with respect to the minerals recovered from the
Area except in accordance with (the provisions of the Convention)'.
527Doc. LOSIPCN/5 (11 Apr. 1983), .Doc. LOSIPCN172 (2 Sept. 1985), the United Kingdom
protested against the legality of the adoption of this Resolution. Doc. LOSIPCN174 (9 Jun. 1986).
See Schmidt., op. cif., p. 287 note 109. See also Mahmoudi, op. cit., pp. 319-320.
528Schmidt,op. cit., p. 303. Mahmoudi, op. cif., p. 321.
529Schmidt,op. cit., pp. 303-304.
223
working on the issue of overlapping claims, the United States engaged in
negotiations with other states on the same issue and participated in a series of
intergovernental agreements. Through the exchange ofNorte Verbales, the United
States acceded to the agreement of the confdentiality of data on deep seabed of
December 1986 between the potential applicants (Belgium, Canada, Italy, and the
Netherlands) and the Soviet Union. Those potential applicants were states tht had
companies belonging to the four United States based consortia. The potential
applicants were entitled to negotiate on behalf of the four United States based
consortia to avoid overlapping mine sites at PrepCom. As a result, although the
United States did not officially participate in the PrepCom negotiation, potential
applicants were able to negotiate with the Soviet Union both inside and outside of
PrepCom. This in effect meant that the United Stàtes was able to confirm sites for
its four mining consortia by making agreements with related states. The United
States also adhered to the agreement of deep seabed mining sites of 14 August
1987, which implemented the settlements of the mine site overlap conflcts between
the Soviet Union and the United States based mining consortia. The United
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany did the same.530 Similar notes were
exchanged with the Foreign Ministries of Belgium, Canada, Italy, and the
Netherlands.531 Although these arrangements were made, they were not as strong as
a universal agreement such as the Convention, since, for example, there was no
Tribunl to resolve conficts between states. After solving the problems of
overlapping sites, including potential applicants, India, France, Japan, and the
530They had already issued licenses to mining consortia. The United Kingdom did so in 1984, the
Federal Republic of Germany in 1985.
53/bid., p. 301, p. 301 note 167.
224
Soviet Union were, in 1987, registered as pioneer investors by PrepCom.532 In order
to accommodate states' claims PrepCom had needed to substantially change the
provisions laid down in Resolution II of the Conference, about the pioneer
investors,533 even though this had originally been thought to have been outside of its
remit.
In terms of navigational rights, the situation developed differently from what the
United States had anticipated. When in 1982 President Reagan offcially announced
that the United States would not sign the Convention, he also stated that the United
States would take up the non-seabed provisions of the Convention, particularly the
provisions which related to navigational rights. Imediately after the rejection,
verbal accusations by the Group of 77 and the United States against each other
staed. The Group of 77 repeated that the United States could not 'pick and choose'
.
the provisions of the Convention because the Convention was a 'package deaL. '534
On the other hand, the United States maintained its position that the non-seabed
regime provisions of the Convention had become customar international law and it
could therefore enjoy them without being part to the Convention. In 1983,
President Reagan proclaimed a United States Exclusive Economic Zone of two-
hundred miles and he also issued an ocean policy statement saying that the United
States would exercise its navigation and overfight rights consistent with the
Convention and would not agree to other states' unilateral action that attempted to
restrict them. Two-hundred miles Exclusive Fishery Zones (EFZs), which only
532in addition, China and a group of East em European states (including Cuba) were later registered.
It also registered South Korea as a pioneer investor. Afer the 1994 Agreement which altered the
international seabed regime was adopted, PrepCom in August 1994 held its final meeting and
adopted its final report.
533This resolution was adopted together with the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982. See also
Schmidt,op. cif., pp. 298-300. Mahmoudi, op. cif., pp. 318-321.
5341n terms of package deal, see chapter 3.
225
covered fisheries, had become wide-spread by 1976, and more than ninety states
had already established EFZs, more than fifty of them as part of EEZS.535 These
facts supported America's claims that settng up the EEZ was customary
international law. Whether the United States could benefit from the non-seabed
provisions, especially straits passage and its overfight, was disputed. The Group of
77 rejected the United States' view consistently, claiming that the navigational
provisions of the Convention created new international law and that there had been
never any intention that this should be available to non-parties. They insisted that
provisions therefore bound only signatory states.536 Nevertheless, open challenges
to the United States' position were rare, and serious challenges came only from
Libya and Iran. 
537
The objections of the Group of 77 to the United States' position were expressed
.
in the UN General Assembly Resolutions in 1983, 1984, 1986.538 At this stage some
coastal states unilaterally enlarged their rights over straits or terrtorial waters, for
example by claiming innocent pasage as opposed to the transit passage provided in
the Convention.539 Four key straits states, Spain, Morocco, Oman, and Iran declared
upon signature of the Convention that they recognised 'innocent passage, '540 not
transit passage, through Gibraltar and Hormuz.541 Transit passage, which basically
means free navigation and overfight, was articulated in the Convention.542 Some
states, such as Indonesia, insisted that only signatories of the Convention enjoy the
535Schmidt, op. cit., p. 269.
. 536There are problems with this argument because the extension Ðfterritorial sea and straits passage
have a very close relationship. See chapter 1.
537Ibid., p. 266 note 19.
538GA Resolutions 38/59 (14 dec. 1983); 39/73 (13 Dec. 1984.); 40/63 (25 Feb. 1986).
539Schmidt, op. cit., pp. 266-274.
540See chapter 5.
54Schmidt,op. cif., p. 267.
542Aricle 38 of the Law of the Sea Convention.
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right of transit passage through straits and innocent passage through archipelagic
sea-lanes, even though those rights had been practised prior to the Law of the Sea
Conference. When the Philppines ratified the Convention in 1984, it did not
provide the innocent passage for foreign vessels which was guaranteed in
archipelagic waters by the Convention. 
543
2. Factors which led to the Secretary-General's informal consultations
There was a development which the United States and the Group of 77 had not
anticipated. This was that the prospects of deep seabed mining had decreased and as
a result the prospect of harsh financial burdens on the developing states, especially
states which had already ratified or acceded to the Convention, appeared. Given the
commercial potential of deep seabed mining, early mining for minerals became
unlikely, since mineral prices were low and the cost of deep seabed mining was
very high. Deep seabed mining was shown to be an extremely costly and capital
intensive industry, requiring a large investment; more than US $1.5 bilion.544 The
price of the main minerals that constitute manganese nodules was by this time low.
In addition, conservation, recycling, land exploration, the introduction of mineral
saving technologies and use of substitutes also had an effect on the demands for
these minerals. Previous concerns that high population growth and expanding
consumption would cause a global shortge of key minerals by the end of the 20th
543See Schmidt, 0p. cif., pp. 267-8, p. 268 note 27. The Philppines, in 1988, confirmed that it would
abide by the provisions of the Convention. See United Nations Division for Ocea Afairs and the
Law of the Sea Offce of Legal Afairs, The La of the Sea: Annual Review of Ocean Affairs: La
an Policy, Main Documents 1989 (New York: United Nations, 1993), p. 6.
544Schmidt,op. cif., pp. 13-15. Schmidt got this figure from several studies published in 1982 and
1984. In addition, he pointed out an Australian study estimated the cost at approximately 2.1 bilion
dollars (at Mar. 1985 US dollar rates.) Schmidt later stted in his work that the amount was 'up to 2.5
bilion United States dollars', 1bid., p. 285.
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century also proved largely unfounded and demand could easily be met by existing
economic or sub-economic land based sources of metals. 545
For the Group of 77, the situation with the United States was a stalemate and it
hoped that the Convention would enter into force as soon as possible, believing that
the pressure of that would change the United States' position. In the late 1980s the
Group of 77, however, realised that deep seabed mining was unlikely to happen in
the foreseeable future. As the problem of overlapping claims of mining sites was
solved, at least for the time being, the prospect of the United States retung to the
Convention became unlikely. This led to worres that other industralised states,
which had been allocated mining sites, might not ratify546 the Convention for a long
time because there was no need to ratify it without commercial viability of deep
seabed mining. If a state ratified the Convention, it became liable to contribute to
.
the ISA in accordance with the scale used for the regular budget of the United
Nations, until the ISA became financially independent. 547 In addition, it would also
be required to finacially support the Enterprise, the mining arm of the ISA.
Without the United States accepting the Convention, other industrialised states were
reluctant to bear those financial burdens, especially given the pessimistic prospects
for deep seabed mining.
At the same time, the fact that some of the developing countres had ratified the
Convention, meant those states had to financially support the new ISA when the
Convention came into force. They would, as a result, suffer financial hardship.
. .
545Porter Hoagland, 'Manganese nodule price trends: Dim prospects for the commercialization of
deep seabed mining', Resource Policy, Vol. 19, No. 4 (December 1993), pp. 295-297; Jonathan 1.
Charey, 'v. S. Provisional Application of the 1994 Deep Seabed Agreement', American Journal of
Interntional La, Vol. 88, (1994), p. 712 note 29.
546Ratification means a formal consent of the highest authority, such as Parliament in the United
Kingdom, in many states, and this is required to make a treaty valid after the government signs the
treaty. In the United States, the Senate is responsible for ratification.
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When the structure of the rSA had been discussed in the Seabed Committee and the
Conference, the Group of 77 had favoured a strong autonomous machinery to
prevent the United States' intervention in the rSA's decisions. During the
negotiations in the Conference, the United States agreed to a strong machinery,
although it attempted to trim the ISA's discretionary power as much as possible. The
ISA's functions were wide and if the Convention came into force the expenditure of
the ISA would be substantiaL. Without commercially profitale exploitation of the
deep seabed the ISA could not expect any income except from contrbutions from
states which had ratified the Convention. Under these circumstances studies of how
much it would cost to establish and ru the ISA were carried out. Under a very
modest underting, the cost of establishment and running the rSA as envisaged by
the Convention would, for the first five years, amount to some US$50 milion per
annum.548 Another study showed that the minimum cost would be US$1O.5 milion
in the case of a self-administrated ISA and Tribunal and US$9 milion in the case of
the United Nations linked Authority and TribunaL. 549 In either case, without any
income from seabed mining, the cost would have to be borne by states which had
ratified and which had no hope of income. 
550 It was therefore almost impossible for
developing states to support the ISA. Under these circumstances, in 1988, the Soviet
Union stated at the United Nations General Assembly that it hoped that all the states
would participate in the Law of the Sea Convention by adopting a 'practical
approach'. Italy also mentioned that in order to make the Convention unversally
accepted, states should consider that the curent circumstances were fudamentally
547 Aricle 160, paragraph 2 (e) of the Convention.
548Doc. AACCIXCAIO/91/7, August 1990, pp. 16-7.
549Ibid., pp. 18-9.
550See Ibid., pp. 16-7.
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different from the ones that existed before the Convention was made.551 The Group
of 77 tried to initiate a new negotiation with the United States since most of the
ratifiers were its members. The spokesman for the Group of 77 made a statement at
PrepCom in August 1989, stating that:
'the developing countries continue to be ready to hold discussions, without
any preconditons, with any delegation or group of delegations-whether
signatories or non-signatories to the Convention-on any issues related to the
Convention and work of the Preparatory Commission. '552
This statement was apparently aimed at the United States even though the United
States had not participated in PrepCom. The statement expressed the Group of 77's
intention to talk to the United States about possible changes in the deep seabed
mining regime. Other groups of states at PrepCom welcomed the statement and a
resolution outlining that every effort should be made to make the Convention
universally accepted was adopted at the United Nations General Assembly in
1989.553 Responding to these moves by states, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, Javier Pèrez de Cuèllar,554 decided to start informal consultations on the
outstanding issues.
At the same time, the United States also started to feel that a universal agreement
of sea use would be a bettr option than no formal agreement although at the time it
was not revealed. George Galdorisi,a Captain of the United States Navy, wrote an
article in 1995 saying that the United States was confronted with increasingly
diverse claims by coastal and island states which were inconsistent with the terms of
the 1982 Convention. Although the lack of an established global regime had not yet
551Moritaka Hayashi, Kokuren Kaiyouhou Jyoyaku Dai Jyuichibu ni Kansuru Jimusocho Kyogi to
Jisshi Kyotei, Kokusaihou Gaiko Zashi, Vot. 93, No. 5 (December, 1994), p. 59.
552R. Platzöder, Third United Nations Conference on the La of the Sea, Vot. X (Dobbs Ferry, New
York: Oceaa Publishers, 1992), p. 472.
553Hayashi,op. cit., p. 60.
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resulted in any overt denial of United States' transit rights through critical straits or
archipelagic waters, the United States' financial and diplomatic costs, as well as the
overall risks associated with the use of its forces, became considerably higher due to
the absence of a binding treaty. He pointed out more than fift countries had already
made claims inconsistent with the 1982 Convention over their adjacent seas.555
Many states were claiming their national jurisdiction differently from provisions of
the Convention, since the Convention was not universally agreed. The United States
realised that it would need a lot of effort and funds in order to maintain its insistence
that navigational provisions of the Convention were customary international law
and in order to keep objecting to the unilateral claims which were contrary to the
provisions of the Convention. As a result, the United States started to feel that in
order to reduce the costs and risks, a universal agreement of sea use would be the
better option. 
556
In summary, the prospects of deep seabed mining decreased and as a result the
Law of the Sea .Convention became a heavy financial burden on the Group of 77.
This changed the attitude of the Group of 77. This means that the existence of the
Convention brought about the change. The United States also started to feel that it
needed a unversal agreement of sea use to reduce the costs and risks in relation to
navigation rights. Although at this stage both sides did not engage in negotiation
directly, these factors fostered fuher negotiation between them in order to resolve
554He was succeded by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 and the new Secretar-General continued
the informal consultations. .
555George Gadorisi, 'The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A National Security
Perspective', American Joumal oflntemational La, Vol. 89. No. 1 (Januar, 1995), p. 209.
556Some evidence of this is the Joint Statement of23 September 1989 of the Soviet Union and the
United States on Uniform Interpretation of Norms ofInternational Law Governing Innocent Passage.
UN doe. N 44/578, Annex. United Nations Division for Ocean Afairs and the Law of the Sea
Offce of Legal Afairs, The La of the Sea: Annual Review of Ocean Affairs: La and Policy, Main
Documents 1989 (New York: United Nations, 1993), pp. 66-67.
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the differences. Changes in the context of the negotiation, such as deep seabed
mining prospects as well as changes generated by the outcome of the Conference
and inconsistent unilateral claims of coastal states, eventually altered the atttudes of
both the Group of77 and the United States.
3. 1994 Agreement
The United Nations Secretary-Generals informal consultations started in 1990.
During the informal consultations, many political and economic changes occured
and they were recognised by the participants. The major ideological confict
between the United States and the Soviet Union ended and the relationship between
them moved from confrontation to co-operation. At PrepCom, co-operation between
Eastern European states and the Group of 77 weakened and the Eastern European
states started to co-operate .with the western industrialised states.SS7 The ideology of
the New International Economic Order was fading by the middle of the eightiesSS8
and the market economy was more accommodated world-wide. In addition,
privatisation was a popular policy especially among the developed countres. The
system which had been adopted for the ISA was infuenced by the ideas of central
economic planng and were shown, for example, in production control of deep
seabed minerals and technology transfer obligation. This system was therefore felt
to have become inappropriate. No state wanted a huge bureaucracy to conduct the
ISA since it would depend on member states' contributions for at least the
foreseeable futue. The developing countries' gradual acceptance of the market
economy considerably changed their thinking and this was reflected during the
negotiation.
SS7Hayashi, op. CÎt., p. 58.
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In December 1991, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Law of the
Sea Resolution, which recognised that
'political and economic changes, including particularly a growing reliance on
market principles, underscore the need to re-evaluate, in light of the issues of
concern to some states, matters in the regime to be applied to the (international
seabed area J and its resources and that a productive dialogue on such issues
involving all interested parties would faciltate the prospect of universal
participation in the Convention, for the benefit of mankind as a whole. '559
Given the above circumstances which furher developed during the informal
consultations, there existed room for negotiation of a new agreement between the
Group of 77 and the United States. The core issues of the negotiation, the deep
sea bed mining regime and the navigational rights were once again the stakes of the
parties. The practical significance of the deep seabed mining regime withn the
Convention had much diminished, but its significance in ideological terms as a
precedent for the United States remained. 
56?
The method of the informal consultations was adopted because the United States
was not a member of PrepCom and therefore the negotiation between the Group of
77 and the United States could not be held in that foru. Before the first meeting
the United States Ambassador to the UN had informal bilateral talks with leaders of
the Group of 77561 to do a preliminary investigation on how serious they were.
When the Secretary~Generals consultations started, the United States Ambassador
to the UN participated in them in his capacity as the Ambassador to the United
Nations, with no authority to enter into negotiations on behalf of the United
558See chapter 5.
559GA Res. 46/78. At the same time it urged states to ratify the Convention and to bring it into force
at the earliest possible date. This cause the United States to abstain.
560 Anderson, op. cif., p. 657.
561The number of developing states with which the United States had talks was about ten. Hayashi,
op. cit., pp. 61-62.
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States.562 His role was to determine whether the developing countries were flexible
enough to produce acceptable results for the United States. When the Secretary-
General's consultations started, there was not much support within the bureaucracy
in the United States for participation in the negotiations or for becoming a part to
the Convention.563 Bureaucrats generally believed that those pars other than the
seabed regime of the Convention, such as EEZ and navigation, represented
customary international law and that state practice had been consistent with those
norms. In addition, bureaucrats believed that 'entry into force (would) fuher
solidify the customary law status of the non-deep seabed portions of the Convention
and that the deficient (deep seabed regime) (would) have no practical effect.'564
The developing countres were ready to negotiate, however, within the Group of
77 there were two opinions. First was the view that the Group of 77 could accept
substantial modifications to find smne accommodation with the United States on the
deep seabed regime. Second was the more hard-line position which hoped to push
the Convention into force and to pressurse the United States to accept it. The 1990
Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee document, for exaple, stated that
'efforts have been made in some quarters to amend the Convention even before it
comes into force. Those who have advocated and lobbied for such premature
amendment of the (Law of the Sea) Convention have ignored the feelings and
aspirations of the people of the developing countries'.565 The United States
recognised that the Group of 77 was not ready to make substantial concessions and
as a result, the United States merely sat in on the consultations as an observer and
562Jonathan i. Charney, 'The United States and the Revision of the 1982 Convention on the Law of
the Sea', Ocean Development and Interntional La, Vol. 23, (1992), p. 280.
5631bid.
564/aid., p. 281.
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did not engage in the negotiation directly with the Group of 77 at that stage. This
was firstly because if the United States did not participate in the consultations at all,
there was hardly any point having them. Secondly, this meant that the United States
could withdraw its 'sitting' in the consultations at any time when it judged that there
would be no hope of improvement in the Convention. Its position was one of
exploring the possibilty of participating in the negotiation. This was a considerable
threat to the Group of 77 because uness it made substantial concessions to the
industralised states, the United States might leave the consultations altogether.
Even though it did not participate, other industralised states did so on its behalf.
Industrialised states, including the United States, considered that if the United States
joined the negotiation actively from the beginning, developing states might interpret
this to mean that it was wiling to accpt some minor improvements in the deep
seabed regime. Other industrialised states supported the position of the United
States in order to obtain more favourable conditions for deep seabed mining. 
566
In addition, the Group of 77 did not recognse that the United States' stake in the
Convention was navigational rights, since at the time this was not clearly visible to
them. As a result the negotiation proceeded on the deep seabed regime with the aim
of accommodating the United States' claims as much as possible. This was to the
United States' distinct advantage.
At the Secretary-General's informal consultations eight obstacles to the
international seabed regime, were put forward by the United Kingdom, Germany
and the Soviet Union.567 Topics were as follows: 1) costs to state paries, 2) the
565Doc. AACCIXCAIO/9117, August 1990, in Kenneth R. Simmonds (ed.), New Directions
in the La of the Sea (Lndon: Oceana Publications), U: 11, paragraph 22.
566This tye oflogic was said to have existed during the PrepCom negotiation. Schmidt, op. cif., pp.
303.304.
567 Anderson, op. cit., p. 657.
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Enterprise, 3) decision-making, 4) the review conference, 5) transfer of technology,
6) production limitation, 7) compensation fund for land producers, and 8) financial
terms of contracts.568 These were in fact consistent with the United States' official
reasons for rejecting the Convention in 1982. The industrialised states argued as
follows: 1) the cost of the ISA and the Tribunl would be too high~ 2) the cost of
fuding the Enterprise and its first mine site would be enormous. The advantages
given to the Enterprise over private sector consortia were a problem. In an era of
privatisation, creating the equivalent of a nationalised industry on the interntional
level, for purely commercial operations, was a problem; 3) the decisions, especially
on financial questions, should not be taken by a majority which did not include the
major industrialised countries and contrbutors to the ISA and the Tribunal; 4) as a
review conference might adopt amendments which could bind all parties, this could
cause conflicts between the amendments and states' constitutional obligations; 5) as
technology could be acquired through normal commercial means and governents
had no means of compelling private corporations to transfer technology to the is A,
obligatory technology transfer was not needed; 6) the limitation of production was
contrary to the principle of free competition and the market; 7) the compensation
fund was not necessary. If a developing land-based producer were to be affected it
should be provided with economic aid and assistance by the international financial
organisation; 8) The financial terms of contracts were too onerous on corporations,
to the point where investment might be chiled.569 The developing states were
568D. H. Anderson, 'Further Efforts to Ensure Universal Participation in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea'. International an Comparative La Quarterly, Vol. 43 (1994),
p.886. Environmental problem was also included but was later deferred.
569 Anderson, 1993, 0p. cit., pp. 658-9. D. H. Anderson, 'Resolution and Agreement Relating to the
Implementation of Par XI of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: A General Assessment', in
ZaöRV, op. cif., pp. 285-288.
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generally receptive to the above ideas because the NIO principles were fading
because of changes in the circumstances.
In April 1993, the Clinton Administration, which came to power in January,
decided to partcipate actively in the consultations.57o Before this, the consultations
had already produced general agreements about what was going to be changed and
how to change the deep seabed regime of the 1982 Convention. The question of the
form in which any agreement was to be set out was also discussed. In general,
participants were reluctat to convene the Fourh United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea,57 lest issues settled at the Third Conference were re-opened.572 In
addition, some of the developing countres, especially those who had ratified the
Convention, were opposed to a re-negotiation of the deep seabed regime because it
was diffcult for them to change so quickly the treaty which they had just ratified.573
.
An informal group of developing and industrialised countries, including the United
States, the so-called 'Boat Group', was formed in August 1993 to discuss the issues
in detal and this became the main foru for negotiations on key issues.574 In
November, the 60th instrument of ratification (including accession) was deposited
by Guyana. The Convention was therefore to enter into force 12 months later.575
Before the 60th ratification had been made, some individuals tried to persuade
heads of considerable numbers of states to ratify or accede to the Convention in
570 Anderson, 1993, op. cit., p. 662. Galdonsi pointed out that the United States Navy was undergoing
a histonc and significant downsizing. Less than a decde previously a six hundred ship Navy was the
goal of the Navy and Department of De fen se. In 1994 the United States Navy was decmmissioning
ships at an accelerated pace and was rapidly approaching 450 ships, a figure planned by the Bush
. Governent. The Clinton administration's Future Years Defense Plan called for a navy of just over
three hundred ships by the end of the century. The United States Navy would therefore have smaller
forces to deal with growing confrontations over its use of the oceas. Galdonsi, op. cit., pp. 209-210.
571Anderson, op. cit., pp. 661-662.
572Anderson,1995,op. cit., p. 277.
573/bid, pp. 277-278.
574Anderson, 1994, op. cit., pp. 887-888. See, also Hayashi, op. cit., p. 62.
575 Aricle. 308 of the Convention.
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order to make the Convention enter into force576 and some of the heads of states
agreed and these states ratified the Convention.577 The actions of individuals
prompted the entry into force of the Convention. The 60th ratification prompted the
negotiation to be conducted more rapidly in order to amend the Convention before it
came into force. In June 1994, it was declared that consultations had concluded with
agreement on the texts of a draft Resolution of the General Assembly. The
Resolution578 was adopted on 28 July 1994 with 121 in favour, none against and 7
abstentions.579 The United States became a sponsor of the Resolution and signed it.
The eight problems were solved as follows, 
580
1) Costs should be minimised. All the institutions established by the Convention
were to be cost-effective.
2) The obligations to private miners are the same as the Enterprise. Operations of
the Enterprise are to be conducted through joint ventures. States are under no
obligation to finance any of the operations of the Enterprise.
3) In terms of decision-making in the ISA, the overall power of Assembly was
denied. Matters which both the Assembly and the Council have competence, and
administrative, budgeta and financial matters need to be based on the
576Intervew with Montak Hayashi in Rome on 23rd September 1997. Mr Hayashi suggested that a
United Nations offcer and his wife were particularly influentiaL.
577Between 1990 and 1993 and before Guyana, 17 states ratified or accded the Convention. They
were Botswana, Uganda, Angola, Grenada, Federal States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands,
Seychells, Djibouti, Dominica, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Saint Kitts-Nevis, Zimbabwe, Malta, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Honduras, and Barbados. See David L. Larson (et al), 'An Analysis of
the Ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea', Ocean Development and International
La, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1995), p. 298.
578GA Res. 48/263 (28 July 1994).
579Russia abstained because, it claimed, its cost reduèing proposals to the ISA were not accepted.
Hayashi,op. cif., p. 63.
580See, Bemard H. Oxman, 'Law of the Sea Forum: The 1994 Agreement on Implementation of the
Seabed Provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea: The 1994 Agreement and the
Convention', American Journal of International La, VoL 88 (1994), Jonathan I. Charey(1994),
'U.S. Provisional Application of the 1994 Deep Seabed Agreement', American Journal of
Interntional La, Voi: 88 (1994), E. D. Brown, 'The 1994 Agreement on the Implementation of
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recommendations of the CounciL. The Assembly may either approve the
recommendations or retur them to the CounciL. The United States was guaranteed a
seat on the Council by a provision saying that 'the State, on the day of entr into
force of the Convention (16 November, 1994), having the largest economy in terms
of gross domestic product' shall be given a seat. Four chambers of states with
particular interests were established within the CounciL. They represented seabed
mineral consumers, investors in seabed mining, major exportrs of mineral derived
from the Area, and developing countries. Two, four-member chambers were to be
controlled by major industrialised states. Any three states in either four-member
chambers could block a substantive decision for which consensus is not required.
Furhermore, decisions by the Assembly or the Council on financial or budgetary
matters would need to be based on the recommendations of the Finance Committee.
Major contributors to the administrative budget, including the United States, are
guranteed seats on the Finance Committee and the Committee's decisions are made
by consensus. As a result, it would be impossible to fund institutions such as
national liberation organisations without the United States' consent. 581
4) The provisions of the review conference were dropped.
5) The provisions on mandatory transfer of technology 'shall not apply'.
Technology was to be obtained on commercial terms on the open market or through
joint ventues.
6) The provisions regarding the production ceilng, production limitations,
paricipation in commodity agreements, production authorisations and selection
.
among applicants 'shall not apply'. The market-oriented GATT restrctions on
Part Xl of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Breakthrough to Universality?' Marine Policy,
Vol. 19 No. 1 (January 1995).
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subsidy were incorporated. There was to be no discrimination between minerals
from the deep seabed and those from other sources.
7) Economic assistance would be provided, not compensation, in case
developing land based producers' economies were affected by seabed mining.
Assistance would be made from the proceeds of mining and would be made in
conjunction with assistance from international financial organisations.
8) The rates of payments by mining organisations would be within the range of
those prevailng in respect of land-based mining of the same or similar minerals and
would prohibit discrimination or rate increases for existing contracts. Application
fees were halved and the detailed financial obligations of mining organisations
including annual fees were eliminated. Financial details would be supplied when
needed by the Council by consensus.
The 1994 Agreement denied the main objectives which the Group of77 had long
fought for. These were the one-nation-one-vote system and a strong autonomous
ISA. These objectives were supported by the NIO principles and the Group of 77
had consistently claimed them as their bottom-line. The Group of 77 hoped to have
the Assembly given primacy power since it was there that the developing states had
numerical superiority. The new system effectively denied the one-nation-one-vote
system since some industrialised states have 'privileged' power to be represented in
the Council of the ISA and they could individually block any financial decisions in
the Finance Committee. The strong autonomous ¡SA was also denied. The Group of
77 originally wanted to have a strong autonomous ISA to avoid intervention by the
. .
industrialised states. Now the industrialised states substantially controlled the ISA
and the ISA had a smaller function than anticipated. On the other hand, the Group
581See also chapter 7 on the United States six objections to the 1982 Convention.
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of 77 stil managed to keep some basic principles; naely the concept of Common
Heritage of Mankind582 and the Enterprise. As a result, the preamble of the 1994
Agreement reaffirms that the international seabed area and its resources are the
Common Heritage of Manind. It was clear from the beginning of the consultations
that any solution would have to respect the approach of the Common Heritage. This
principle was not for re-negotiation, and it was not seriously questioned during the
consultations.583 In the consultations, the need for an Enterprise was questioned.
The Group of 77 wanted to have a direct involvement in deep seabed mining and it
maintained the Enterprise was the only way of achieving this. In the end, the
Enterprise was left in the Agreement, however, the terms of its operation were
changed.584 These two items were symbolic for the Group of 77. On the other hand,
the United States did not obtain complete control but now had substantial power
within the ¡SA.
When the United States signed the Agreement 10 1994 the Department of
Defense and the NOAA were very much in favour of ratifying it. Secretary of
Defense, Wiliam J. Perr stated, '(w)e support the convention because it confrms
traditional high-seas freedoms of navigation and over flght, it details passage rights
through international straits, and it reduces prospects for disagreements with coastal
nations during (Navy) operations.'585 In submitting the Agreement to the United
States Senate for consent, President Clinton stated that the 'deep seabed mining
regime ... was in need of reform ... Such reform has now been achieved. The
582When the words 'Common Heritage of Mankind' were introduced by Arid Pardo in 1967, the
United States and other industrialised states opposed the words as meaningless. When the Principles
Resolution, which contained the above words, was adopted in 1970, the United States and many
other industrialised states voted for it.
583Anderson, 1995, op. cit., p. 278.
~84Ibid., p. 285.
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Agreement ... fundamentally changes the ... regime of the Convention'.586 The
1994 Agreement also stabilised the deep seabed mining regime since conflcts
between states would be solved within the framework of the amended Convention.
4. Discussion
At this stage the context surounding the Law of the Sea negotiation changed and
as a result so did the preferences of the parties. Dim prospects of deep seabed
mining, unilateral claims of sea use, weakening of the NIO principles, breakdown
of the Soviet Union and acceptance of the principles of the free market all played a
par in altering the preferences of the pares. This changing context of the parties
and shift in preferences ha been highlighted in the previous chapter and this stage
of the negotiation reinforces the view that factors in the context of the negotiation,
including its outcomes, alter the preferences of the parties which in turn alter 1he
context of the negotiation.
This chapter also highlighted how actions of individuals can influence states'
actions. As outlined earlier, before the 60th ratification (or accession) of the
Convention was made, some individuals tried to persuade heads or leaders of states
to ratify or accede to the Convention in order to make the Convention enter into
force.587 Regardless of the size of states, states' status is equal in counting the
number of ratifications and individuals attempted to utilise ths to pursue their
interests. When individuals, regardless of their nationality, talked to heads of states
about the ratification of the Convention and when they agreed and the Convention
585Bette Hileman, 'V.S. Signs controversial Law of Sea Treaty', Chemical & Engineering News, Vot
72 (August 15, 1994), p. 32.
586Treat Document 103-39 of Oct. 1994. cited in D. H. Anderson, 'Legal Implication of the Entry
into Force of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea', Interntional and Comparative La
Quarterly, Vot. 44, (1995), p. 315.
5871nterview with Moritaka Hayashi, op. cit.
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was ratified in those states, it meant that individuals were clearly influencing policy-
makers and, by extension, international society. This means that even if persuasion
is 'personal' and crosses the boundaries of states, individuals are capable of
infuencing states' actions. Influences which lead to states' actions are not
necessarily from within the states nor from other states. They can be 'personal' and
cross boundary.
In addition, although the companies within the deep seabed mining consortia
based in the United States wanted to have the support of the governent and
although the US governent attempted to establish more secure systems for its
miners, those companies succeeded in securing mining sites at the PrepCom
negotiation by using the status of other states, namely potential applicants, to pursue
their interests. Even though the United States did not participate in PrepCom,
potential applicants, that is states to which one of the consortia's constituting
member belongs, could negotiate at PrepCom on the consortia's behalf. For those
American based multinational consortia, which state they belong to was not vitally
importt because they were able to utilse the rights of other states to negotiate at
PrepCom.
5. Conclusion
The context of the negotiation changed and this not only changed the perceptions
of the parties but also brought them back to the negotiating table and brought about
an agreement between them. The context of the negotiation is therefore an essential
part of the analysis of the negotiation. .
Influences of individuals in one state on another states' actions, as well as the
actions of multinational consortia, show that if the analysis of the Law of the Sea
negotiation is èonducted by examining only states' actions at the negotiation, as in
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the cases of most negotiation theory, or states' actions at the international arena, as
in the case of most international relations theory, the analysis is not able to explain
the whole process. A broader perspective which can explain the relationships
between individuals (within and outside of states) and states' actions is needed. This
is discussed fuher in chapter 9.
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Chapter 9 Discussion of the Negotiation Process and a New
Model
The Law of the Sea negotiation was, as shown in chapters 4 to 8, influenced by
various international and domestic factors. This makes theoretical analysis diffcult
since existing theoretical models are incapable of explaining the whole process of
the negotiation in one framework. This is largely because existing theory regards
the state as a unitary actor. This raises two issues which need to be examined
fuher. First is the issue of the status of states and second is the issue of
communication networks in interntional society. This chapter examines these two
issues and then presents a model for the analysis of the Law of the Sea negotiation.
1. Problems in the analysis of the negotiation and the status of states.
.
As demonstrated in chapters 2 to 8, international relations theory is of limited
utilty in explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation because it differentiates the
international arena from the domestic domain too rigidly. Some behavioural
theories within negotiation theory can explain communications between the
domestic domain and states' behaviour at the negotiation but these have diffculty in
explaining communication channels other than those of a 'horizontal' nature.
Furher, the influence which the context, including domestic factors, has on the
chage or shift of preferences durng a negotiation is also diffcult to explain.
International relations and negotiation theories, in most cases, treat states as
unitary actors, but this emphasis on states as t~e units of analysis creates problems
in explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation. When states' actions in the
international arena, such as the Law of the Sea negotiations are examined, domestic
factors which infuence the way states act, are ignored. Likewise when domestic
245
factors are examined, states' interactions at the negotiation tend to be ignored.
Furthermore, the influence of domestic factors within a state on other states' actions
at the negotiation, or the influence of states' actions at the negotiation on domestic
factors of other states, are also overlooked. The above problems of international
relations theory and negotiation theory are related to the level-of-analysis problem
which investigates which level or unit of analysis can best explain international
events. Although within this area of study it is generally concluded that all units or
levels are interrelated, how these can be put together in order to explain the whole
Law of the Sea negotiation process is stil left unanswered.
These issues lead to a questioning of the status of states in international society,
since all the above problems are related to the meaning of states. In addition, as the
Law of the Sea negotiation was an international law making process, it is assumed
to be a negotiation conducted only by states. This however does not correspond with
the conclusion of the level-of-analysis problem that all unts or levels are
interrelated. Therefore the meaning of states, particularly the status of states in
interntional society, is examined below.
International law making is stil characterised by the consent of states, although
the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed.588 States are considered
to have a special status in international society, and this is a given assumption in
international relations. In the 19th century, states were considered as the only legal
personality in the world.589 This has changed over the last 100 years, and
international organisations, companies and individuals have acquired some legal
588Nicholas Bostow, "Who decides' and World Public Order', Journal of Interntional La an
Politics. Vol. 27, No. 3 (Spring, 1995), p. 579, p. 582.
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personality. The status of states, however, is stil far different from others in that
only a state meeting specific conditions and gaining recogntion from other states
can be recognised as such. 
590
The most importnt element in the status of states in interntional society is
sovereignty. The principle of sovereignty was established firmly in the Peace of
Westphalia of 1648, which held that only sovereign states could enter into treaty
relations with each other.59! This principle, however, 'was little more than a legal
doctrine expressing a situation that prevailed politically throughout large portions of
Europe by the end of the seventeenth century'.592 From this historical perspective,
states' special status in international society can be said to stem from their
'legitimacy' in internationa society. This means that each state has its own
'legitimacy' as a sovereign state.593 When states agree to confer some of their
.
legitimacy to, for example, a paricular international organisation594 through treaty
or agreement, those states become subject to the international organisation to the
extent of the given legitimacy. As mentioned above, international organisations,
companies and individuals have acquired some legal status. The International Bank
of Reconstruction and Development has set up an international arbitral trbunal to
hear investment disputes that arse between states and nationals of states. Similarly,
589Michael Akehurst, A Modrn Introduction to International La, 6th 00. (London: AlIen and
Unwin, 1987), p. 70.; Gehard von Glahm, La Among Nations: An Introdction to Public
Interntional La 7th 00. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996), p. 31.
590asic conditions for a state are as follows: (1) it must have terrtory; (2) a state must have a
population; (3) A state must have a governent capable of maintaining effecive control over its
terrtory. See Akehurst, op. cif., p. 53.
.59!K. 1. Holsti, International Politics: A Frameworkfor Analysis, .¡th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.:
Prentice-Hall, 1983), pp. 83-84.
592Ihid., p. 83.
593 Akehurst noted that the meaning of the term 'sovereign' is just 'independent'. Akehurst, op.cit., p.
16. In this thesis, however, 'sovereignty' is used to identify total control over its terrtones in order to
differentiate jurisdiction from sovereignty in relation to the legal status of adjacent seas of coastal
states.
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individuals and companies in the European Union can bring claims before the Cour
of Justice of the European Union.595 These rights have not arisen because these
entities or individuals acquired the rights themselves, but because states conferred
the rights on them as a form of treaty or agreement between states. Alternatively,
they may have acquired these rights through the United Nations General Assembly
resolutions or because states' practices became interntional customary law. In this
sense, the legitimacy that belongs to these entities or individuals originates from
states. This legitimacy, conferred to them, may be withdrawn by a state if the state
so wishes, providing the conferred legitimacy has not become interntional law.
This arguent shows that, in international society, each state has special status,
namely legitimacy, and this demarcates its activities from others. The fact that states
have special status in international society suggests that the most importnt thing in
.
international society in terms of states is states' legitimacy. This legitimacy of states
is the key to understading the meaning of states in international society.
As mentioned earlier the Law of the Sea negotiation is assumed to be a
negotiation between states. The above argument suggests that states' legitimacy in
international society can be considered to be the instrument for international law
making. In addition states' legitimacy is the instrent of states' formal
communications in international society. The formal communcation is that which
shows 'the wil of the state', such as the expressed policy of a decision-maker, the
remarks of a representative, or the employment of force by the state, et cetera. The
formal communication by states brings about international law. 596
594The term 'international organisation' is used to descnbe an organisation set up by agreement
between two or more states. See Akehurst op.cit., p. 70.
595Ibid., pp. 73-74.
596As for the meaning ofintemationallaw, see chapter 4.
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In terms of the communication which influences states' actions, Keohane and
Nye argued that one of the three characteristics of complex interdependence is
multiple channels of contact (communications) which includes interstate,
transgovemmental and transnational relations. They suggested that the
communication network, which influences states' policies in international society is
not just a communication between states. The communcation network is much
wider and includes transgovernental and transnational communications.
Examination of the Law of the Sea negotiation however has shown that
communications between societies are in reality much wider and more complicated
than Keohane and Nye have suggested. The communcation network does in fact
include both intentional and unintentional communications between individuals or
groups of individuals in different states. For example, an action by an individual in a
state may influence the decision of a decision-maker in another state, which may
either alter or cause actions by that state. Put another way, the actions of an
individual may alter the formal communication of a state. Extending the point
further it can be argued that a decision-maker might be infuenced in deciding his
state's policy by reading a book or newspaper article, watching television, listening
to the rado, reading Internet messages, or talking to people irrespective of the
source of information or nationality. People in a state might take actions to
influence their own state's policy when they are infuenced by the mass media or
other communication networks. In addition, a private company in a state may lobby
another state's governent to extend the state's national jurisdiction seawards in
.
order to exploit offshore-oil in the extended area. If the lobbying is successful it
could be said that actions of individuals or groups outside the boundaries of a state
have infuenced the state's actions. Therefore the formal communcation channels of
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states are only part of a much larger communication network. Within these
communication networks states are not necessarily functioning as units, rather they
are adding legitimacy to the communication network that exists in international
society.
This view questions the concept that states are unitary actors, and that only
domestic factors in a state infuence the state's actions. It can be furher argued that
there is, in theory, no barrier between the communication inside and outside of
states. In practice, however, there are usually languge, cultural, and political
barrers which restrict the flow of communcations. When different languages are
used in different states, or within a state, it is diffcult to communcate freely. When
cultues are different there are additional diffculties. With regard to political
barriers, if the flow of information or freedom of speech is restrcted, people in the
state might not know what is happening in the outside world. In this case, although
the domestic political process of pluralist states may not be operating, decision-
makers stil might know what is happening in other states and as a result might take
actions, which are portrayed as their formal communications in international
society. Language, cultural and political barrers do restrict the flow of
communications, however, these barrers are becoming smaller due to the rapid
development of communications world-wide. When communication is examined, it
therefore becomes apparent that the boundaries of states are not particularly
importnt.
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2. A model for analysis
International politics is defined as 'the effort of one state, or other international
actor, to influence in some way another state, or other international actor'.597 Within
this definition states have often been considered as primary actors in world politics
since this view regards a state as a unit. What matters in interntional society is
what actions states take. If the communication network is considered to be basically
free, however, then the boundaries of states, at least in terms of communication, do
not have much meaning. The combination of these two observations: that states'
actions are importnt in international societ and that the boundaries of states are
largely irrelevant in terms of communication, suggests that wherever a
communication comes from, in order for it to become formal in interntional
society, it needs to be expressed as a communication of a state. In other words, in
order to add legitimacy to communications, the communications need to be passed
through a state mechansm, and the communication needs to be expressed by states,
in most cases by states' representatives or decision-makers. Therefore the state
system could be considered as the system of legitimacy in the interntional society
and the mechanism by which states give legitimacy to communications.
In terms of the Law of the Sea negotiation, when states are considered as giving
legitimacy to communications, be it of individuals or groups, the negotiation
process can be explained. Examination of the Law of the Sea negotiation in the
context of negotiation and international relations theory found three major
problems. First that distinctions between the international arena and domestic
domain are too rigid, second that the communication network is not fuly
597James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contending Theories of Interntional
Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, 3rd. ed. (New York; Harper & Row, 1990.), p. 14.
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understood, and, finally, that the influence of the context of the negotiation is also
not fully understood. If states are considered as providing legitimacy to
communications the first two problems are overcome, since where communications
come from, whether within a state or outside, is not importnt. In terms of the
context of negotiation. the study has highlighted that this is judged subjectively by
people who are concerned about the negotiation. In addition, the context of the
negotiation changes frequently, reflecting new incoming information from various
communication networks. It is therefore diffcult to determine the exact context of
the negotiation at anyone time. On the other hand, if it is assumed that the
communication network is operating freely, the context of the negotiation need not
be considered as being divided into sections, such those of the as international arena
or domestic domains. In this case the context can be regarded as being more like air,
surounding both domestic and international factors and the communication
networks, regardless of whether they are inside or outside of states. Although the
people who are concerned with the negotiation, regardless of their nationalities, may
attempt to make states express their views because states provide legitimacy in
international society, such attempts will not necessarily determine the outcome of
the negotiation. Varous other factors, springing from the domestic or international
factors or the communication network, might influence the outcome intentionally or
non-intentionally. This therefore forms the model presented by this thesis:
That states give legitimacy to a world-wide communication network and
formalise communication. The communication network operates freely. An
international negotiation is influenced by the changing context of it. That context is
made up of domestic and international factors, the communication network and the
interaction between them. The negotiation, in turn, influences its context.. 
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Within this model the Law of the Sea negotiation process is explained as follows.
An individual who believed that the resources of the seas should become the
Common Heritage of Mankind used the legitimacy of the state of Malta to bring his
personal idea into the interntional arena. The concept of the Common Heritage of
Manknd was one catalyst for the instigation of the negotiation. This idea of
polarised the negotiation along North-South lines and this divide in the negotiation
influenced not only states actions, but also the context of the negotiation from its
beginnng to end.
Although rapid changes in sea use had made the existing circumstances of sea
use unstable and were also responsible for bringing about the negotiation, actions of
individuals had a huge impact on the negotiation of the Law of the Sea. Throughout
the entire course of the negotiation, individuals and groups of individuals used the
legitimacy of states to lobby their own interests. What is importnt about this is not
only that lobbying of governents by individuals and groups influenced statesl
actions but that these groups and individuals were able to lobby policy-makers who
were not their own. As far as their interests were concerned the boundaries of states
were irrelevant and the important item was the utilisation of the system of
legitimacy to achieve their objectives in the international arena. Policy-makers
themselves also utilised the legitimacy of states to express their views on the issues.
Changes in the context of the negotiation influenced the negotiation enormously.
Prevailng domestic and international factors altered the perceptions of groups and
individuals. The changing context also directly affected states' actions via policy-
makers, and these states' actions then in turn influenced the context of the
negotiation and the perceptions of individuals and states (policy-makers).
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The system that operated can be likened to a funnel, surounded by air which
makes up the context of the negotiation. Within the air lies not only the domestic
and interntional factors but also the communication network of individuals and
groups. The communication network and context of the negotiation are constantly
interacting and pushing towards the funnel, namely the legitimacy of states. Once
actions pass through the fuel they are then considered as the states' formal
communication in the international arena. Groups and individuals utilse the funnel
to achieve their aims and out of the other side of the funnel comes states' actions.
Since the funnel is surounded by air which makes up the context, the output of the
funnel immediately influences this and as a result furher infuences states' actions.
This model can be called the state fuel modeL.
3. Conclusion
International relations theory and negotiation theory do not adequately explain
the Law of the Sea negotiation for three main reasons. They differentiate the
international arena from the domestic domain too rigidly, they are unable to explain
communications beteen the two and they cannot explain the influence of the
changing context surrounding the negotiation on it. These factors largely occur
because the theories consider the state as a unitary actor. Arguably this is not the
case and in international negotiation the state is a mechanism for providing
legitimacy to a world-wide communication network. If this view is accepted then
the differentiation of the interntional arena and domestic domain is less importnt
since international and domestic factors are constantly interacting with each other,
and the communication network, to influence the actions that states tae. The
communication network is considered to operate freely, thereby allowing
individuals or groups to interact with each other and possibly influencé states'
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actions. This further blurs the distinction between the international arena and
domestic domain.
With regard to context this is likened to air surounding the funneL. The funnel is
the state, adding legitimacy to communications, which are part of a world-wide
communication network.
What this model means in tenns of interntional relations theory is that the
actions of states cannot be judged to be solely based on either domestic factors or
the international system, they are infuenced by a far greater range of factors. It
ilustrates that there is a mechanism by which individuals or groups can alter the
actions of states, even those which are not their own, in the international arena. The
model raises many issues in terms of the abilities of interests groups, such as
Greenpeace, or large corporations, to infuence what happens in interntional
.
society. It also raises questions about the ethics of this, since in the case of large
corprations their motives may be purely financiaL. The issues of dividing states
into smaller states or merging states into larger ones would also be relevant to the
state funnel modeL. The ramifications of the state fuel model are large and outside
the scope of ths thesis. At this point it is sufficent to question the assumption that
the state is a unita actor, since the work of this thesis has shown that in the case of
the Law of the Sea negotiation this was not the case.
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Chapter 10 Conclusion
The Law of the Sea negotiation produced the Law of the Sea Convention,
including the 1994 Agreement, and is often described as one of the greatest
achievements in modem history brought about through international negotiations. If
the mechanism of the negotiation process can therefore be identified it could
possibly help future international negotiations. The aim of this thesis was to conduct
a theoretical examination of the Law of the Sea negotiation process in an attempt to
understad the process in the context of international relations and negotiation
theory. In pursuing this aim the thesis examined international relations theory,
negotiation theory and the negotiation process itself
The Law of the Sea negotiation was brought about because on intensified sea
use. The negotiation was a package deal and due to the principle of Common
Heritage of Mankind was polarised along North-South lines. It was finally
concluded aftr 27 years. Despite its importnce there have in fact been few
attempts to explain the Law of the Sea negotiation in international relations theory
and those attempts that have been made largely fail to understand the relationship
between domestic and international factors and in addition assume that the state is a
unitary actor. The level-of-analysis problem paricularly addressed the problem of
the state as the unt of analysis but failed to explain the mechanism by which the
state relates to other levels of analysis.
Similarly negotiation theory has problems in explaining the Law of the Sea. In
panicular there is diffculty in explaining how the context of the negotiation
influences it and how factors present in the domestic domain influence states'
actions.
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It was largely against this patchy theoretical background that a study of the Law
of the Sea negotiation was made. In examining why the negotiation started, the
overrding features were that of change and complexity. It was apparent that the
communication network, that is the ability of individuals, groups to influence each
other was much more complex than the theoretical base envisaged. In addition
technological development, change of sea use and a broader understanding of the
issues relating to the sea, changed the perceptions of policy-makers and as a result
changed states' policy. Prior to the negotiations states had begun to take unilateral
action and this destabilsed sea use. This action by states was also a driving force in
starting the Law of the Sea negotiation. It was not only the actions of states that
created a need for a new Law of the Sea, individuals with various interests also
played crucial role in bringing the issue of sea use into the international arena.
With regard to the major issues of the negotiation and examination of these also
reinforced the view that existing theory is inadequate to explain the Law of the Sea
negotiation. What is particularly obvious in that negotiation theory cannot explain
the fact that in the Law of the Sea negotiation the parties and their interests were not
defined at the start of the negotiation, rather they evolved over time. In addition
negotiation theory had failed to recognise that par of the negotiation, as in the case
of the Group of 77, may be carried out informally and away from the negotiating
table.
Examination of the development of the negotiation highlighted dramatically how
the negotiation was influenced by its changing context, a factor which cannot be
.
explained by existing theory. Changes in the context where multi-faceted and
changed the perceptions of states' policymakers. These then influenced states'
actions and this further influenced the context of the negotiation. This cyclical
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nature of interntional negotiations could not be explained by existing theory and it
was from this basis that the state funnel model was constrcted. What is particularly
interesting about this cyclical process is that within it there is an information
exchange for communication network that allows individuals and groups to
infuence states' actions. This communication network led to a questioning of the
view that the state is a untary actor and at this point it was possible to introduce the
idea that the state in interntional negotiation is not a unitary actor but is a
mechanism which gives legitimacy to communcations. That is, individuals and
groups must force their ideas through a state mechanism in order to legitimise them
in interntional society.
At this point the thesis was therefore able to draw to its major conclusion. Not
only was it able to conclude that international relations theory and negotiation
theory are inadequate in explaining the Law of the Sea negotiation but it was also
able to present an original modeL. The model, termed the state funnel model, closes
the gaps in existing theory and is able to explain the factors which existing theory
cannot.
The central assumptions of the state funnel model are that there is a free
communication network that interacts with both domestic and international factors
to give the negotiation context. From this context comes interests which must pass
through a state 'funel' in order to have legitimacy in international society. The
thesis therefore questions the assumption that the state is a unitary actor. The state
funel model also addresses the level of analysis problem, and provides a
.
mechanism by which all units of analysis can be inter-related. In addition to the
'main finding of the thesis other findings that were relevant to the actual Law of the
Sea negotiation process were also made. These include: recogntion of the influence
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of the Latin American states on deciding the direction of the negotiation and the
reason why they were able to do this; the existence of the implicit coalition between
the United States and the Soviet Union; the influence of SDI on the Reagan
Administration's rejection of the Law of the Sea Convention; the impact of the
provisional agreement on the outcome of the negotiation; and the fact that the actual
existence of the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 was a contributory factor that
led to the successful conclusion ofthe negotiation.
In terms of negotiation theory additional findings of the work include that
preferences of parties may change during the course of negotiation. This means
firstly, that negotiators should not set their minds on the preferences of their
counterparts at the outset of the negotiation since these are subject to change.
Secondly, negotiators should consider that a provisional agreement might begin to
operate before the end of negotiation, and negotiators should be aware that this
provisional agreement might influence the future course of the negotiation. This
point is paricularly importnt when parties are negotiating a 'package deal' because
if a provisional agreement is made the package deal might cease to' exist. Thirdly
negotiators should recognise tht the context of negotiation can change the
preferences of partes. Negotiators should therefore pay attntion to such chages
both inside and outside of their own and their counterprts' states. In addition to the
above, negotiators should be aware of what norms or rules they are using. If
negotiating parties are using different norms or rues it would be very diffcult to
come to an agreement. In the case of the Law of the Sea negotiation, there was
conflct over whether the norms of the United Nations or of interntional law
applied, and this was a large influence on the negotiation. Finally, within the state
fuel model, it needs to be recognsed that negotiators are able to manoeuvre the
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negotiation by using their own domestic factors or by influencing the domestic
factors of their counterparts.
1. Future research
The state funel model can possibly be used to explain many international
events, for example, the reason why many states are at present being divided into
smaller states. People living in certin areas are hoping to become independent in
order to represent themselves in international society and what is importnt for these
people is to acquire the status of a state. Acquiring 'independence' can be done by
taking control of an area but in order to become a state the people need recogntion
from other states. It can be said, therefore, that people establish a state in order to
utilse the state's legitimacy as a vehicle to represent their views in international
society. Contrary to this, there is also a movement of states in the world towards
integration, such as the European Union (EU). Although states who belong to the
EU preserve their legitimacy, citizens of member states of the EU are now able to
represent their views directly in the international arena without going via a state.
This is because states have conferred their legitimacy to another organisation, in this
case to the EU Even within the EU, negotiations are basically conducted by states
and the mechaism of the negotiation process follows the state fuel modeL. Even
if the EU achieves complete integration and becomes like a single state, when the
EU negotiates with other states the mechanism of the negotiation process stil
follows the state funel modeL. Nevertheless the problems of dividing states and
integrating states in terms ofthe state funnel model needs to be investigated further. .
In addition, the concept of the state funnel model is related to the international
regime. Krasner defined international regime as 'sets of implicit or explicit
prinCiples, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors'
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expectations converge in a given area of international relations'. Principles are
beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in
terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for
action. Decision-making procedures are prevailng practices for making and
implementing collective choice.598 States' legitimacy is therefore 'explicit principles,
norms, rules and decision-making procedures' because the status of states', namely
legitimacy in international society, coincides with all these factors. The relationship
between the international regime and the state funnel model therefore needs to be
examined further.
Finally, it is recommended that the state funnel model be tested by examining
other international negotiations. Negotiations which have conflcts as their central
issue, such as the Oslo Accord or the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement would
make particularly relevant research when it is assumed that all the relevant parties
have a 'state-like' legitimacy. Likewise the state funnel model in the context of
theories on nationalism is a recommended course of study.
2. Final Comment
John A. Vasquez has argued that the perception or image of the world created the
curent world and' he stated, in terms of the role of theory in creating the notion of
the world, that:
'I assume that any theory of world politics that has an impact on practice is not
only a tool for understanding, but also helps construct a world. ... The theory and
practices of power politics helped in constructing the modem world of nation-
states not only in terms of conceptualizing this world and thereby providing a
mental construct, but more materially in global institution-building and culture-
598Stephen D. Krasner, 'Structral causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening
variables', in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.) International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1983), p. 2.
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making. It helped provide both formal and informal structures that shaped
behavior among the collectivities of the modem global system through the
creation of customs. '599
In terms of the nation-state, Kenneth E. Boulding also stated that 'the symbolic
image of the nation has importnt dimensions of security and insecurty',600
however, he pointed out that nations are the creation of their historians and their
enemies.601 Boulding views the nation as only an image.602 If the curent world is
therefore constrcted based on an image, the current world might change if that
image is changed. The state funnel model questions this existing image in that it
offers an alternative view of the state as one of a mental construct which is utilised
by individuals and groups to pursue their interests.
The Law of the Sea negotiation was a long and complicated process, however,
. there are stil many problems which human beings are facing and will need to solve
collectively. By providing an explanation of how the mechanism of international
negotiation works, namely the state fuel model, the thesis has achieved its aim
599JoOO A. Vasquez, Th War Puzzle (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1993), p. 87. In tenns of
explaining international events, David Easton stated that 'what we chose to put inside our system, to
consider within its boundares, will depend upon what we wish to examine in detaiL.' (David Easton,
A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. 1.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 66.), namely it
is the 'products of analytic selecion'. Ibid., p. 65.
600Kenneth E. Boulditig, The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society (An Arbor: University of
Michigan, 1956), p. 112. See also James E. Doughert and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contending
Theories of Interntional Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, 3rd. ed. (New York; Harper & Row,
1990.), p. 142-143.
601Ibid., p. 114.
602These statements are the same as constructivism. Philosophers of science now uniformly believe
that facts are facts only within some theoretical framework. Egon G. Guba, 'The Alternative
Paradigm Dialog', in Egon G. Guba (ed.), The Paradigm Dialog, (Newbur Park, California: Sage
Publications, 1990), p. 25. See also Yvonna S. Lincoln, 'The Making of a Constructivist: A
Remembrance of Transformations Past', in Ibid., p. 79. n. C. Philips states 'by and large human
knowledge, and the criteria and methods we use in our inquiries, are all constructed.' D. C. Philips,
'The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The Many Faces ofConstructivism', Edcational Researcher,
Vol. 24, No. 7. (October 1995), p. 5. In this sense, 'Our world has never been a reflection of a 'real'
world, but a mental construction'. Clemens Murath, 'Introduction' in Clemens Murath and Susan
Price (eds), The World, The Image an Aesthetic Exerience: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on
Perception and Understanng (Bradford, West Yorkshire: Deparment of Modern Languages,
University of Bradford, 1996), p. 2. This is explained by the mechanism of human brain. Gerhard
Manteuffel, 'How the Brain Constructs Significance and Meaning', in Ibid, pp. 27-46.
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and it is hoped that the work can make a small contribution to more effective futue
international negotiations.
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